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Abstract 
This thesis proposes a methodology for constructing decision mak-
ing models in decision theory. The method allows decision makers 
to express their knowledge, beliefs and doubts about decision situ-
ations and derive from them a) decision tables, b) utility functions 
and c) probability distributions, from which optimal decisions can 
then be computed. The work expounded here is based on two seem-
ingly unrelated theories that recently emerged in the field of artificial 
intelligence, viz. argumentation theory and the theory of coherent 
previsions. Decision models can have a dramatic impact on the de-
cisions eventually adopted by decision makers. The methods used to 
obtain these models must therefore exhibit substantive and norma-
tive goodness, i.e. both have practical value and be mathematically 
coherent. Argumentation has the ability to model human knowl-
edge, expertise and opinions (perhaps to some extent intuition as 
well) and when carefully employed understandably permits to reach 
satisfying degrees of substantive goodness. The theory of coherent 
previsions offers a fully axiomatic and unified view on probability as 
well as rational decision making: we adopt this theory as a warrant 
for normative goodness. Various parts of the method are studied 
in detail and separately applied with success to decision problems 
pertaining to domains such as finance, trust computing and poker. 
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In 1956, John McCarthy coined the term artificial intelligence, which he defined 
as "the science and engineering of making intelligent machines". According to 
[Arvey, 1994], the term intelligence denotes "the general mental capability that, 
among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. 
It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. 
Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our sur-
roundings, catching on, making sense of things, or figuring out what to do". An 
important branch of artificial intelligence [Russel and Norvig, 2002] is thus con-
cerned with decision making, which can be essentially regarded as the mental 
process leading to the selection and adoption of a course of action amongst a 
number of alternatives. 
In decision under risk, which constitutes the main branch of decision the-
ory [Fishburn, 1964; Raiffa, 1968; French, 1987], a decision making problem is 
modeled by a decision table, a utility function and a probability distribution. 
The decision table represents the decisions that can be taken and all the pos- 
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sible outcomes of each decision under different scenarios. The utility function 
quantifies the desirability of each outcome from the decision maker's viewpoint. 
The probability distribution finally describes the chance of occurrence of the 
scenarios. Decision theory offers several criteria to select the best decision, 
such as Wald's maximin return, Hurwicz's optimism-pessimism index, Savage's 
minimax regret and Laplace's principle of insufficient reason for decision making 
under strict risk (when no probabilistic information is available) or the expected 
utility criterion in decision under risk (when the distribution of probability of 
the scenarios is known precisely). 
For very simple decision making problems, constructing a decision model is 
not an issue. However, in general, modeling a decision making problem may 
constitute a complex task in itself. The inputs required by decision theory are 
sufficiently elaborate and far too critical to be improvised. The construction of 
a substantively good model (having practical value) requires knowledge or even 
expert knowledge in the domain of application as well as the ability to reason 
with qualitative, incomplete and often conflicting sources of information. The 
main objective of this thesis is thus to develop scientific methods for support-
ing decision makers in modeling decision making problems. The task consists 
in capturing all pieces of information relevant to the problem and processing 
it in a rigorous and automated way, so as to eventually obtain models having 
both substantive and normative goodness (mathematical coherence). Our ap-
proach is principally based on two modern theories of artificial intelligence, viz. 
argumentation theory and the theory of coherent previsions. 
We will follow the plan described here-after. Chapter 2 introduces basic ele-
ments of decision theory and gives an overview of argumentation-based decision 
making. Decision theory is good from a normative standpoint and constitutes 
an elegant computational theory of decision making. It however completely 
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relies on the assumption that the decision maker is able to build an abstract 
mathematical model of decision making problems. Argumentation on the other 
hand appeals to concrete pieces of information: the underlying beliefs of the 
decision maker and his reasons for believing that a decision is either good or 
bad. The tools developed in this thesis are based on simple ideas and material 
originating from the field of argumentation, but their ultimate purpose will only 
be to ease the process of constructing models for decision theory. 
Chapter 3 addresses the problem of constructing decision tables. Decision 
tables encapsulate a lot of information. They show all the possible decisions 
the decision maker can choose from. They also describe all the possible out-
comes of these decisions, under all possible scenarios. In decision under strict 
uncertainty, a decision model consists of a decision table plus a utility func-
tion. The utility function is itself defined over the set of possible outcomes and 
measures the desirability of these outcomes. In decision under risk, the decision 
model additionally requires the specification of a probability distribution, which 
is defined over the set of scenarios of the decision table. Therefore, decision ta-
bles constitute a critical element of the model. In order to help the decision 
maker constructing a decision table, we introduce a logical and semi-graphical 
tool called basic influence diagram for describing situations of decision making 
under strict uncertainty. Here, we ignore information concerning either the de-
sirability of outcomes (utility function) or the likelihood of scenarios (probability 
distribution). We propose an assumption-based argumentation technique [Dung 
et al., 2006] for reasoning about these diagrams and a semantics called liberal 
stable semantics to identify all the possible decisions, scenarios and outcomes. 
An existing hypergraph algorithm [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995] is then employed 
for computing these outcomes and generating decision tables automatically. As 
a concrete example of application, we construct a decision table for the game of 
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poker [Mendelson, 2005]. 
Chapter 4 investigates the possible role of argumentation regarding the con-
struction of utility functions. After decision tables, utility functions are in deci-
sion theory the next most important element of decision models, as probability 
distributions are only required for decision making under risk. The mathemati-
cal term of utility function is normally reserved to denote real-valued functions 
representing the preferences of a decision maker over lotteries with random out-
comes [Fishburn, 1964]. We are not concerned with such complex objects in this 
thesis. Instead, we consider real-valued functions defined over sets of possible 
outcomes. A function which assigns to each possible outcome a real number is 
called a value function. Only value functions are truly needed in decision theory 
[Fleming, 1952]. We will present a method for building value functions based 
on judgements of desirability concerning outcomes. These judgements take the 
form of abstract arguments [Dung, 1995] and are interpreted as justified claims 
[Krause et al., 1995]. Some arguments correspond to claims concerning the de-
gree of desirability of outcomes. The other arguments are used to challenge 
(undermine) such claims and more finely appreciate their validity. To this ef-
fect, we develop a measure of argument strength using elements of abstract 
argumentation [Dung, 1995] and game theory [von Neumann, 1928]. We apply 
the mathematical formalism of linear social welfare functions introduced first 
by [Fleming, 1952] and later developed by [Harsanyi, 1955] and [Dyer and Sarin, 
1978] to aggregate all arguments (according to their strength) into a single value 
function. We show as an application how to generate value functions for various 
poker players. 
Chapter 5 proposes a method for assessing the probability of occurrence 
of scenarios and more generally events (sets of scenarios), by combination of 
statistical data and the opinion of experts. In that chapter, opinions are also 
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modeled using the framework of abstract argumentation and the resulting prob-
abilities are consequently given the name of dialectical probabilities. We distin-
guish between forecast arguments, whose role is to support the occurrence of 
events, and mitigation arguments, which are used to mitigate forecast argu-
ments and indirectly, to model conflicts between expert opinions. The mea-
sure of argument strength developed in Chapter 4 is used here again to as-
sess the validity of arguments. Dialectical probabilities are proved to have the 
intuitive form of maximal &contaminations: one of the most basic types of 
imprecise probabilities, introduced in Robust Bayesian Analysis [Huber, 1981; 
Berger and Berliner, 1986] in the 80s. We show that dialectical probabilities 
also correspond to a special class of belief functions [Shafer, 1976] — a modern 
uncertainty model that generalises the Bayesian approach and has allowed the 
recent emergence of many expert systems in artificial intelligence. We show 
that dialectical probabilities are mathematically coherent in the sense of [Wal-
ley, 1991]. We study their properties with respect to argumentation theory 
as well as generalised uncertainty and information theory [Klir, 2006]. As a 
first application, we show their efficiency as a computational model of trust in 
service-oriented computing. 
In Chapter 6, we use the property of coherence of dialectical probabilities 
and the theory of coherent previsions [Walley, 1991; 1996; 2000] to derive a 
practical framework for statistical inference, risk analysis and decision analysis. 
Such a framework is needed since decision theory and statistics both assume 
a Bayesian model of probability, whereas dialectical probabilities are usually 
non-Bayesian. In order to better understand the decision criteria used for se-
lecting the best decisions under dialectical probabilities, we establish formal 
links between them and the classical decision criteria for decision making under 
risk or strict uncertainty. As an application, we show that dialectical probabil- 
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ities derived from arguments based on technical analysis can lead to significant 
performance improvements in financial forecasting and stock trading. 
We summarise our work and conclude in Chapter 7. 
The novelty of this thesis is first to propose argumentation as a foundation 
for decision theory. By this, we mean developing tangible argumentation-based 
methods for obtaining a) decision tables, b) value functions and c) probability 
distributions as required by decision theory. By doing so, we hope to increase 
the applicability of decision theory, intend to clarify and strengthen the con-
nection between decision theory and argumentation and also aim at promoting 
some of the ideas and principles employed in argumentation. Second, we intro-
duce dialectical probabilities as a new type of non-Bayesian probabilities. We 
notably provide a concrete recipe for aggregating statistical data with expert 
opinions (seen as arguments) and quantify experimentally the added value of 
argumentation in two important statistical problems, namely trust computing 
and financial forecasting. Third, we explore and revisit the classical decision-
theoretic criteria used either in decision making under strict uncertainty or risk 
in the general context where probabilities are only imprecisely known. We thus 
also propose new mathematical closed-form formulae for robust statistical infer-
ence, decision analysis, trust and financial risk analysis as well as algorithms for 
decision making and robust optimisation. Finally, we contribute to the field of 
argumentation, by proposing a new dialectical measure of argument strength, a 
new notion of argument acceptability called liberal stable semantics, by showing 
how to practically derive arguments in technical analysis to forecast the prices 
of stocks and by demonstrating the value added by arguments in the estimation 
of subjective probabilities. 
Several of the results obtained in this thesis have already been published in 
scientific conferences. The results of Chapter 3 concerning the use of assumption- 
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based argumentation in decision making under strict uncertainty and the prop-
erties of the liberal stable semantics have been published in [Matt and Toni, 
2008a] at the Second International Conference on Computational Models of 
Arguments (COMMA 2008). Chapters 4 and 5 rely on the same dialectical 
measure of argument strength. The foundations, construction and properties 
of this measure have been published in [Matt and Toni, 2008b] at the Eleventh 




In this chapter, we introduce two very distinct theories of decision making in 
artificial intelligence, namely decision theory and argumentation for decision 
making. Both theories are interesting and have their advantages. Decision the-
ory is abstract, general, quantitative and fully axiomatic. It is in other words 
a coherent mathematical theory of decision making. Unfortunately, its norma-
tive goodness is not sufficient to make it practically valuable. It is probably in 
response to the abuse of abstraction in academic research on decision making 
that several groups of researchers have started to develop an interest in more 
qualitative and practical approaches to decision making. Argumentation for de-
cision making — although arguably not fully mature yet — provides an excellent 
account of what a practical and substantively good theory of decision making 
should look like. In the first section of this chapter, we provide a brief and formal 
introduction to decision theory. This part is necessary to understand what this 
thesis aims at. In the second section, we present the main ideas behind argu-
mentation for decision making and introduce thereby a lot of material that will 
be re-used throughout the following chapters. Note that some of these chapters 
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contain additional background on topics such as assumption-based argumenta-
tion, hypergraphs, game theory, value theory, Bayesian probability, statistics, 
imprecise probability or the theory of coherent previsions. 
2.1 Decision theory 
2.1.1 Decision model 
Decision theory [Fishburn, 1964; Raiffa, 1968; French, 1987] is the standard 
theory of decision making in artificial intelligence [Russel and Norvig, 2002]. 
The theory aims at identifying the best decision to take. It assumes that the 
decision maker is able to specify an abstract decision model in terms of 
• a decision table, 
• a utility function, and 
• a probability distribution. 
A decision table is a table of the form shown in Figure 2.1. The lines of a decision 
table correspond to the possible decisions d1 , 	, dm , where it is assumed that 
m > 2. The decision maker must choose one of them. The columns of the 
table are scenarios w1 , . . . , tun , where n > 1. Scenarios occur randomly and 
are uncontrollable. The set of scenarios {wi , 	, wn} is denoted St (omega) and 
called the universe. It is assumed that the universe is exhaustive (one of the 
scenarios will occur) and that the scenarios are mutually exclusive (only one 
scenario can happen). Scenarios are said to be random because the decision 
maker is not certain exactly which one of them will occur. The consequence 
of a decision is called an outcome and depends on which scenario occurs. By 
convention, the outcome of decision di under scenario wi is denoted by the 
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symbol x,,i and appears in the cell of the table at the intersection of line i and 
column j. 
wi W2 • • • Wj • • - Wn 
d1 X1,1 X1,2 • • • X1,j • • • Xl,n 
d2 X2,1 X2,2 • • • X2,j • • • X2,n 
d i  xi,1 Xi,2 • • • Xi,j • • • Xi,n 
. . 	. 	. 
dm Xm,1 Xm,2 ... Xm,j . 	.. Xmo., 
Figure 2.1: General form of a decision table. 
Situations where the number of scenarios is n = 1 are referred to as decision 
making under certainty. Decision making under strict 'uncertainty on the op-
posite corresponds to cases where n > 2 and the decision maker knows nothing 
about the likelihood of the scenarios. Finally, decision making 'under risk de-
notes to situations where n > 2 and a Bayesian probability distribution defined 
over the set of scenarios is available / known. A probability distribution is a 
function P : S2 —> [0, 1] such that P(wi ) + 	+ P(wn ) = 1. For every scenario 
w e C2, the value P(w) is interpreted as the chance of occurrence or likelihood of 
the scenario w from the decision maker's viewpoint. In the remainder, we will 
refer to probability distributions as Bayesian to distinguish them from imprecise 
probabilities studied in Chapter 5. 
In decision making under certainty, strict uncertainty and under risk, it is 
systematically assumed that the decision maker is able to quantify the desir-
ability of each outcome x,, j . Decision theory thus assumes given a function u 
called a value function associating to each outcome xi,j  a level of desirability 
E R (or simply Q or Z so as to avoid issues related to the representation 
of irrational numbers). The level of desirability of an outcome can be either 
positive (the outcome is seen as desirable) or negative (the outcome is undesir-
able). This function u represents the preferences of the decision maker over the 
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set of possible outcomes. We would for instance say that 
• xi j is preferred to xk,/ whenever u(xi , j ) > u(xk,t), 
• xi, • is strictly preferred to xk,/ whenever u(xi,j) > u(xk,/), and 
• x j,3 and xk,/ are equally preferred whenever u(xi ,j) = u(xk,/)• 
2.1.2 Decision criteria under strict uncertainty 
Which decision should be chosen by the decision maker ? In a situation of 
decision under certainty, the best decision d, is clearly the one with highest value 
u(x2 ,1). In decision under strict uncertainty, several criteria for choosing the best 
decision have been proposed. Usually, a criterion takes the form of a formula 
that allows to assess numerically the value of a decision, independently of which 
scenario will occur. The result is a score that is used to rank decisions. The most 
famous and widely used criteria for decision under strict uncertainty are defined 
as follows. We will eventually come back to these criteria in Chapter 6 and show 
that the decision criteria used for making decision under imprecise probabilities, 
and in particular with the dialectical probabilities defined in Chapter 5 relate to 
these criteria when the probabilities are maximally imprecise, or in other words, 
when no probabilistic information is available at all. In the following definitions 
and the remainder of this thesis, we denote the value u(xi , j ) of an outcome x,,3 
simply by the symbol u,,,. 
Definition 2.1. Define the security level of decision d, by s, = miny i{u,d } 
Wald's maximum return criterion consists in choosing the decision with 
maximal security level. 
Definition 2.2. Define the level of optimism of di by o, = maxy=i{u,,i} . Given 
a value x E [0, 1] called the optimism-pessimism index, Hurwicz's optimism- 
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pessimism index criterion consists in choosing the decision di that maximises 
xs + (1 — x)oi , where si is the security level of di . 
Definition 2.3. Define the regret of an outcome xi ,3 as ri,i = 	1 - 
ui , j. Define the regret of a decision di as pi = max7=1{ri,j}. Savage's mini-
max regret criterion consists in choosing the decision with minimal regret. 
Definition 2.4. Laplace's principle of insufficient reason criterion con- 
n 1 sists in choosing the decision di that maximises E j=1 -n ui j. 
As an illustration, consider the fictitious decision table displayed in Figure 
2.2, where each outcome xio has been directly replaced by the value of u(x,,,3 ). 
The calculations of the values of the decisions are given in Figure 2.3. Wald's 
criterion leads to choose d2 with maximal maximin return of 1. Hurwicz's 
criterion leads to choose d3 for x = 0 and x = 1/2 with respective optimism-
pessimism indexes of 4 and 3/2. Savage's criterion leads to choose d4 with 
minimal regret of 1 and finally Laplace's principle of insufficient reason leads to 
choose d1  with maximal expected value E73?"=„1Pjltz,j  of 5/4 under the uniform 
probability distribution (p3 = 1/n for every j). We see that these four criteria 
can disagree and lead to the choice of completely different decisions. 
wi W2 W3 W4 
d1  2 2 0 1 
d2 1 1 1 1 
d3  0 4 0 0 
d4 1 3 0 0 
Figure 2.2: Example of a fictitious decision table. 
In decision making under strict uncertainty, it is quite important to carefully 
select the criterion. The selection is usually made by looking at the axioms the 
criteria fulfil and depends on the practical decision problem considered. Eight 
important axioms for rational decision making are listed here-below. 
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Wald Hurwicz (x = 0) Hurwicz (x = 0.5) Savage Laplace 
d1  0 2 1 2 5/4 
d2 1 1 1 3 1 
d3 0 4 2 2 1 
d4 0 3 3/2 1 1 
Figure 2.3: Values associated to each decision under different criteria. 
Axiom 2.1 (complete ranking). The criterion provides a complete ranking (i.e. 
a total pre-order 1 ) of all the possible decisions. 
Axiom 2.2 (independence of labeling). The strict preference of one decision 
over another should not depend on the order of the decisions and scenarios in 
the decision table. 
Axiom 2.3 (independence of value scale). The strict preference of one decision 
over another should remain the same after application of an affine transforma-
tion of the value function. 
Axiom 2.4 (strong domination). If the value of the outcome of a first decision 
is strictly greater than the one of a second decision under every scenario, then 
the first decision should be strictly preferred to the second one. 
Axiom 2.5 (independence of irrelevant alternatives). The strict preference of 
a decision over another should not depend on any other possible decision. 
Axiom 2.6 (independence of addition of a constant to a column). The strict 
preference of one decision over another should be invariant to the addition of a 
constant to the value of outcomes under a specific scenario. 
Axiom 2.7 (independence of column duplication). The ranking of decisions 
should remain the same after duplication of a column in the decision table. 
1A total pre-order is a binary relation that is transitive, total and reflexive. 
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Note that apart from axioms 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 which are considered uncontro-
versial, the other axioms are not universally accepted by the scientific commu-
nity (the reader may refer to the first chapter of [French, 1987] for a discussion 
on that topic). Concerning for example axiom 2.5, some economists think it 
sometimes makes sense to evaluate a decision relatively to one or more other 
decisions. We also support this idea and will prove in Chapter 6 that the main 
decision criterion for making decisions under imprecise probabilities violates ax-
iom 2.5 (but satisfies all the other ones). Anyway, as Figure 2.4 shows, none of 
the classical criteria satisfies all seven axioms. It has been shown in fact that a 
criterion that satisfies them all could not even exist. 
Axiom versus criterion Wald Hurwicz Savage Laplace 
complete ranking (axiom 2.1) V ../ V V 
ind. of labelling (axiom 2.2) V V V V 
ind. of value scale (axiom 2.3) V V V V 
strong domination (axiom 2.4) V V V V 
ind. of irrelevant alternatives (axiom 2.5) V V x V 
ind. of addition of a constant (axiom 2.6) x x V V 
ind. of column duplication (axiom 2.7) V V V x 
Figure 2.4: Axioms satisfied by the four classical criteria. 
2.1.3 Decision under risk & the expected utility criterion 
In decision under risk, a probability distribution P is given. Taking a deci-
sion c/,, is then equivalent to entering some kind of non-deterministic game 
where the possible prices are the outcomes xi , i , 	, 	and the probability 
of winning them are respectively P(wi ), 	, P(Ion ). This kind of game in 
which prices are random constitutes what is called a lottery. In general, a 
lottery with prices x1 , 	, xr  and respective probabilities pl , 	, Ty is denoted 
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(191, xi; P2, x2; • . • ; Pr, Xr). The lottery associated with decision cl, is thus 
(P(Wi), xi , l ; P (W2), Xi,2 ; - •i P(Wn), X i,n) 
The utility theory developed by [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] uses 
three axioms to define the rationality of a preference relation r over lotteries 
• completeness: for any two lotteries L and L', either L 	L', L' 	L or 
both (L L') 
• transitivity: if L >- M and M N, then L N 
• Archimedean: if L M and M N, then there exists p E [0, 1] such that 
pL 	(1 — p)N 
Given these axioms (referred to as von Neumann-Morgenstern postulates) and 
a rational preference >- specified over the set of lotteries with prices in X, 
utility theory shows that there always exists a unique value function u (up to 
a scaling change) that represents 	This means that for every pair of possible 
outcomes xi and x j , xi >-x1  .=> u(xi ) > u(x j ) and that for every pair of lotteries 
(Pi, xl ; P21 X2 ; • • • ; pr , xr ) and (2 1 , x ; p2 , x 2 ; . . . ; pr' , xr ): 
(Pixl ; P2, x2 ; • • • ; Pr, x r) 	(14, x1 ; P2, x2 ; • • • ; pr, x7 ) if and only if 
Epiu(x.i ) Egu(xi ) 
In summary, assuming given 
• a decision table T : D x 	X, where D = {d1, . , dm} is a set of 
possible decisions, ft = {w1, 	, wn} is a universe and X is the set of 
possible outcomes, 
• a value function u : X —3 R, and 
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• a probability distribution P : Sl —* [0,1] 
the decisions of D are ranked and chosen as follows. 
Definition 2.5. Define for every decision d i E D the expected utility of d i as 
the value E(d i ) =E 7=1 P(wi )u(x i , j ). The expected utility criterion consists 
in choosing the decision with maximal expected utility. 
Remark that the expected utility criterion fulfils all the axioms from 2.1 to 
2.6. Axiom 2.7 can only be adopted to study criteria which do no make use of 
probabilistic information, but this is not the case here. In Chapter 6, we will 
see that the criteria used for decision making with imprecise probabilities also 
collapse with the expected utility criterion when probabilities become precise, 
thus offering a unified approach to rational decision making. 
2.1.4 Decision theory: summary 
In summary, we have seen that decisions are modeled by a) a decision table 
describing the outcomes of a set of possible decisions under different scenarios, 
b) a value function measuring the desirability of the outcomes and optionally c) 
a probability distribution describing the chance of occurrence of the scenarios. 
The decision model must be provided by the decision maker and its construc-
tion is not the object of the theory. If no probability distribution is available 
(strict uncertainty) then the best decision can be chosen by applying criteria 
such as Wald's maximin return, Hurwicz's optimism-pessimism index, Savage's 
minimax regret or Laplace's principle of insufficient reason. Wald's criterion, 
by only looking at the worst-case scenario of a decision, is safe but very pes-
simistic. Hurwicz's criterion combines both the worst and best case scenario 
and thus allows a decision maker to adapt its level of optimism to the situation. 
Savage's criterion focuses on avoiding regrets that may result from making a 
27 
wrong decision. Finally, Laplace's criterion gives equal importance to all possi-
ble scenarios. Despite their rationality (see list of axioms fulfilled), the criteria 
may lead to different decisions. Finally, if a probability distribution is available, 
then the decision maker can choose the best decision by applying the expected 
utility criterion which weights the utility of every possible outcome of a decision 
against its likelihood. 
2.2 Argumentation for decision making 
2.2.1 What is argumentation ? 
Uses of argumentation form a recent branch of logic and artificial intelligence. 
From a historical point of view [Chesrievar et al., 2000], modeling arguments 
appears to be at the foundation of artificial intelligence's understanding of rule-
based systems where rules can come into conflict. When a rule supporting a 
conclusion may be defeated by new information, it is said that such reasoning 
is defeasible. When we chain defeasible reasons to reach a conclusion, we have 
arguments, instead of proofs. Broadly speaking, arguments can therefore be 
interpreted as justified claims or objects that have the form of logical proof, but 
that do not have the force of logical proof [Krause et al., 1995]. 
Nonetheless, the concepts of mathematical proof and argument can be de-
fined in the same manner [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007], by defining means for 
expressing assertions, accepted bases on which to build theorems from axioms, 
procedures by which further theorems may be derived from existing theorems 
and axioms, and precise concepts of termination for derivation. The concept of 
argument generalises the one of proof, insofar as arguments can be derived from 
uncertain information, taking the form of defeasible rules or defeasible beliefs 
(referred to as assumptions in this chapter). This characteristic is what gives 
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them their defeasible character. Since assumptions are adopted subjectively, 
arguments can also be said to be subjective. Therefore, arguments are the basis 
of opinions and it is necessary to keep in mind that their primary role is to 
persuade, not to find universal truth. 
Research in argumentation covers a rather wide collection of topics. The 
earliest studies of argumentation are of philosophical nature and concerned 
with the nature, structure and representation of arguments [Wigmore, 1940; 
Toulmin, 1958]. In the early 90s, argumentation started to be used as a way of 
representing uncertain knowledge [Krause and Clark, 1993], to model common 
sense [McCarthy, 1990] and default reasoning [Pollock, 1992] as well as reasoning 
under uncertainty [Fox et al., 1993]. Abstract argumentation [Dung, 1995] then 
offered a unified theory of non-monotonic reasoning and logic programming. 
Abstract argumentation has since then favoured the development of logical 
approaches to epistemic reasoning [Bondarenko et al., 1997; Prakken and Sartor, 
1997; Besnard and Hunter, 2000; Dung et al., 2002; 2006; Toni, 2007; Besnard 
and Hunter, 2008; Toni, 2008]. A parallel evolution has been the development 
of logics of argumentation for reasoning under uncertainty [Krause et al., 1995; 
Bonet and Geffner, 1996; Parsons, 1997; Fox, 2003] which together with ab-
stract argumentation have strongly stimulated the emergence of argumentation-
based methods for practical reasoning [Amgoud and Prade, 2004; Amgoud, 2005; 
Amgoud and Prade, 2006; Prakken, 2006]. 
Recent results in the field of argumentation are refinements concerning the 
notion of argument acceptability [Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998; 2002; Caminada, 
2006; Dung et al., 2007] and their computation [Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000; 
Dung et al., 2007] or complexity [Dimopoulos et al., 2002; Dunne, 2007; 2008; 
2009], studies on the persuasiveness and explanatory power of arguments [Bench-
Capon and Prakken, 2006; Morge and Mancarella, 2007; Amgoud and de Saint- 
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Cyr, 2008], the design of argument strength measures [Jakobovits and Vermeir, 
1999; Besnard and Hunter, 2000; Fox, 2003; Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005], 
the analysis of strategies of argumentation [Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2003; 
Rahwan and Larson, 2008] , the design and study of expert systems and deci-
sion support systems [Fox, 1993; Fox et al., 1998; Jefferys et al., 2006; Mozina 
et al., 2007] and the automated interpretation and generation of human-like 
(enthymematic) arguments [Zuckerman, 2009]. 
Amongst these topics, some are of particular relevance for analysing prob-
lems of decision making under uncertainty. These are epistemic reasoning, rea-
soning under uncertainty, practical reasoning, the acceptability of arguments, 
the strength of arguments and the design and study of expert systems and de-
cision support systems. Our objective in the next subsections is to give an 
overview of argumentation for decision making. This will allow us to illustrate 
the differences that exist between argumentative decision making and decision 
theory. We shall recall the reader that our purpose in this thesis is not to 
provide an argumentation-based alternative to decision theory, but rather to 
develop argumentation-based tools complementing decision theory. Thus, the 
next subsections will in fact allow us to introduce basic ideas and material for 
developing new decision-theoretic tools using argumentation. 
2.2.2 General decision making process 
A general approach for argumentative decision making has been recently out-
lined in [Amgoud, 2005] and [Amgoud, 2009]. Assuming given a set of possible 
decisions D = {d1 ,...,dm }, where m > 1 and a set or language G of proposi-
tions relevant to the decision making situation and notably including D, let us 
call belief any proposition in G which is not a possible decision. The decision 
making process is decomposed into five successive steps: 
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1. constructing arguments in favour or against decisions or beliefs 
2. evaluating the intrinsic strength of each argument 
3. determining the conflicts among arguments 
4. evaluating the acceptability of arguments 
5. comparing decisions on the basis of the accepted arguments 
Arguments in favour or against a decision are called practical arguments. 
Practical arguments essentially serve to highlight the advantages and disadvan-
tages of decisions under various circumstances. Such arguments are therefore 
built both from the preferences of the decision maker (what is good or bad) and 
his beliefs. Arguments in favour or against beliefs are instead called epistemic 
arguments. Their role is to justify or invalidate beliefs, or, in other words, to 
mitigate uncertainty. 
Epistemic arguments are uncertain claims according to which some beliefs 
are or are not true. Thus, it is clear that the set of epistemic arguments im-
plicitly refers to a universe. As we will see in the next subsection, the intrinsic 
strength of epistemic arguments plays essentially the same role as the probabil-
ity distribution P in a decision-theoretic model. Practical arguments contain 
information concerning the (desirability of the) possible outcomes of decisions. 
It is as if these practical arguments were built from an implicit value function it. 
The fourth step, which consists in selecting a subset of "accepted" arguments 
has no equivalent in decision theory. The selection of acceptable arguments 
allows to simplify the decision making, by ignoring part of the available in-
formation and basing the decision comparison on the information that is the 
most credible. In decision theory, this would be tantamount to selecting the 
most likely scenario and ignoring the others, reducing then the problem to a 
very simple situation of decision making under certainty. Decisions can then 
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be compared on the basis of the accepted practical arguments only via decision 
principles. Decision principles play the same role as decision criteria in decision 
theory, viz., the one of establishing a ranking of the decisions. We ignore the 
construction of arguments at the first step but describe in detail the other steps 
in the next subsections. 
2.2.3 Intrinsic strength of arguments 
The second step of the argumentative decision making process consists in estab-
lishing and specifying preference orders between the arguments. Three pre-order 
relations 2 are required. These are noted >, to compare epistemic arguments, 
>p to compare practical arguments and >„,, to compare epistemic arguments 
with practical arguments. For any arguments x and y, the relation x > y (for 
any of these orders) can be read as "x is stronger than y". The simplest of these 
pre-orders is 	as one considers in argumentation for decision making that 
epistemic arguments are stronger than practical arguments. We now explain 
in turn the pre-orders used for comparing epistemic arguments and practical 
arguments respectively. 
One writes x >, y when x and y are both epistemic arguments and x is 
"stronger" than y. One may compare the strength of arguments either subjec-
tively, as in the view of [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969] and the work of 
[Bench-Capon, 2003], where the strength of an argument depends on the social 
or moral values that it advances — or objectively, by treating the strength of an 
epistemic argument as its probability of holding for true. Some authors such 
as [Zuckerman, 2009] use nowadays Bayesian networks to compute these prob-
abilities. Other probabilistic models are of course possible. A simple approach 
employed by[Poole, 1993; Krause et al., 1995] to evaluate the probability of an 
epistemic argument consists in decomposing the underlying assumptions of the 
2 A pre-order is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive. 
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argument into statistically independent propositions and multiply their individ-
ual probabilities. In probability theory, to say that two events are independent 
intuitively means that the occurrence of one event makes it neither more nor 
less probable that the other occurs. For instance, the existence of cats, dogs 
or other quadrupled life-forms on Mars are clearly dependent. Thus, the ex-
istence of life on Mars cannot simply be refuted by enumerating a sufficiently 
large number of known quadrupled life-forms. It is also possible to use possi-
bility and necessity measures [Amgoud and Prade, 2004] instead of probability 
distributions to assess the strength of an epistemic argument. A very general 
presentation of the mathematical properties and examples of intrinsic strength 
measures defined over numerical or symbolic scales of confidence can be found 
in [Krause et al., 1995] and [Ambler, 1996]. Concrete examples of measures 
over the interval [0,1] are: the weakest link measure, whereby the confidence 
of an argument is taken as the minimum of the confidences of its assumptions; 
the product rule whereby the confidence of an argument is the product of the 
confidence of its assumptions; or a probabilistic valuation (sum-product rule), 
where the confidence in a proposition is the sum of the confidence of the argu-
ments supporting it and the confidence of each argument is the product of the 
probability of its assumptions. 
Informally speaking, practical arguments denote justified claims according 
to which a decision is good or bad. The justifications can be that the decision 
allows or fails to achieve a desirable or undesirable outcome. Justifications are 
build from facts and assumptions. Practical arguments in favour of a decision 
are called arguments pro and those against a decision arguments con. One 
writes x > p y when x and y are both practical arguments and x is "stronger" 
than y. The strength of a practical argument is a function of two variables: 
• the level of certainty C of the argument, which depends on the overall 
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confidence the decision maker has in the assumptions of the argument, 
• the importance I of achieving or avoiding that outcome. 
The certainty level can be assessed in the same way as the intrinsic strength 
of epistemic arguments. The importance of the outcome is represented by a 
number. The strength of the practical argument is taken by [Amgoud, 2009] as 
equal to the minimum of the two values C and I. It goes without saying that for 
the comparisons to be meaningful, the importance and certainty levels must all 
be expressed on a common scale and in the same unit. If probability is chosen 
to express the certainty level of practical arguments, then levels of importance 
must also be specified by values ranging between 0 and 1. The idea of using 
the importance of achieving an outcome to appreciate its strength is originally 
due to [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969], who rather than using the term 
importance speaks of value advanced or promoted by an argument. 
2.2.4 Conflicts and notions of argument acceptability 
When an epistemic argument x is expressed against a belief p and that p consti-
tutes one of the underlying assumptions of the epistemic or practical argument 
y, we say that "x attacks y". In a similar fashion, if x is an argument in favour 
of p and the negation 	of p is an assumption of y, then we say that "x attacks 
y". The set Arg of all epistemic and practical arguments together with the set 
att of all pairs of arguments x and y such that x attacks y can be seen as a 
directed graph (Arg, att) in which 1) nodes are arguments and 2) arcs repre-
sent attacks between the arguments. Such a graph displaying arguments and 
their conflicts is called in the field of argumentation an abstract argumentation 
framework [Dung, 1995]. 
Definition 2.6. An abstract argumentation framework is a pair F = 
(Arg, att), where Arg is a set of arguments and att is a binary relation on Arg. 
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Abstract argumentation overlooks the internal structure of arguments, hence 
the use of the term abstract. In decision making, the graph of attacks among 
arguments is transformed into a defeat graph which merges attacks and infor-
mation concerning the intrinsic strength of the arguments. Note that abstract 
argumentation itself prevents the derivation of an intrinsic measure of strength 
for arguments, as having access to the internal structure of an argument is es-
sential to assess the probability of an argument holding for true. The attack 
binary relation and the preference relation > determined by the strength given 
to practical and epistemic arguments are merged into a new binary relation 
between arguments called the defeat relation. 
Definition 2.7. For every pair of arguments x and y, we say that x defeats y 
if and only if x attacks y and it is not the case that y > x, i.e. y is not strictly 
preferred to x 3 . 
This notion of defeat extends the notion of defeat first proposed in value-
based argumentation [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2002; Bench-Capon, 2003], 
whereby the preference of a practical argument over another only depends on the 
values respectively promoted by these arguments and the preferences existing 
over these values (but does not depend on their intrinsic strengths). 
Various acceptability semantics can be given, allowing to identify which ar-
guments to select to make a decision. These semantics were originally defined 
based on the attack relationship, as follows. For every arguments a, b E Arg 
and sets of arguments A, B C Arg, we write 
• a attacks b iff (a, b) E att 
• A attacks b iff there exists a E A such that a attacks b 
• a attacks B iff there exists b E B such that a attacks b 
3By definition, y > x when y > x and x y. 
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• A attacks B if there exist a E A and b e B such that a attacks b 
Definition 2.8 (acceptability semantics). For any A C Arg , A is 
• conflict-free iff it is not the case that A attacks itself 
• naive iff A is maximally conflict free with respect to set inclusion 
• admissible iff A is conflict-free and attacks all arguments that attack it 
• preferred iff A is maximally admissible with respect to set inclusion 
• complete iff A is admissible and contains every argument x such that A 
attacks all arguments attacking x 
• semi-stable iff A is complete where AU {x121 attacks x} is maximal with 
respect to set inclusion 
• stable iff A is conflict-free and attacks every argument it does not contain 
• grounded iff A is minimally complete with respect to set inclusion 
• ideal iff A is a maximally admissible set of arguments that is contained 
in every preferred set of arguments 
The conflict-free, admissible, preferred, stable, complete and grounded se-
mantics have been introduced by [Dung, 1995], the naive semantics by [Bon-
darenko et al., 1997], the semi-stable semantics by [Caminada, 2006] and the 
ideal semantics by [Dung et al., 2007]. These semantics have the following prop-
erties and relationships [Dung, 1995; Bondarenko et al., 1997; Caminada, 2006; 
Dung et al., 2007]. Here, extensions simply correspond to sets of arguments. 
Property 2.1. There always exists conflict-free, naive, admissible, preferred, 
semi-stable, complete, grounded and ideal extensions. 
Property 2.2. The grounded and ideal extensions are unique. 
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Property 2.3. Every conflict-free extension is contained in a naive extension. 
Property 2.4. Every admissible extension is contained in a preferred extension. 
Property 2.5. Every stable extension is a preferred extension. 
Property 2.6. Every preferred extension is a complete extension. 
Property 2.7. Every stable extension is a semi-stable extension. 
Property 2.8. The grounded extension is contained in the ideal extension. 
In argumentation for decision making, the attack relation is replaced by the 
defeat relation in the definition of these semantics. For the decision making 
process to take place, a notion of acceptability is chosen. We refer to the set of 
arguments deemed acceptable by the chosen semantics as accepted arguments. 
2.2.5 Decision principles 
After the selection of acceptable arguments comes the final step of comparing 
the possible decisions. Decision are compared according to decision principles 
which have the same role as decision criteria in decision theory. Principles can 
be either unipolar, bipolar or non-polar [Amgoud and Prade, 2008]. 
Unipolar principles are the simplest ones. They are called unipolar because 
they only take into account one type of practical argument, which can be either 
the arguments in favour of decisions (pro) or against decisions (con). A typical 
example of unipolar principle is the counting principle. 
Definition 2.9. d1 is preferred to d 2 (d1 d 2 ) if and only if 
• the number of accepted arguments pro d1 is greater than the number of 
accepted arguments pro d 2 , or alternatively 
• the number of accepted arguments con d1 is smaller than the number of 
accepted arguments con d2. 
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This preference relation naturally defines a total pre-order on the set of deci-
sions. Another way of comparing decisions is to compare the intrinsic strength 
of their arguments pro (or con). So, we may use a different unipolar principle, 
referred to as focus principle. 
Definition 2.10. d1  is preferred to d2 (d1>- d2) if and only if 
• there exists an accepted argument pro d1 whose intrinsic strength is greater 
than the intrinsic strength of any accepted argument pro d2 , or alterna-
tively 
• the intrinsic strength of any accepted argument con d1 is smaller than the 
intrinsic strength of one of the accepted arguments con d2. 
Bipolar principles take into account both accepted arguments pro and con. 
These consequently generalise the unipolar principles. A possible generalisation 
of the counting principle is the bipolar counting principle. 
Definition 2.11. d1  is preferred to d2 (d1 r d2 ) if and only if the number of 
accepted arguments pro d1 is greater than the number of accepted arguments pro 
d2 and the number of accepted arguments con d1 is smaller than the number of 
accepted arguments con d2 . 
The focus principle is generalised by the bipolar focus principle. 
Definition 2.12. d1  is preferred to d2 (d1 d2 ) if and only if there exists an 
accepted argument pro d1 whose intrinsic strength is greater than the intrinsic 
strength of any accepted argument pro d2 and the intrinsic strength of every 
accepted argument con d1 is smaller than the intrinsic strength of one of the 
accepted arguments con d2 . 
Note however that neither of these two generalisations leads to total pre-
orders. Sometimes, decisions become incomparable under such principles. This 
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problem also exists in decision theory (axiom 2.1 concerning the complete rank-
ing of decisions implied by any "rational" decision criterion is not universally 
accepted). 
In order to obtain a complete pre-order on the set of possible decisions, one 
needs to aggregate all arguments pro and con a decision and compute a single 
value. Decision principles that rely upon such an aggregation criterion are called 
non-polar. For instance, one may count the total number of accepted arguments 
pro a decision and subtract from it the total number of accepted arguments con. 
The weakness of this simplistic approach is that it does not take into account the 
strength of the practical arguments. Thus, a more satisfying approach would 
consist in adding the strength of all accepted arguments pro a decision and 
subtracting from it the strength of all accepted arguments con. Such a non-
polar principle obviously leads to a total pre-order on the entire set of possible 
decisions. 
2.2.6 Argumentation for decision making: summary 
We have defined argumentation as the study of defeasible proofs and have dis-
cussed the origins and objectives of this branch of artificial intelligence. We have 
then outlined a methodology for decision making based on the construction and 
use of arguments in favour or against decisions (practical arguments) or beliefs 
(epistemic arguments). In this approach, each argument is first examined indi-
vidually and its intrinsic strength is assessed, by examining either its probability 
or the values it promotes. The existing approaches for estimating the intrinsic 
strength of epistemic arguments have been briefly introduced. The strength of 
a practical argument in favour or against a decision obviously depends on the 
level of confidence (intrinsic strength) the decision makers has in its truth. It 
nevertheless also depends on the importance of the specific benefits or disad- 
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vantages shown by the argument. Practical arguments are based on beliefs, 
some of which may be uncertain, because the decision maker has found reasons 
(epistemic arguments) to question them. At the dialectical level, practical and 
epistemic arguments conflict. Such conflicts can be formally modeled by a di-
rected graph of attacks. This graph of attacks is transformed into another graph 
of defeats between the arguments. The conflicts can be resolved by employing 
notions of argument acceptability on the defeat graph. Decision criteria such as 
the bipolar counting or focus principle finally easily allow to rank decisions by 
comparing the accepted practical arguments in favour or against them. 
2.3 Summary 
We have defined the concepts of decision table, value function and Bayesian 
probability distribution and have introduced the main criteria for making de-
cisions in decision theory. We have introduced argumentation in the context 
of artificial intelligence and have presented argumentation for decision making 
in detail. In particular, we have defined the notion of abstract argumentation. 
Abstract argumentation will be used in Chapters 4 and 5 to construct value 
functions and estimate probability distributions. In Chapter 3, a special in-
stance of abstract argumentation called assumption-based argumentation will 
be used to construct decision tables. In this thesis, argumentation will be used 
as a practical foundation for decision theory, unlike argumentation for decision 
making, which constitutes an alternative to decision theory. 
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Chapter 3 
Decision tables Sz 
assumption-based 
argumentation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, decision theory is concerned with decision making 
under strict uncertainty and under risk. Decision tables are needed to support 
both types of decision making. This chapter is concerned with the practical 
construction of decision tables. Some researchers in the field of artificial intelli-
gence [Vanthienen and Dries, 1993] have observed that very little had actually 
been done by 1993 within decision table theory [Schmidt and Kavanagh, 1964; 
King, 1968; Milner, 1977; Reilly et al., 1987] to support and automate the con-
struction of decision tables. This is still true today. 
The construction of a decision table is not straightforward [Verhelst, 1980], 
for the following reasons. First, the decision maker must find a way of represent-
ing the decisions, scenarios and outcomes. Second, the decision maker must use 
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his knowledge and understanding of the domain to link decisions and scenarios 
(causes) to outcomes (effects). Finally, he shall process all relevant data and ar-
rive at a complete, consistent and comprehensible identification of the possible 
decisions and scenarios and precisely determine the outcome of each decision 
under every scenario. Good decisions cannot be made without good decision 
tables: the decision maker should not overlook any possible scenario or decision 
and must carefully examine each outcome before comparing their likelihood or 
desirability and committing to any decision. 
We propose basic influence diagrams as a tool for describing situations of 
decision making under strict uncertainty. The objective of this chapter is —
given a basic influence diagram as input — to propose an automated and rational 
way to process the diagram and construct a decision table. We propose to use 
a particular model of argumentation called assumption-based argumentation 
[Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2006; Toni, 2007] and the new liberal 
stable semantics to obtain decision tables from basic influence diagrams. We 
develop an algorithm derived from hypergraph theory [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995; 
Boros et al., 2000; Eiter and Gottlob, 2002; Khachiyan et al., 2005] to compute 
the liberal stable semantics and construct decision tables. As an illustration 
and application, we employ this method to construct a decision table for the 
game of poker [Mendelson, 2005]. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 introduces basic influence 
diagrams. Section 3.2 recalls background definitions for assumption-based argu-
mentation and introduces an extension of this form of argumentation (needed 
for the purposes of this chapter). Section 3.3 shows how to transform basic 
influence diagrams into extended assumption-based argumentation frameworks. 
Then Section 3.4 introduces the liberal stable semantics and shows that under 
some mild assumptions this semantics allows to solve basic influence diagrams. 
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Sections 3.5 presents a hypergraph algorithm for computing the liberal stable 
semantics. Section 3.6 shows how to obtain a decision table once the liberal 
stable semantics has been computed. Section 3.7 applies the method to the 
game of poker. We discuss related work in Section 3.8. Section 3.9 summarises 
and concludes the chapter. 
The results exposed in Sections 3.1 (basic influence diagrams), 3.2 (extended 
assumption-based argumentation), 3.3 (link between basic influence diagrams 
and extended assumption-based argumentation frameworks) and 3.4 (liberal 
stable semantics) have been published in [Matt and Toni, 2008a] at the Second 
International Conference on Computational Models of Argument. 
3.1 Basic influence diagrams 
As presented in Chapter 2, a decision table is a graphical representation of a 
mapping of the form T : D x S2 —> X where D = {d1, , dm} is a set of 
possible decisions to choose from, 12 = {w1, 	, tan} is a set of possible states 
of the world or scenarios and X is a set of outcomes. For every pair of decision 
di and scenario w3 , T(d,,,w3 ) = xz ,3 represents the consequence of di under 
w,. In decision under strict uncertainty, the decision maker does not know 
which scenario w, will occur or is the true one. The set of scenarios 12 thus 
represents the uncertainty of the decision maker. Then, given a value function 
U : X 	R quantifying the desirability U(x) of every outcome x E X, the 
decision maker may choose a decision by applying one of the criteria listed 
in Chapter 2 (Wald's maximin return, Hurwicz's optimism-pessimism index, 
Savage's minimax regret, Laplace's principle of insufficient reason). In decision 
under risk, it is also assumed that the decision maker knows the probability 
distribution P : 	[0,1] of the scenarios. The best decision is then given by 
the expected utility criterion, also given in Chapter 2. We are not concerned 
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here with decision making (i.e. the adoption of decision criteria and computation 
of optimal decisions), but restrict our attention to the construction of T. The 
problem considered is to identify the set of possible decisions D, the set of 
scenarios 52, the set of outcomes X and a mapping T that is consistent with the 
decision maker's knowledge of the decision domain. 
We use basic influence diagrams to model the decision maker's objectives, 
decisions, beliefs, uncertainties, the causal dependencies between decisions and 
beliefs, and the possible conflicts between beliefs or decisions. Formally, 
Definition 3.1. A basic influence diagram is composed of two parts: a 
diagram and a set of dependency rules. The diagram is an annotated finite 
directed acyclic graph whose nodes are labelled by literals of the form p or 
from a given language L. Every node belongs to one of the following categories: 
• Goals are the nodes that have no outgoing arcs. Goals may be positive or 
negative, graphically distinguished with a + and - symbol respectively. 
• Atomic decisions form an arbitrary subset of the nodes that are not 
goals and that have no incoming arcs. Atomic decisions are graphically 
distinguished from the other nodes by a square box. 
• Beliefs are the nodes which are neither goals nor atomic decisions. Be-
liefs that have no incoming arcs are called fundamental beliefs. The 
fundamental beliefs that are known to be true by the decision maker are 
called facts and are underlined. The other fundamental beliefs are called 
unobservable fundamental beliefs and are annotated with a ? symbol. 
Dependency rules may be of the form 'if p1 and ... and pk then q' or 
`q', where p1 ,..., pk and q are literals in L. The arcs of the influence diagram 
and the dependency rules must conform in the following way. For each rule of 
the form 'if pi and ... and pk then q' there must exist for every i E {1, ..., k} 
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an arc from pi to q. For each dependency rule `g', q must appear as a fact in 
the diagram (and be underlined). Conversely, for each arc from p to q in the 
diagram, there must exist at least one dependency rule 'if 	p ... then q' and 
for each fact q there must exist a dependency rule `g'. 
C is meant to be the set of all literals occurring in the diagram. Thus, 
may not be closed under (negation). Goals serve to model the objectives of 
the decision maker and correspond to properties the decision maker desires to 
achieve (positive goals) or to avoid (negative goals). Unobservable fundamental 
beliefs represent the uncertainties of the decision maker. An arc from a node 
labelled by p to a node labelled by q means that the truth of q logically depends 
on the truth of p in the decision domain. All logical dependencies are expressed 
by dependency rules. These rules are strict, which mean that their conclusion is 
certain, as opposed to defeasible rules whose conclusion is only plausible. The 
use of defeasible rules amounts to filtering out abnormal or unlikely scenarios 
and thus prevents the construction of an exhaustive set of scenarios 12. Finally, 
remark that according to their definition, basic influence diagrams may not be 
bipartite graphs 1. 
Let us now see how to concretely represent a decision making problem using 
a basic influence diagram. The basic influence diagram shown in Figure 3.1 
models a simple decision problem borrowed and adapted from [Amgoud and 
Prade, 2004] in which one has to decide whether to take an umbrella or not 
when going out for a walk. The decision maker has some elementary knowledge 
about the weather. He knows as a fact that the weather is cold and he believes 
that if the weather is cold and cloudy, then it will rain. Taking an umbrella 
guarantees him to be able to stay dry but has the disadvantage of making him 
'A bipartite graph or bigraph is a set of graph vertices decomposed into two disjoint sets 
such that no two graph vertices within the same set are adjacent. For example, a basic 
influence diagram based on the following dependency rules is not bipartite: if a then b, if b 
then c, if a then c. 
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loaded- loaded+  
if umbrella then loaded 
if umbrella then dry 
if rain then dry 
if -iumbrella then -loaded 
if -umbrella and rain then -dry 
if -clouds then -rain 
if clouds and cold then rain 
cold 
Figure 3.1: Basic influence diagram for the umbrella problem. 
loaded. 
Our diagrams are similar to the type of diagrams used in the argumentation-
based decision support system developed by [Morge and Mancarella, 2007]. 
Their diagrams also correspond to nodes connected by directed arcs modeling 
cause-effect dependencies and nodes correspond either to decisions, knowledge 
(equivalent to our beliefs) or value nodes (equivalent to our goals). However, 
our diagrams also include dependency rules, making explicit the dependencies 
between nodes. This is a specificity of basic influence diagrams. Without the 
dependency rules, the arcs of a diagram would be ambiguous. For instance, the 
arc cold —> rain could be misunderstood as `if cold then rain'. Note that even 
though the meaning of dependency rules is more precise than the one of arcs 
linking nodes in the diagram, the dependency rules on their own do not suffice 
to represent the decision problem and build a decision table, as for instance the 
diagram allows to identify the desirable (+) and undesirable (-) goals of the 
decision maker. This distinction is actually unnecessary for the construction 
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of a decision table. It is nevertheless quite useful to make a decision and in 
particular to build a value function, as we shall see in the next chapter. In 
the remainder of this chapter, we ignore the + and - symbols for goals. The 
diagram also allows us to distinguish decisions from unobservable fundamental 
beliefs. Finally, the diagram constitutes a sometimes precious graphical aid to 
the specification of dependency rules in complex decision domains. 
Our final remark on basic influence diagrams concerns the use of the negation 
symbol 	Here corresponds to classical negation. Thus, whenever a node in 
the diagram is labelled by a literal -p, it will be assumed that in every possible 
outcome either p or 	holds, and that p and 	cannot hold simultaneously. 
Therefore, in a basic influence diagram, strong logical dependencies which we 
may see as conflicts exist between nodes of the form p and -p. However, we 
do not force L to be closed under 	If for some p E L, -p does not occur in 
the diagram, then 	does not belong to L. Finally, for every -p E £, we will 
assume in the remainder of this chapter that 	= p. 
Given a basic influence diagram, we say that 
Definition 3.2. A entails q and write A F- q if and only if A is a set of literals 
of the diagram composed only of atomic decisions and unobservable fundamental 
beliefs and there exists a sequence of literals pi , ... 4), where pn = q such that 
for every i E {1, ... , n} , either pi is an element of A or pi is the conclusion of 
a dependency rule whose premises all belong to {pi, • • • ,P2-11. 
For example, in the umbrella problem, we would have {umbrella} H loaded, 
{umbrella, clouds} F- -,dry and {umbrella, clouds} I- -loaded. 
When reasoning with negation, rationality is based on two requirements, 
viz. consistency (or absence of conflicts) and closure under inference [Caminada 
and Amgoud, 2005; Toni, 2007]. These two properties are widely recognised as 
essential and we believe that a rational decision maker should conform to them. 
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When using a basic influence diagram and classical negation, it is important 
to strengthen this basic notion of rationality by adding a third requirement. 
Namely, in order to reflect the interpretation of 	as classical negation, for 
every p, -'p E G, one must enforce the decision maker to choose to believe in 
either p or —I). We call this property decidedness. Some authors [Takahashi and 
Sawamura, 2004] insist on the philosophical importance of allowing descriptions 
of states of the world whereby both p and 	hold, or even where neither of 
them holds. Such descriptions correspond for instance to logical formalizations 
of dialogues between parties sharing different views, but they are not meant 
to be taken as fully rational opinions of individuals as intended in this thesis. 
Therefore, we define 
Definition 3.3. An outcome is a subset of G. An outcome 0 is rational if 
and only if 
• V(p, 	E .C2: it is not the case that p E 0 and -'p E 0 (consistency) 
• V(p, -'p) E G2 : p E 0 or 	E 0 (decidedness) 
• there exists a set of atomic decisions and unobservable fundamental beliefs 
A such that 0 = 	 p} (closure under dependency rules) 
We call rational opinion a set of atomic decisions and unobservable funda-
mental beliefs that entails a rational outcome. 
Definition 3.4. An opinion is a set of atomic decisions and unobservable 
fundamental beliefs. An opinion A is rational if and only if the set 0(A) = 
{pEGIAI—p} is a rational outcome. 
In order to construct a decision table from a basic influence diagram, we 
must find all the rational outcomes. The search for rational outcomes boils 
down to the search for rational opinions. This can be done by assumption-
based argumentation, as discussed next. 
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3.2 Extended assumption-based argumentation 
This section introduces a simple extension of assumption-based argumentation 
[Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2006; Toni, 2007]. But first, let us start 
with basic definitions from standard assumption-based argumentation. 
3.2.1 Assumption-based argumentation 
In [Dung et al., 2006], a (flat) assumption-based argumentation framework is a 
tuple (G, R, A, C) where 
• £ is a language composed of a finite set of sentences. 
• R. is a set of inference rules of the form 
P11• • • , Pk  
q 
where pi , 	,pk,q E L and k > 0. The sentences pi , 	, pk are called 
the premises of the rule and q the conclusion of the rule. The rule can 
be read if pi., • • • ,Pk-i and pk hold, then q holds'. When k = 0, the rule 
represents the fact that q holds. 
• A C .0 is a set of assumptions. A must be such that no assumption 
appears as the conclusion of an inference rule. 
• C : A H .0 is a total mapping associating to every assumption x E 
contrary C(x) E L. 
We will assume in this thesis that all sentences in L are literals, although this 
is not necessarily the case in general assumption-based argumentation. 
Definition 3.5. A tight argument based on a set of assumptions A with con-
clusion q is denoted A t-  q and corresponds to a sequence of sets Si, . , Sin C L, 
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where m > 1, S1 = {q}, 	-= A and for every i E {1, 	, m — 1}, there exists 
E Si such that Si±i = Si — {o- } U S for some inference rule of the form tsrl. 
In other words, a tight argument A ht q is a backward deduction of q from 
A in the deductive system formed by the pair (G, R). Given any two sets of 
assumptions A, B C A, we say that 
Definition 3.6. A attacks B if and only if A' 1--t q and q = C(b) for some 
A' C A and b E B. 
In other words, A attacks B if and only if there exists a tight argument 
based on A whose conclusion is the contrary of an assumption contained in B. 
Given this notion of attack, various notions of acceptability can be defined. 
These notions capture different epistemic notions of rationality, as they can be 
used as criteria for accepting or rejecting sets of assumptions (referred to as 
extensions) in the same way the corresponding notions of acceptability from 
abstract argumentation (see definitions in background Section 2.2.4) can be 
used to accept or reject sets of arguments. 
Definition 3.7. A set of assumptions A C A is 
• conflict-free iff A does not attack itself 
• naive iff A is maximally conflict-free with respect to set inclusion 
• admissible iff A is conflict-free and A attacks every set B of assumptions 
that attacks A 
• preferred iff A is maximally admissible with respect to set inclusion 
• complete iff A is admissible and contains all assumptions x such that A 
attacks all the sets of assumptions that attack {x} 
• stable iff A is conflict-free and attacks every {x} such that x E A — A 
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• semi-stable iff A is complete where {A} U {B C ALA attacks B} is 
maximal with respect to the inclusion of sets of sets 
• grounded iff A is minimally complete with respect to set inclusion 
• ideal iff A is a maximally admissible set of assumptions with respect to 
set inclusion that is included in every preferred set of assumptions. 
The conflict-free, naive, admissible, preferred, complete, stable and grounded 
semantics for assumption-based argumentation have been given by [Bondarenko 
et al., 1997]. The definition of the semi-stable semantics for assumption-based 
argumentation is here adapted from [Caminada, 2006]. The ideal semantics has 
been introduced by [Dung et al., 2007]. 
3.2.2 Extended assumption-based argumentation 
Extended assumption-based argumentation differs from standard assumption-
based argumentation in the notion of contrary C, the notion of attack between 
sets of assumptions, and the notions of stable and complete extensions. 
Definition 3.8. An extended assumption-based argumentation frame-
work is a tuple (C, R., A, C), where 
• L, 7Z and A are defined as in standard assumption-based argumentation, 
• C is a binary relation between sets of assumptions and sentences in L: 
C C 2A x L. 
For every pair (A, p) E C, p is a contrary of the set A of assumptions. 
However, p is not the contrary of any single assumption of A (unless A is a 
singleton of course). A very similar idea can be found in the work of [Nielsen 
and Parsons, 2006] who, in the context of abstract argumentation, consider 
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attacks from a set of arguments against an argument. In these joint attacks, no 
single argument in the attacking set forms an attack on its own. 
The contrary relation C is by definition a subset of 2A x G and can thus be 
represented by a set (unordered list) of pairs of the form (P, q), where P c A and 
q E G. The maximum number of such pairs is 21A1.it1• In the next section, we 
will consider a special class of extended assumption-based frameworks, namely, 
those derived from basic influence diagrams. In these frameworks, the number 
of pairs contained in the contrary relation is in fact always bounded up by 
Nar9 .1GI, where Narg is defined as the maximum number of tight arguments 
that support a sentence in L. 
We do not require that every set of assumptions admits a contrary, nor in 
particular that every singleton set {x} admits a contrary in G. The standard 
contrary relation is a special case of the extended contrary relation for which 
every pair (A, p) E C is such that the set of assumptions A is a singleton and 
for every x E A, there exists a pair ({x}, p) E C. 
For any sets of assumptions A, B C A, we say that 
Definition 3.9. A attacks B if and only if there exists a pair (P, q) E C such 
that A' Ht q and P C B for some A' C A. 
In other words, we say that A attacks B if and only if there exists an argu-
ment supported by A whose conclusion is a contrary of some of the assumptions 
contained in B. The standard notion of attack is a special case of the extended 
relation of attack in which P must be a singleton. 
As already said, all the semantics in extended assumption-based argumen-
tation are defined as in standard assumption-based argumentation, except for 
the notions of complete and stable extensions. These modifications are neces-
sary since sets of assumptions of the form {x} (singletons) do not always have 
a contrary sentence in extended frameworks and thus may not be attacked. 
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Definition 3.10. A set of assumptions A is said to be 
• complete if A is admissible and includes every set B such that A attacks 
all sets attacking B, 
• stable if A is conflict-free and attacks every set it does not include. 
The new definitions generalise the standard ones. Indeed, any standard 
framework can be seen as an extended one and, for standard frameworks, the 
standard notion of attack is equivalent to the new one. Then: 
Property 3.1. Given a standard assumption-based argumentation framework 
and a set A of assumptions 
.1. A is stable in the standard sense if A is stable in the new sense, and 
2. A is complete in the standard sense if A is complete in the new sense. 
Proof. 1 	If A is stable in the standard sense, then A is conflict-free. If A 
does not include some set B, i.e. A B, then 3b E B — A. b cZ A, A attacks 
{b} and therefore A attacks B. Hence, A is stable in the new sense. 
1 	If A is stable in the new sense, then A is conflict-free. If x ,% A, then 
A 	{x} so A attacks {x} and A is stable in the standard sense. 
2 	If A is complete in the standard sense, then A is admissible. Assume 
B is defended by A (meaning that A attacks all sets attacking B) and let b E B. 
If {b} is not attacked, then A defends {b} and therefore b E A. Otherwise, if 
{b} is attacked, A defends B so A defends {b} and by completeness b E A. So, 
A 	B and A is complete in the new sense. 
2 	If A is complete in the new sense, then A is admissible. If A defends 
{x}, then A {x}, i.e. x E A and A is complete in the standard sense. 	0 
The next section shows how basic influence diagrams can be seen as extended 
assumption-based argumentation frameworks. Then Section 3.4 discusses the 
53 
unsuitability of the notions of acceptability defined for extended assumption-
based argumentation to characterise rational opinions. In the remainder, when 
clear from the context and by sheer convenience, we will often refer to extended 
assumption-based argumentation frameworks as assumption-based argumenta-
tion frameworks or even simply as argumentation frameworks. 
3.3 Basic influence diagrams as argumentation 
frameworks 
Basic influence diagrams can be easily transformed into argumentation frame-
works. 
Definition 3.11. Given a basic influence diagram, take 
• G as the set of all literals that appear in the diagram, or equivalently in 
the dependency rules, 
• 7Z as the set of all inference rules r''""P" where 'if pi and ... and pm then 
q' is a dependency rule and - where `q' is a dependency rule, 
• A as the set of all atomic decisions and unobservable fundamental beliefs 
in the diagram, and 
• C as the set of all pairs (P, q) such that 	E L and P 
The resulting tuple (L, 7Z, A, C) is referred to as the extended (assumption-based 
argumentation) framework derived from the basic influence diagram. 
Here G is the set of literals labelling nodes of the diagram and R. models both 
the arcs in the diagram and the dependency rules. A represents the uncertainties 
of the decision maker who does not know which atomic decisions to choose nor 
which unobservable fundamental beliefs hold true. Since atomic decisions and 
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unobservable fundamental beliefs have no incoming nodes, we can be sure that 
these assumptions are not the conclusions of any inference rule. Consequently, 
Lemma 3.1. The argumentation framework derived from a basic influence di-
agram always corresponds to a flat assumption-based argumentation framework. 
In the umbrella problem, the framework derived is given by 
• G = {umbrella, loaded, -clouds, -irain, dry, clouds, -, umbrella, 
cold, rain, -dry} 
• { 
umbrella umbrella -rain -,umbrella 	 -,clouds clouds,cold 
— 	loaded > 	dry 	dry e  -loaded rain 	cold 	} 
• A = {umbrella, -umbrella, clouds, -clouds} 
• C{({umbrella},-loaded), ( {-umbrella},loaded), ({umbrella},-dry), 
({-clouds},-dry), ({-mmbrella,clouds},dry), ({-,umbrella},umbrella), 
({umbrella},-umbrella), ({clouds},-rain), ({-clouds},rain), 
({-clouds},clouds), ({clouds},-clouds)} 
The notion of entailment H for a basic influence diagram and the notion of 
tight argument Ht for its derived framework are linked in the following way. 
Lemma 3.2. If A I- q, then A' F t q for some A' C A. If A Ft q, then A F q. 
Proof. If A H q, then A is a set of assumptions (atomic decisions and unob- 
servable fundamental beliefs) and there exists a sequence 	,pr „ E L where 
pn = q such that for every i E {1, . . n}, either p, is an element of A or 
pi is the conclusion of a dependency rule Ri whose premises P„ all belong to 
{pi, ... ,p,_1}. For each dependency rule Ri there exists by construction an 
associated inference rule 'L'°- . Define Si = {Ai } and for every i E {1, 	, n} 
the set 5,41 = Si - 	U Pn+i-, if Pn+i-/ V A and 5,41 = Si other- 
wise. Let us prove by induction that for every i E {1, 	,n + 1} the property 
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II(i) holds, where II(i) means that Si C {pi , ... 	U A. H(1) holds since 
Sl = {pn} g {pi, 	}. If II(i) holds for i E {1, 	, n}, then either 
• 23,2+1-i E A, in which case Si+1 = Si C {Pi ,  • • . ,p,•,+i_i} U A and conse-
quently Si+  {Pi, • • • Pn+1-  (i+1)} U A, or 
• Pn+i-i 	A, in which case Si+1 = Si - {Pn+i-i} U Pn-F i_i. By II(i) 
we have Si+1 C {Pi, • • • 	U A - U Pn+1_ i . Clearly we 
also have Si+i C {pi, • • • ,Pn+1-(i4-1)} U A U Pn+i_i. Since Pn+l-i 
{pi, • • • ,Pn-F1-i-1} we finally get Si+i C {Pi, • • • ,Pn+i-(i+1)} U A. 
In both cases, II(i+ 1) holds. So II(i) is true for every i E {1, 	, n + 1 }. Since in 
particular II(n + 1) is true, we have Sn+i C A. Let A' = S,2+1 . We have A' 1-t q 
(by elimination in the sequence Si, 	Sn-f-i of the sets Si where pn+i_i E A) 
and A' C A. 
If A 1-t q, then by definition of 1-t  from Section 3.2.1 there exists a sequence 
	
.. , Sm with Si = {q}, S,n = A and for every i E {1, 	, m -1 }, there exists 
Qi E Si such that Si±i = Si - fai l U Pi for some inference rule . For every 
i E {1, , m - 1} we have P, C Si+1  and since there exists a dependency rule 
corresponding to the inference rule o  we also have 2 by construction St+i H 
Let us consider a sequence pi , 	, pk, pk+i, 	, 	such that {pi, • • • , Pk} = 
A and 
(13k-1-1, • • • ,Pk+m-i • • • Pk+772-1) = (arn-17 • • • gi, • • • 1(71) 
Let us show by induction that for every i E {1, ..., m} the property II(i) holds, 
where II(i) means that Si C {pi , ... ,pk+,_,}. II(m) : Sm = A C {pi ,... , pk} 
is true. We have Si+1 = Si -Ica UP, and consequently Si C Si+1  U {ai}. Since 
ai = Pk+m-i it is clear that II(i + 1) implies II(i). So II(i) holds for every i E 
2 i-  is strictly speaking an abuse of notation as Si+1 is not necessarily composed of decisions 
and unobservable fundamental beliefs. We simply mean here that a-, can be derived from Si+1 
by application of dependency rules. 
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{1, 	, m}. We have already shown that Si+1  F- a-, for every i E {1, 	, m - 1}. 
By combining these two results we get that {pi , ... ,pk±m_ i_1} h pk+ni_ i for 
every i E {1, 	, m-1}. Since a1 E Si and 51 = {q}, we have cr1 = q. Moreover, 
observe that Pk+m-1 = a1 = q. The sequence pi ,...,pk+ni-1 constitutes a 
sequence of inferences from A to q. We conclude that A I- q. 	 ❑  
In the remainder, we will denote A F- q when A' I-, q for some A' C A. 
This abuse of notation is justified by lemma 3.2. The notion of attack for the 
framework derived from a basic influence diagram allows to capture the conflicts 
between pairs of literals p and -p in that diagram. 
Lemma 3.3. In the framework derived from a basic influence diagram and 
for any sets of assumptions A, B C A, A attacks B if and only if there exists 
E G such that A I- q and B 
Proof. By definition of an attack from Section 3.2.2, A attacks B if and only if 
there exists a pair (P, q) E C such that A' ht q and P c B for some A' C A. By 
lemma 3.2, the existence of A' C A and A' ht q is itself equivalent to A F- q. By 
construction of the contrary relation, (P, q) E C is true if and only if P ht 
Again by lemma 3.2, (P, q) E C and P C B are true if and only if B 	❑  
The following property ensures that the attack relation used the in frame-
work derived from a basic influence diagram is always symmetric. This property 
will play a substantial role in the proofs for the results in Section 3.4 (when the 
attack relation is symmetric, every conflict-free set of assumptions is also ad-
missible). 
Property 3.2. In the framework derived from a basic influence diagram and 
for any sets of assumptions A and B, if A attacks B, then B attacks A. 
Proof. If A attacks B, then by lemma 3.3 there exists q, -q E G such that A F- q 
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and B H 	Let p = 	We have --p = 	=q so B H p and A H --p, with 
p, —p E L. Consequently, by lemma 3.3 again, B attacks A. 	 0 
The framework derived from a basic influence diagram models in fact all 
the information originally contained in the basic influence diagram, except for 
the positivity and negativity of goals, which are of no importance in the con-
struction of decision tables. It is consequently possible to use assumption-based 
argumentation for studying basic influence diagrams. We now search for notions 
of acceptability that allow to exactly characterise all the rational opinions and 
by entailment all the rational outcomes of a basic influence diagram. 
3.4 Rationality & the liberal stable semantics 
We are after a notion of acceptability for extended assumption-based argumen-
tation that allows to characterise rational opinions. We may first examine the 
existing notions of acceptability and start by observing that the conflict-freeness 
of A is already sufficient to guarantee the consistency of the outcome 0(A). 
Lemma 3.4. The outcome 0(A) is consistent if and only if the set of assump-
tions A is conflict-free. 
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that 0(A) is inconsistent if and only if A attacks 
itself. By lemma 3.3, A attacks itself if and only if there exists q,—,q E L such 
that A H q and A H 	By definition 3.4 of 0(A), if A H q and A H 	then 
q E 0(A) and 	E 0(A). Thus, if A attacks itself then 0(A) is inconsistent. 
Conversely, if 0(A) is inconsistent, there exists q, -,q E L such that q E 0(A) 
and 	E 0(A). By definition 3.4 of 0(A), A H q and A H 	Thus, A attacks 
itself. 	 0 
Unfortunately, all of the previously mentioned notions of acceptability fail 
to characterise the rationality of opinions. 
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Theorem 3.1. Among the conflict-free, naive, admissible, stable, semi-stable, 
preferred, complete, grounded and ideal semantics, none is such that 0(A) is a 
rational outcome if and only if A is acceptable under the chosen semantics. 
b? 
if a and b then p 
if c then 
Figure 3.2: Basic influence diagram for theorem 3.1. 
Proof. Let us consider the basic influence diagram of Figure 3.2. We ob-
tain a generalised assumption-based framework with .0 = {a, b, c, p, —p} , 7Z = 
f a,b c 1 A = {a, b, c} and C = {({a, b} , —p), ({c},p)} . The rational opinions 
P 
are {c}, {a, b}, {a, c} and {b, c}. 0 is conflict-free but is not rational. {c} is not 
naive (as {a, c} is naive) but it is rational. 0 is admissible (it is not attacked) 
but is not rational. {c} is not stable (it attacks neither {a} nor {b}) but it is 
rational. {c} is not preferred (as {a, c} is preferred) but it is rational. {c} is 
not complete (it defends {a} since {a} is not attacked but does not contain a) 
but it is rational. {c} is not grounded as {c} is not complete but it is rational. 
{c} is not semi-stable as it is not complete, but it is rational. 0 is ideal (it is 
the only admissible set included in the empty intersection of the preferred sets 
{a, b}, {a, c} and {b, c}) but is not rational. 	 0 
This justifies the need for a new semantics, corresponding to the rational 
opinions of basic influence diagrams. For any set of assumptions A C A, let us 
first define 
Definition 3.12. A+ = {p E ,C I A I— p and there exists B such that (B,p) E Cl 
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Property 3.3. In the framework derived from a basic influence diagram, it 
holds that A+ = {pEGIAI- p, 
Proof. For any p E L, if there exists B such that (B,p) E C, then by construction 
of C in the derived framework we have B Ft -p. Thus, --p E L. For any p E L, 
if -p E L, then we can construct a tight argument B 	-p and again by 
construction of C, (B,p) E C. 	 0 
For any set of assumptions A, we say that 
Definition 3.13. A is liberal stable if and only if 
• A is conflict-free, and 
• there is no conflict-free set B of assumptions such that B+ D A+. 
In the umbrella problem, the liberal stable sets of assumptions are 
• {umbrella, clouds} 
• {umbrella, -clouds} 
• {-umbrella, clouds} 
• {-,umbrella, -clouds} 
since these sets are conflict-free sets of assumptions where 
A = {umbrella, -umbrella, clouds-clouds} 
and any set of assumptions B such that B+ D A+ must here be such that B D A 
and thus would not be conflict-free. Here, the liberal stable sets of assumptions 
coincide with the rational opinions. Note that they also coincide with the naive 
sets of assumptions. 
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The liberal stable sets of assumptions also coincide with the rational opinions 
in the example of Figure 3.2. Indeed, note first that the conflict-free sets of 
assumptions are the strict subsets of A. It is clear that in this example, if a set 
of assumptions A is such that both A V p and A I/ -.pi then A+ = 0. Such a set 
A is not liberal stable. Indeed, consider the conflict-free set B = {c}. We have 
B+ = {-,p} D = A+. So, it is necessary for a liberal stable set to be such 
that A I- p or A F- 7p. The only conflict-free set such that A I- p is Al = {a, b} 
and the only conflict-free sets such that A 	are A2 = {c}, A3 = {a, c} and 
A4 = {b, c}. For all these sets, the only B such that B+ A+ is B = A which 
is not conflict-free. Consequently, A1, A2, A3 and A4 are the liberal stable sets 
of assumptions. They exactly correspond to the rational opinions as seen in the 
proof of theorem 3.1. 
Liberal stable sets of assumptions are guaranteed to exist as long as a 
conflict-free set of assumptions exists. 
Property 3.4. If there exists a conflict-free sets of assumptions, then there 
exists a liberal stable set of assumptions. 
Proof If there exists a conflict-free set A of assumptions, then there exists a 
conflict-free set B such that B+ is maximal with respect to set inclusion. By 
definition, B must be a liberal stable set of assumptions. 	 0 
However, in extended assumption-based argumentation, there may not al-
ways exist some conflict-free set of assumptions. For instance, if in a basic 
influence diagram q and 	are facts, then in the derived framework, 0 attacks 
itself, and consequently, all sets of assumptions also attack themselves. 
We prove generally, in theorem 3.2 below, that the liberal stable sets corre-
spond exactly to the rational opinions whenever the framework has a property 
referred to as extensibility. 
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Definition 3.14. The framework derived from a basic influence diagram is said 
to be extensible if and only if for every naive set N of assumptions the outcome 
0(N) is decided. 
Checking the property of extensibility thus requires the preliminary com-
putation of all the naive sets. However, we may state that frameworks fail to 
be extensible notably when there exists (p, -'p) E G2 such that p and —p are 
entailed by the same sets of assumptions. The existence of a simple but general 
characterisation of extensibility remains an open issue. 
We have as an immediate corollary of the previous definition: 
Corollary 3.1. If the framework derived from a basic influence diagram is 
extensible, then every conflict-free set of assumptions is contained in at least 
one rational opinion. 
Proof. Let A be a conflict-free set. There exists a naive set N such that A C N. 
By extensibility, 0(N) is decided. Since N is conflict-free and by lemma 3.4, 
the outcome 0(N) is also decided. 0(N) is obviously closed under F-, so 0(N) 
is a rational outcome and N is a rational opinion. 	 El 
In other words, when extensibility holds, any conflict-free set of assumptions 
can be "extended" to a larger set of assumptions that constitutes a rational 
opinion. Hence the choice of the name "extensibility". 
We now show that in extensible frameworks, liberal stability exactly char-
acterises the rational opinions. Formally, 
Theorem 3.2. i) If A is a rational opinion, then A is a liberal stable set of 
assumptions. If the argumentation framework is extensible, we also have ii) if 
A is a liberal stable set of assumptions, then A is a rational opinion. 
Proof. According to lemma 3.4 and the definition of a rational outcome, if A is 
rational then 0(A) is consistent and A is conflict-free. Also, if A is liberal stable 
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then A is conflict-free and 0(A) is consistent. Consequently, it only remains to 
prove in i) that there is no conflict-free set B such that B+ 	A+, and in ii) 
that for every pair (p, -ip) E L2, either p E 0(A) or -'p E 0(A). 
Proof of i): Let A be a rational opinion. Assume by contradiction that there 
is a conflict-free set B such that B+ D A+. Then B+ - A+ 0, so there exists 
p E B+ - A. Thus B p and AV p. A is rational and therefore either A F- -p 
or A F- p. We know that A If p so by elimination A F- 	By hypothesis, 
B+ D A+, therefore B -'p. B p and B -'p so by lemma 3.3, B attacks 
itself. This is absurd because B is conflict-free by hypothesis. 
Proof of ii): Let A be a liberal stable set of assumptions and p,-p E L. 
Assume by contradiction that p 0(A) and -,23, cl 0(A). A is liberal stable and 
a fortiori conflict-free. Since we have assumed that the framework is extensible, 
by corollary 3.1, A can be extended to a set A' J A that is rational. Clearly, 
A' D A implies that A'+ D A+. By rationality of A' and lemma 3.4, A' is 
conflict-free and such that A' F- p or A' F- 	We may assume without loss of 
generality that A' I- p. Then A'+ D A+ since p E A' but p 0 A. This is absurd 
because A is liberal stable by hypothesis. 	 El 
Note that certain frameworks are not extensible, for instance if they admit 
at least one conflict-free set of assumptions but no rational outcome. As an 
example, consider the basic influence diagram of Figure 3.3 and its derived 
extended framework 
• L = 
• R = {P, -4} 
• A = {d} 
• C = {({d}, p), ({d}, gy p)} 
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if d then p 
if d then —p 
Figure 3.3: Pathological case of basic influence diagram. 
in which 0 is conflict-free but the only decided outcome 0 ({d}) = {d, p, --, p} is 
not consistent. Such a framework and its derived basic influence diagram are 
pathological as they do not conform to the idea that, in the decision domain, 
either p or 	holds, but p and 	cannot hold simultaneously. Thus, arguably, 
no such framework can be derived from a basic influence diagram. 
In the remainder, we make the hypothesis that extensibility is satisfied in 
the framework derived from the basic influence diagram. We will not treat the 
case of basic influence diagrams that do not fulfil this natural property. Indeed, 
without this property, liberal stability would provide all rational opinions but 
could undesirably contain extensions that are not rational. 
Clearly, the liberal stable semantics differs from the other ones. In fact, it 
relates to the other notions of acceptability in the following manner. 
Theorem 3.3. For any framework derived from a basic influence diagram, 
every stable set is liberal stable and every liberal stable set is conflict-free and 
admissible. For any framework derived from a basic influence diagram that fulfils 
the property of extensibility, every naive, stable or preferred set is liberal stable 
(see Figure 3.4). 
In Figure 3.4, \/ denotes an implication that holds in general, E an implica-
tion that holds under extensibility and x an implication that does not generally 
hold, even under extensibility. The symbols in exponent indicate the paragraph 
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of the proof below in which the result is proved. 
Semantics s s 	liberal stable ? liberal stable = s ? 
conflict-free x* Vu 
naive E1 x* 
admissible x* v2  
stable V3 x * 
semi-stable X 4 x * 
preferred E5 x* 
complete X 6  x 
grounded x 7 x* 
ideal x* X 8 
Figure 3.4: Links between liberal stability and other semantics. 
Proof. *) These results derive from theorem 3.2 and the counter-examples of 
Figure 3.2 previously examined in context of the proof of theorem 3.1, where 
we have seen that a set of assumptions could be 
• conflict-free, admissible or ideal but not rational, e.g. 0, 
• liberal stable but not naive, stable, semi-stable, preferred, or complete, 
e.g. {c} or grounded e.g. {a, c}. 
0) Every liberal stable set is conflict-free by definition. 
1) Let A be a naive set. A is conflict-free. Assume there exists a conflict-free 
set B such that B+ 9 A+. Then, there would exist p E B+ — A+. A I-
otherwise A could be extended by extensibility to a conflict-free set that entails 
p or —p and that set would be strictly larger than A, which is absurd because A 
is maximally conflict-free. So, —p E A+. Since B+ A+, 	B+ and B H 
Thus, B attacks itself, which is absurd. 
2) It is easy to see that when the relation of attack is symmetric, the notion 
of admissibility collapses with the notion of conflict-freeness. This happens in 
the frameworks derived from basic influence diagrams, as they are symmetric 
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by property 3.2. Since liberal stability implies conflict-freeness, it is also clear 
that liberal stability implies admissibility. 
3) Let A be a stable set. A is conflict-free. Assume by contradiction, that 
there exists a conflict-free set B such that B+ A+. A does not include B, as 
we would otherwise have B+ C A+. Thus, by stability, A attacks B. So there 
exists p E G such that p E A+ and -'p E B+. Since B+ A+, p E B+ so B 
attacks itself, which is absurd. 
5) Preferred sets are defined as maximally admissible and by symmetry 
(property 3.2) actually coincide with the maximally conflict-free (naive) ones. 
The proof of 1) allows us to conclude that preferred sets are liberal stable. 
6) Consider the basic influence diagram of Figure 3.5 and its derived frame-
work where 
• .0 = la, b,x,p, 
• A = {a,b,x} and 
• C = {({z},{-14),({b},{19}), ({a,19},{1)})}. 
 
p+ 
   
if x then p 
if b then -'p 
if a and b then 
  
a? 	 b? 
    
Figure 3.5: Basic influence diagram where a complete set of assumptions is not 
liberal stable. 
Here {a} is not attacked, so it is admissible. {a} does not attack any set, so 
the only sets it defends are the sets of assumptions that are not attacked. The 
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sets {x} and {b} and their supersets of assumptions are all attacked. Therefore, 
{a} is complete. However, it is not liberal stable since {a}+ = 0 C {b}+ and 
{b} is conflict-free. 
7) In the same framework as in 6), note that all complete sets must in-
clude {a} (which is not attacked) and therefore A = {a} is minimally complete 
(grounded). However, A is not liberal stable, as proved in 6). 
4) Semi-stable sets must be complete. In the same framework as in 6), all 
complete sets contain a. So, {x} is neither complete nor semi-stable. However, 
{x} is liberal stable, since it is conflict-free and any set B such that B+ D 
{x}+ = {p} would be such that B+ = {p, —p} and by lemma 3.3 would not be 
conflict-free. 
8) Consider again the basic influence diagram of Figure 3.2 and its derived 
framework, where 
• 	G = fa, b, c, p, 
• _ ,b c 
P 
• A = {a, b, c} and 
• C = f(fa, 	({c}, p)}. 
By symmetry of the framework (property 3.2) the admissible sets of assumptions 
correspond to the conflict-free sets of assumptions. Therefore, the preferred sets 
of assumptions correspond to the naive sets of assumptions. The preferred sets 
are thus {a, b}, {c, a} and {c, b}. Ideal sets must be admissible and contained in 
the intersection {a, b} fl {c, a} n {c, b} = 0. So, the only ideal set of assumptions 
is 0 but 0 is not liberal stable. 	 ❑  
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3.5 Computing the liberal stable semantics 
We have shown in the previous theorem 3.3 that, under extensibility, every naive 
set of assumptions is liberal stable. In fact, we will see that the liberal stable 
sets of assumptions can easily be computed from the naive sets of assumptions. 
First, we explain how to compute the naive sets of assumptions using known 
results from hypergraph theory. 
3.5.1 Computing the naive semantics 
Let V be a finite set and let us refer to its elements as vertexes. In hypergraph 
theory [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995; Boros et al., 2000; Eiter and Gottlob, 2002; 
Khachiyan et al., 2005], one defines a hyperedge as a subset of V. A hypergraph 
is a pair (V, 7-1) where 7-1 is a set of hyperedges. A vertex set S C V is said 
independent if it does not include any hyperedge of R. Given the framework 
(G, 7Z, A, C) derived from a basic influence diagram, we consider the hypergraph 
where V = A and is the set of minimally conflicting sets of assumptions with 
respect to set inclusion. A set of assumptions is said to be conflicting when it 
attacks itself. This set of hyperedges 7-1 is obtained using Algorithm 1 below. 
Algorithm 1 Computes the set 7-1 of minimally conflicting sets given as input 
an extended assumption-based argumentation framework (C,72., A, C) derived 
from a basic influence diagram. 
1: Initialise: 
2: for every pair of the form (p, -'p) E ,C2 do 
3: for every A, B C A such that A 1-t p and B 
4: 1-( <—'1-N{AuB} 
5: end for 
6: end for 
7: remove from 7-i all its non minimal elements 
8: return 7-1 
--p do 
This algorithm is correct since sets of assumptions X that attack themselves 
are such that there exists p, 	E G such that A I--t p and B 1-t -p for some 
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A, B C X. At line 7, all conflicting sets that are not minimal are removed. 
In the example of Figure 3.2, the tight arguments considered are {a, b} Ht p 
and {c} H -p so 1-t = {{a, b, c}}. In the umbrella problem of Figure 3.1, the 
tight arguments are 
• {umbrella} Ht umbrella, 
• {umbrella} ht loaded, 
• {umbrella} Ft dry, 
• {-clouds} Ht dry, 
• {--clouds} Ft 
• {-clouds} Ht -clouds, 
• {clouds} Ht clouds, 
• {clouds} ht rain, 
• {-umbrella} Ht -umbrella, 
• {-umbrella} Ht -,loaded and 
• {-umbrella, clouds} ht -dry. 
The conflicting sets computed after the end of the loop in line 6 are 
• {umbrella, -umbrella}, 
• {umbrella, -umbrella, clouds}, 
• {-clouds, clouds} and 
• {-umbrella, clouds, clouds}. 
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After elimination of the non-minimal sets, we are left with 
= {{umbrella, —umbrella}, {—clouds, clouds}} 
Observe that the conflict-free sets of assumptions correspond exactly to 
the independent sets of the hypergraph obtained from the derived framework. 
Therefore, trivially: 
Lemma 3.5. The naive sets of assumptions correspond exactly to the maximal 
independent sets of the hypergraph (V, 7-c), where V = A and H is the set of 
minimally conflicting sets of assumptions in the framework (C,R., A, C) derived 
from a basic influence diagram. 
The problem of finding the set 1(7-1) of all maximal independent sets of a 
hypergraph has been tackled in the literature on hypergraphs [Eiter and Gottlob, 
1995; Boros et al., 2000; Khachiyan et al., 2005]. We can use Algorithm 2 below 
to compute /(7-1) and thus compute the naive semantics. The algorithm involves 
objects called transverses of 71, which are sets of vertexes that intersect every 
hyperedge of H. A transverse is called minimal if no strict subset of it is a 
transverse. The set of all minimal transverses of 7-1 is denoted Tr(R). For every 
transverse T, T denotes the complement V — T. 
After line 13 of the algorithm, g is equal to Tr(H) as this part of the al-
gorithm corresponds to the algorithm proposed by [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995] to 
compute the set of all minimal transverse of a hypergraph. This part of the 
program (still up to line 13) can alternatively be replaced by the algorithm of 
[Boros et al., 2000]. At line 14, 1(7-l) is equal to the complement of Tr(N) and 
according to [Khachiyan et al., 2005] is equal to the set 1(7-1) of all maximal 
independent sets of H. The maximal independent sets of the argumentation 
hypergraph exactly corresponds to the set of naive sets of assumptions, as sane- 
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Algorithm 2 Computes the set Al of all naive sets of assumptions given as 
input the hypergraph (V,11), where V = A and 	is the set of all minimally 
conflicting sets of A in the extended framework (G, R., A, C) derived from a basic 
influence diagram. 
1: k4- max(IEI: E E 7-l);04- 0 
2: loop 
3: if 5T E 2v , 121 < k:T ETr(G)AT V then 
4: reduce T to a minimal transverse T1  
5: else 
6: if 3gi 	g, igii =k+1:VEcg:E 
then 
{xlx E V, RE E g', x e > 1} 
7: reduce {XIX E 	E gl ,X E > 1} to a minimal transverse 
8: else 
9: exit loop 
10: end if 
i 
11: egn÷_d igf 
12: 
u 
 {Ti ); 
13: endloop 
14: I(H) <— {V — HRH E g} 
15: Ar 
16: return N- 
tioned by lemma 3.5. Thus Algorithm 2 is correct. 
This algorithm has been implemented in Maple version 9.5. In the ex- 
ample of Figure 3.2, we have V = {a, b, c} and 	= {{a, b, c}}. We obtain 
the naive sets N- = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}. In the umbrella problem, we have 
V = {umbrella, —umbrella, clouds, —clouds} and the set of hyperedges 	= 
{{umbrella, —umbrella}, {clouds, —,clouds}}. We obtain Al = {{umbrella, clouds}, 
{umbrella, clouds}, {—umbrella, clouds}, {—umbrella, —clouds}}. 
3.5.2 From the naive to the liberal stable semantics 
In the remainder, we assume that the argumentation framework obtained by 
translation of the basic influence diagram satisfies the property of extensibility. 
Then, by theorem 3.3, we know that every naive set of assumptions is liberal 
stable. The potentially remaining liberal stable sets can then be identified by 
exploiting the following theorem. 
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Theorem 3.4. Under extensibility, A is liberal stable if and only if there exists 
a naive set of assumptions N such that A C N and A+ = N+. 
Proof. Let A be a liberal stable set of assumptions. A is conflict-free, so there 
exists a naive set N such that A C N. This implies A+ C N+. By liberal 
stability, it is impossible that A+ C N+, so A+ = N+. 
Conversely, assume that A is a set of assumptions such that A C N and 
A+ = N+ where N is a naive set. Since N is conflict-free and A C N, A is also 
conflict-free. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a conflict-free set B 
such that B+ A+. Since A+ = N+, we have B+ D N+. Clearly, B+ cannot 
be empty, which implies that there exists at least one literal q E G (entailed by 
B) such that 	E L. By extensibility, since N is naive, 0(N) is decided, but 
then there must exist a pair (p, —np) E L2 such that B p and B —p. Thus, B 
attacks itself, which is absurd. 	 0 
The set of liberal stable sets of assumptions can be consequently derived 
from the set of naive sets of assumptions by using Algorithm 3 below. 
Algorithm 3 Computes the set S of all liberal stable sets of assumptions, given 
as input the set .Ar of all naive sets of assumptions in an extensible framework 
derived from a basic influence diagram. 
1: Initialise: S <- 
2: for every N E N do 
3: C N+ and k I C I 
4: for every pi E {731, • • • > plc} = C do 
5: Rj 	{Pi,j 	1--t pi , 	c N} 
6: end for 
7: for every (P.,i, ...,P.,k) E R1 x 	x Rk do 
8: P <— P.,1 U ...0 Pe,k 
9: S<—SU{XIPCXCN} 
10: end for 
11: end for 
12: return S 
This algorithm finds all the conflict-free sets A such that A+ = N+ and 
A C N for some naive set of assumptions N. For each such N, it first computes 
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N+ (line 3) and gathers all the subsets of N (guaranteed to be conflict-free) 
supporting any argument with conclusion p E N+ for every p E N+ (lines 4 to 
6). The sets P obtained in line 8 fulfill P+ D N+ by construction, and are in 
fact such that P+ = N+ since P C N implies P+ C N. Under extensibility, 
the previous theorem 3.4 guarantees that S corresponds exactly to the set of all 
liberal stable sets of assumptions. Thus, Algorithm 3 is correct. 
In the example of Figure 3.2, the naive sets of assumptions are N1 = {a, b}, 
N2 = {b, c} and N3 = {a, c}. We have Ni = {p}, N2 = {-ip} and Arl- = {gyp}. 
The only tight argument supporting p is {a, b} Ft  p and the only tight argument 
	
supporting 	is {c} 1-t -p. Therefore the liberal stable sets are all the sets of 
assumptions that contain either {a, b} or {c} but not both. These are {a, b}, 
{c}, {b, c} and {a, c}. Here, {c} is liberal stable and its outcome is rational, 
although {c} is not naive. 
As shown at the end of Section 3.5.1 for the umbrella problem, the naive 
sets of assumptions are 
• N1  = {umbrella, clouds}, 
• N2 = {umbrella, -clouds}, 
• N3 = {-, umbrella, clouds} and 
• N4 = 	 -clouds}. 
We have then 
• Ni = {umbrella, clouds, loaded, rain, dry}, 
• .Al2 = {umbrella, -clouds, loaded, -rrain, dry}, 
• Ail- = {umbrella, clouds, -loaded, rain, -idry} and 
• ATI- = {-mmbrella, -clouds, -rloaded, rain, dry}. 
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The tight arguments are 
• {umbrella} Ft umbrella, 
• {umbrella} Ft loaded, 
• {umbrella} F dry, 
• {clouds} Ft dry, 
• {-clouds} Ft -rain, 
• {-clouds} Ft -clouds, 
• {clouds} Ft clouds, 
• {clouds} Ft rain, 
• {-umbrella} Ft -umbrella, 
• {-umbrella} Ft -loaded and 
• {-umbrella, clouds} Ft -dry. 
The liberal stable sets are 
• {umbrella, clouds}, 
• { umbrella, -clouds}, 
• {-umbrella, clouds} and 
• {-umbrella, -clouds}. 
Here, the liberal stable sets exactly coincide with the naive sets, as already 
observed in Section 3.4. More generally, we have 
Property 3.5. In an extensible framework (G, R, A, C) derived from a basic 
influence diagram, if the set of assumptions A is closed under 	then the liberal 
stable sets of assumptions correspond to the naive sets of assumptions. 
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Proof. By theorem 3.4, a set of assumptions A is liberal stable if and only if 
there exists a naive set N of assumptions such that A C N and A+ = N+. 
When A is closed under and for any set of assumptions X C A, if x E X, 
then x E X+. Since the framework (G, 7Z, A, C) derived from a basic influence 
diagram is always flat by lemma 3.1, for any set of assumptions A, if A C N, 
then A+ C N+. Thus, any liberal stable set A must be such that A = N for 
some naive set N of assumptions. Conversely, we know by theorem 3.3 that 
under extensibility every naive set of assumptions is liberal stable. 	0 
In such situations, it is perfectly unnecessary to use Algorithm 3, as the 
naive sets of assumptions are already given by Algorithm 2. 
3.6 Computing decision tables 
Having computed the liberal stable semantics, we finally may generate a full 
decision table. The scenarios can be simply obtained by considering the un-
observable fundamental beliefs that underlie the possible outcomes. Denoting 
by B the set of unobservable fundamental beliefs in the basic influence dia-
gram and S the set of liberal stable sets of assumptions of the derived extended 
assumption-based argumentation framework, 
Definition 3.15. The set of scenarios or universe is 
11={w1w=SnB,SES} 
Note that each scenario w is a set (of unobservable fundamental beliefs) and 
the universe 1/ is a set of sets. 
The possible decisions correspond to the sets of atomic decisions X which 
always lead to a rational outcome (given by the liberal stable sets of assump- 
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tions), no matter the scenario w E St that occurs. Thus, if we denote by A the 
set of atomic decisions of the basic influence diagram, then 
Definition 3.16. The set of possible decisions is 
D={XIX CA,VwESI:XUwES} 
Possible decisions that contain more than one atomic decision are interpreted 
as combined decisions. Combined decisions are practically 'possible' in the sense 
that they always lead to a rational outcome, no matter the scenario which oc-
curs. Good decisions in practise often need to be the combination of elementary 
(atomic) decisions 3. 
Finally, the outcome T (d, w) of every possible decision d E D and scenario 
w E SI is given by the set of all literals entailed by d and w. Thus, 
Definition 3.17. The decision table T : D x S2 is defined V (d, w) G D x SI as 
T(d,w) = {pi p E G,dU w p} 
In the example of Figure 3.2, we have S = {{a, b}, {c}, {b, 	{a, c}}, B = {b} 
and A = {a, c} . Thus 12 = {{b}, 0}, D = {{c}} and T as shown in the decision 
table of Figure 3.6. 
W1 = 0 
	 W2 = {b} 
d1 = {c} T(di, wi) = {c, —13} T (di , w2 ) = 1c, b, 
Figure 3.6: Decision table for the example of Figure 3.2. 
In the umbrella problem, the liberal stable sets are S = {S1, S2, S3, S4} with 
S1 = {umbrella, clouds}, 52 = {umbrella, —clouds}, S3 = 	 clouds} 
3 For instance, a doctor may choose to prescribe two drugs in combination in order to cure 
a patient and prevent the manifestation of undesirable secondary effects. 
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and S4 = {umbrella, -clouds}. We have B = {clouds, -clouds} and A = 
{umbrella, -umbrella}. Thus, we get the universe CI = {{clouds}, {-clouds}}, 
the set of possible decisions D = {{umbrella}, {--umbrella}} and T is shown in 
the decision table of Figure 3.7. 
- wi = {clouds} W2 = {clouds} 
d1  = {umbrella} T(di, wi) 	 = 
{umbrella, loaded, 
dry, clouds, cold, rain} 
T(di, w2) 	 = 
{umbrella, loaded, 
dry, -clouds, cold, -rain} 
d2 = {umbrella} T(d2, wi) 	 = 
{-,umbrella, -loaded, 
clouds, cold, rain, -Ary} 
T(d2, w2) 	 = 
{-umbrella, --,loaded, 
-clouds, cold, -rain, dry} 
Figure 3.7: Decision table for the umbrella problem. 
3.7 	Application to the construction of a decision 
table for poker 
Poker is perhaps one of the few games which is still considered a challenge in the 
artificial intelligence community [Billings et al., 1999], unlike chess, backgammon 
or othello. In its most popular version, called Texas Hold'Em poker [Mendelson, 
2005], each player is given by a dealer two cards called pocket cards which he 
keeps secret from the other players. There can be from two to eight players 
at the table. Other cards known as community cards are shown progressively 
(there are 5 cards in total) with which the players can compose their hand (best 
possible combination of 5 cards drawn from the pool of pocket and community 
cards). At poker, players must constantly bet and take risks under uncertainty 
to win. Playing a hand is hard, as only partial information about the hand of 
the other players is available. Players decide how they want to bet but their 
decisions trigger behaviours from the other players which can be predicted only 
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very qualitatively. Good players use poker tells [Caro, 2003] to better judge the 
strength of their opponents. Understanding tells involves understanding some 
psychological mechanisms and body language and is not an exact science. Of-
ten, the tells picked up by a player may conflict, because good opponents know 
how to mislead those who observe them. Poker players are actors sending wrong 
and contradictory signals to their opponents to confuse them, but some tells are 
more reliable than others. It is important for poker players and poker play-
ing programs to quickly identify the possible scenarios and their corresponding 
outcomes before taking any decision. 
There are essentially four possible moves at poker 
• fold: withdraw from further participation in the current pot 
• check: make no bet, but still hold your cards 
• call: match a bet 
• raise: increase the bet 
These are the decisions to choose from. We may however treat folding and 
checking as one decision. Indeed, when checking is possible, a player should 
always check rather than fold. Checking allows the player to stay in the hand 
without betting more money. This is clearly always preferable to folding. Nev-
ertheless, a player can only check if his bet already equals the maximum betting 
amount of the other players. We therefore reduce the problem to three deci-
sions: di = fold/check, d2 = call and d3 = raise. These decision are mutually 
exclusive. This needs to be expressed logically and we can simply do so using 
the following portion of basic influence diagram shown in Figure 3.8. 
All decisions have their pros and cons. For instance some moves involve 





if fold/check then 
if fold/check then -,raise 
if call then ---,fold/check 
if call then -,raise 
if raise then -fold/check 
if raise then -call 
Figure 3.8: Poker basic influence diagram (part 1). 
of the player's hand. The amount of risk involved by each decision can be defined 
by another portion of the basic influence diagram (see Figure 3.9). 
small risk- no risk+ 
fold/check  
big risk- 
good hand? 	 -,good hand? 
if fold/check then no_risk 
if call then small.j-isk 
if raise and good_hand then small_risk 
if raise and --good_hand then big risk 
Figure 3.9: Poker basic influence diagram (part 2). 
By refusing to take risk, one acts weakly and this makes the opponents feel 
quite confident. Confident opponents want to stay in the hand and usually want 
to bet more. As a result, the competition between the players increases. On 
the opposite, if one is willing to take risks, one acts strongly and this tends to 
scare opponents, chasing them sometimes away. This increases the chances to 
win the hand as fewer opponents remain, but this also does not help increasing 




another part (see Figure 3.10). 
opponents strong? -- add pot value+ increased future chances+  
opponents confident 
I fold/check I 
if fold/check then opponents_confident 
if call then add_pot_value 
if raise then add_pot_value 
if raise then opponentsscared 
if opponents_confident and opponents_strong then add_pot_value 
if opponents_scared and —,opponents_strong then increased_future_chances 
Figure 3.10: Poker basic influence diagram (part 3). 
Players also need to reason about their chances to win or lose. In poker, a 
player wins the pot either because all the others have folded or because he has 
the strongest hand amongst those that remain. All hands are ranked, from the 
strongest which is the straight flush (e.g. A4-K*-016-J4-1046) to a pair (e.g. 
J4.-JO-X-X-X) and high cards (e.g. QC7-X-X-X-X) as follows. 
1. Straight Flush: five cards in sequence, all of the same suit. 
2. Four of a Kind: four cards of one rank, and an unmatched card of another 
rank. 
3. Full House: three matching cards of one rank, and two matching cards of 
another rank. 
4. Flush: five cards of the same suit, not in rank sequence. 
5. Straight: five cards of sequential rank but in more than one suit. 
6. Three of a Kind: three cards of the same rank, plus two unmatched cards. 
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7. Two Pairs: two cards of the same rank, plus two cards of another rank 
(that match each other but not the first pair), plus one unmatched card. 
8. One Pair: two cards of the same rank, plus three other unmatched cards. 
9. High Cards: five cards in which no two cards have the same rank, the five 
cards are not in sequence, and the five cards are not all the same suit. 
Players try to guess whether they currently hold the best hand or not, or if they 
eventually can have it as more community cards get revealed. For instance, a 
player with a pair of pocket tens and a ten on the flop (the three first community 
cards) is very likely to have the best hand and to have it until the end. But a 
player with only a pocket jack that has flopped a pair of jacks is in danger since 
another player may get a higher pair such as queens QQ when the fourth and 
fifth community cards are displayed. We model this in Figure 3.11. 
-solid hand? 	unlikely best- likely best+ 	solid hand? 
unlikely best future- likely best future 
-potentially better hand? 	-, good hand? 	good hand? 	potentially better hand? 
if -good_hand then unlikely_best 
if good_hand then likely_best 
if -,good_hand and -'potentially_better_hand then unlikely_best_future 
if -,good_hand and potentially_better_hand then likely_best_future 
if good_hand and solid_hand then likely_best_future 
if good_hand and -'solid_hand then unlikely_best_future 
Figure 3.11: Poker basic influence diagram (part 4). 
Our poker basic influence diagrams is composed of parts 1 to 4. More parts 
could be added and the current part could be extended if needed, for instance, 
to model the opponents individually and reason more precisely about hand 
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strength. Restricting ourselves to these four parts, we obtain the set of scenarios 
shown in Figure 3.12, where for example 
wi = {good_hand, opponents strong, -,potentially_better_hand, solid_hand} 
and a set of possible decisions initially expected D = {d1 , d2 , d3}. The corre-
sponding decision table is shown in Figure 3.13, where due to lack of space we 
have only shown the goals in each outcome and have employed the following 
abbreviations: 
• NR stands for 'no risk', 
• APV for 'added pot value', 
• UB for 'unlikely the best', 
• UBF for 'unlikely the best in the future', 
• LB for 'likely the best', 
• LBF for 'likely to be the best in the future', 
• SR for 'small risk', 
• BR for 'big risk' and 
• IFC for 'increased future chances'. 
Note that instead of having 16 columns, we only use 8. Columns which have 
identical outcomes can naturally be merged. This however requires using dis-
junctions of scenarios instead of single scenarios as column labels. 
We believe that such a poker decision table could in the future serve as the 
basis for the development of a decision-theoretic poker program. The idea be-
ing that the program would gather information continuously from the game and 
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not good hand X X X X X X 
opponents strong V V V V X X x 
not opponents strong x x x x V V V 
not potentially better hand VVX XV V X 
potentially better hand x X VVX X V 
solid hand V X V X V X x 
not solid hand xVxVx  V 
II "11 I 	"10 I 	"'11 I 	"12 	I "11 I "14 "15 I 	"it 	I 
good hand x x X X X X X X 
not good hand V V V V V V V V 
opponents strong V V V V x X x x 
not opponents strong x x X x V V V V 
not potentially better hand V V x x V V x X 
potentially better hand X X V V x x V V 
solid hand V x V x V x V X 
not solid hand x V X V X V X V 
Figure 3.12: Scenarios for the poker decision table. 
0' V le 	 ",o V le 	 "c V 
d1  NR+ , APV+, LB+ , LBF+ NR+. APV+ , LB+ . UBF — NB+ , LB+, LEIF+ 
d 2 SR — , APV+ , LB+, LBF+ SR — , /WV+, LB+ , UBF —  SR— • APV+ , LB+ , L BF+ 
d3 SR — ,APV+, LB+ , LBF+ SR — , APV+, LB+ , UBF —  SR— , APV+ , IFC+, LB+ , LBF+ 
• ,111 6 V 11,8 	 "9 V "10 	 "11 V "12 
d1  NR+ , LB+ ,1113F — N R+ , APV+ , UB — .UBF —  N R+ , APV+ ,1113 — . LBF+ 
d2 SR — , APV+ . L13+, LI BF —  SR — , APV+ ,III3 — , U131,—  SR — , APV+ ,UB — , LBF+ 
d1  SR — , APV+ , IFC 	LB+ , UBF —  BR— . APV+,t1B — .U13F — BR — , APV+ ,UF1— , LI3F+ 
"11 V "'14 	 "15 V  "16 
      
dl N It+ , U 	,U BF — 
  
N R+ U , LB F+ 
 
SR — , APV+ UR — ,UBF — 
 
SR — ,APV+,UB — LBF+ d2 
d3 
 
BR — APV+ , IFC+ U13 — 
 
1311— APV+, IFC+, UB — , LL3F+ 
      
Figure 3.13: Poker decision table. 
use it to build a probability distribution of the scenarios (for instance using the 
method that will be presented in Chapter 5) and a value function for the out-
comes (this will actually be done in Chapter 4), and then apply (a generalisation 
of) the expected utility criterion to make decisions from that table (this will be 
the issue addressed in Chapter 6). The decision table would be constructed first 
and then fixed during the game, so as not to be manipulated by disinformation 
being disseminated by the program's opponents. 
3.8 Related work 
An influence diagram [Howard and Matheson, 1981] is a directed acyclic graph 
containing decision nodes, uncertainty/deterministic nodes and a value node. 
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Decision nodes represent the possible decisions, uncertainty nodes represent 
any kind of uncertainty about logical or numeric variables and the value node 
models a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The arcs are used to rep-
resent probabilistic, deterministic and functional dependencies between nodes. 
Influence diagrams can thus be used to completely model and solve decision 
making problems. In comparison, basic influence diagrams involve atomic deci-
sions (which may be different from the possible decisions as discussed in Section 
3.6), unobservable fundamental beliefs which are logical uncertainty nodes, de-
terministic nodes which are beliefs, and goals instead of the value node. Basic 
influence diagrams do not model the value function of the decision maker. They 
do not have probabilistic and functional arcs, they only have deterministic arcs 
modeling logical dependencies. Basic influence diagrams cannot be used to solve 
decision making problems, they can only be used to build decision tables. Note 
that influence diagrams do not allow to identify the scenarios and outcomes of 
decisions and that they are not equipped with any notion of rationality. Influ-
ence diagrams allow to make decisions without relying on any (explicit) decision 
table. Thus, basic influence diagrams are more specific, less informative and 
serve a different purpose. 
Bayesian networks [Pearl, 1986] are a special kind of influence diagrams 
which are only used for representing and solving statistical inference problems. 
Bayesian networks are widely used for knowledge representation [Brachman and 
Levesque, 2004] in expert systems design. Bayesian networks model probabilistic 
dependencies, which is not the case with basic influence diagrams. Nevertheless, 
basic influence diagrams are used as a tool to represent (expert) knowledge in 
decision domains. Recently, influence diagrams have started to be used to struc-
ture argumentation-based systems for decision support [Morge and Mancarella, 
2007] and our contribution is very much in line with this type of approach to 
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decision making (a comparison with the work of Morge and Mancarella can be 
found in Section 3.1). 
Most of the research work on the construction of decision tables has so far 
focused on a simple yet extremely useful type of decision table called decision 
logic tables [Schmidt and Kavanagh, 1964; King, 1968]. These are defined as 
functional descriptions that map conditions (scenarios) to actions (decisions). 
In this approach, it is implicitly assumed that only one goal must be satisfied. 
In other words, the set of possible outcomes is restricted to X = {Yes, No}, 
the Yes being interpreted as 'the goal is achieved' and No as 'the goal is not 
achieved'. It becomes then possible to represent the decision table as a collection 
of decision rules of the form "if scenario w is true, then choose action d". A 
decision table is said to be: complete if, for every scenario, there is a rule that 
recommends a certain course of action to satisfy the goal; redundant when a 
rule appears more than once within the decision table; ambiguous when the 
conditions of any two rules are identical but the recommended decisions are 
different; inconsistent when the condition of any two rules are identical but the 
recommended decisions contradict each other; and to have a logically impossible 
ambiguity when there exists a decision rule whose conditions contradict each 
other (the condition of the rule is unsatisfiable). Note that inconsistency is 
a special form of ambiguity. [Verhelst, 1980] proposed a manual method for 
constructing decision tables based on the following stages: 1) obtain conditions, 
condition states and actions of the decision situation, 2) specify the problem in 
terms of decision rules, 3) fill the decision table based on the rules, 4) check for 
completeness, redundancy, ambiguity, etc. and 5) simplify the decision table 
and display it. Our method proceeds in a very similar fashion, starting with 
the elicitation of beliefs and decisions, the description of a decision situation 
in terms of a diagram and if-then rules, the construction of the decision table 
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via computation of the liberal stable semantics and finishing with the potential 
simplification of the table by merging identical columns (as done in the poker 
Section 3.7). The differences are that steps 1) and 2) can be done using a 
basic influence diagram as a graphical aid, step 3) is completed automatically 
by computation of the liberal stable semantics and step 4) is obsolete, as the 
outcomes are guaranteed to be rational under extensibility. 
[Vanthienen and Dries, 1993] promoted the idea of automating the construc-
tion process and developed the PROLOGA software. We have implemented our 
algorithms for computing decision tables in Maple version 9.5. [Vanthienen and 
Robben, 1993] developed applications e.g. for the verification and visualisation 
of legal procedures, checking consistency in medical treatments, help desk ap-
plications for computer networks, validation of knowledge-based systems, rates 
and premiums in banks and insurance companies. Many other applications of 
decision logic tables exist, from management data processing, medicine, quality 
control to engineering problems [Moore and Cullinane, 1969]. [Milner, 1977] 
proposed for example decision tables as a form of tabular diagnostics for dis-
covering reasons for breakdowns of manufacturing systems. Generally speaking, 
decision tables can be used as a way to define and document the logic of decision 
making. Thus, our poker decision table could also be used as tool for teaching 
poker. 
An important number of algorithms have been developed to make decision 
logic tables complete, non redundant, non ambiguous, consistent and to detect 
logical errors [King, 1968; Milner, 1977; Shwayder, 1975; Lew and Tamanaha, 
1976; Ibramsha and Rajaraman, 1978; Lew, 1984]. The type of decision tables 
we have considered in this chapter is different and more general than the one on 
which decision table theory focuses, as a) we consider more than one goal to be 
achieved and b) we also consider goals that need to be avoided (such as being 
86 
loaded when going out for a walk in the umbrella problem). The decision tables 
we construct could at best be used for deriving practical arguments, i.e. heuristic 
arguments either in favour or against decisions, but these arguments still would 
not have the force of decision rules (i.e. lead with certainty to the satisfaction 
of all positive goals and avoidance of all negative goals). The decision tables 
we construct are thus neither complete (there may not exist an ideal decision 
under every scenario), nor unambiguous (more than one decision may be ideal or 
optimal under a given scenario) or consistent (two mutually exclusive decisions 
may perfectly be optimal under the same scenario). The notions of redundancy 
and logical impossible ambiguity do not even apply to our approach. 
[Shwayder, 1975] studies methods for reducing the number of decision rules 
used to represent decision logic tables. The basic intuition is that any two 
decision rules recommending the same decision under different conditions can 
be combined into one rule recommending that decision under the disjunction 
of these conditions. In the case where outcomes are described by more than 
one goal, such direct simplifications are not possible anymore. However, when 
two columns in a decision table are equal, the columns can be merged into one 
only by preserving the outcomes and taking the disjunction of the conditions or 
union of the associated events, as we have done in the decision table for poker 
in Section 3.7. 
Since decision logic tables are based upon decision rules of the form 'if con-
dition then action', [Reilly et al., 1987] has advocated logic programming tech-
niques [Kowalski, 1979b; 1979a] to define and implement them. The resulting de-
cision tables can then be easily queried using Prolog, allowing the user to ask if a 
certain goal is achievable and if so to know by which course of action, under given 
specific circumstances. We have also chosen to rely upon if-then rules to specify 
decision tables and have advocated the use of a generalisation of logic pro- 
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gramming, namely assumption-based argumentation [Bondarenko et al., 1997; 
Dung et al., 2006]. The rules considered are however of a different type: 'if con-
dition and optionally action then condition or goal'. We query the assumption-
based argumentation frameworks derived from basic influence diagrams using 
the liberal stable semantics to rationally identify all the possible outcomes of 
decisions (Section 3.4). 
3.9 Summary and conclusion 
We have proposed basic influence diagrams as a tool to describe qualitatively 
practical situations of decision making under strict uncertainty. These diagrams 
give a logical structure to the decision domain and reveal the decision maker's 
most fundamental uncertainties. Basic influence diagrams can be analysed and 
their rational outcomes be identified using an extension of assumption-based 
argumentation. In the argumentation framework derived from a diagram and 
under a quite natural hypothesis called extensibility, we have proved that the 
possible outcomes of decisions are in one-to-one correspondence with the conse-
quences of liberal stable sets of assumptions. We have studied the relationship 
between the liberal stable semantics and existing notions of acceptability in 
assumption-based argumentation. The liberal stable semantics can be com-
puted using and adapting existing hypergraph algorithms. Computing the lib-
eral stable semantics directly allows to derive the scenarios, possible decisions, 
rational outcomes and compute decision tables. These tables are by construc-




Argument strength & value 
functions 
The objective in this chapter is to investigate the practical construction of value 
functions in decision theory [Fishburn, 1964; Raiffa, 1968; French, 1987]. Value 
functions serve to quantify the desirability of the outcomes of decisions from 
the point of view of a decision maker. In the previous chapter, we have shown 
how to use basic influence diagrams, extended assumption-based argumentation 
frameworks and the liberal stable semantics to identify the possible outcomes 
of decisions. In this chapter, we use abstract argumentation for constructing 
value functions. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the problem of 
constructing value functions and motivates the use of argumentation to solve 
this problem. Section 4.2 presents an abstract argumentation model for repre-
senting the uncertain knowledge of a decision maker concerning the desirability 
of his objectives. Section 4.3 introduces a new measure of argument strength 
suitable for abstract argumentation. This measure is of general purpose and will 
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thus also be used in the next chapter for the construction of imprecise proba-
bilities. In Section 4.4, we introduce a mechanism for aggregating arguments 
and constructing value functions from arguments based on linear social welfare 
theory [Fleming, 1952; Harsanyi, 1955; Dyer and Sarin, 1978]. In Section 4.5, we 
apply this method to generate value functions for poker programs having var-
ious psychological and emotional features. We discuss related work in Section 
4.6 and conclude in Section 4.7. 
The argument strength measure presented in Section 4.3 has been published 
in the proceedings of the Eleventh European Conference on Logics in Artificial 
Intelligence [Matt and Toni, 2008b]. 
4.1 	On the construction of value functions 
As a result of Chapter 3, we may now assume given 
• a set of possible decisions D = {d1 , • • • 'dm}, 
• a set of scenarios C2 = {wi , 	, tar, }, and 
• a mapping T:DxQ —> X from decisions and scenarios to outcomes. 
We denote by xi ,3 the outcome of decision c/ 2 under scenario ?v.) and X the set 
of all such outcomes. A value function, is a real-valued function V : X —+ R 
such that, for every outcome x E X, the value V(x) represents the desirability 
of x from the decision maker's viewpoint. We have seen in Chapter 2 that 
value functions are necessary for decision making both in situations of strict 
uncertainty and risk. 
We are now concerned with the issue of measuring the values V(x), for 
all x E X. Existing measures in value theory [Fishburn, 1964] include the 
partial ordinal measure, the ordinal measure, the first, second and third ordered 
metric measures, the first, second and third bounded interval measures and the 
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interval measure. The partial ordinal measure for instance denotes the class 
of value functions that are compatible with a given partial order 1  on X, the 
ordinal measure denotes the class of value functions that are compatible with 
a total order 2. In fact, all of these measures are derived from statements 
of preference concerning the elements of X that need to be elicited from the 
decision maker. Such preference statements are amenable to relations of the 
form V(x) > V(y), V(a)— V(b) > x(V (c) — V (d)) or V(a) = pV(x)+(1 —p)V(y), 
where x, y, a, b, c and d are outcomes in X, x E IR and p E [0, 1]. The decision 
maker's preferences are thus usually modeled as a system of linear inequalities. 
Existence and possibly uniqueness of solutions of these systems can be usually 
guaranteed under conditions concerning the rationality of the decision maker, 
e.g. the von Neumann-Morgenstern postulates [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944] (see utility functions in Chapter 2). Sometimes, solutions do not exist and 
one then usually tries to find a value function V that best satisfies the system 
(minimising the error by the least squares method). 
[Fishburn, 1964] mentioned a number of important issues that may arise 
when applying these methods: a) the decision maker may lack rationality and 
provide conflicting statements, b) he may be uncertain about his objectives, c) 
his preferences may change over time, d) he might be dishonest, e) the number 
of outcomes can be very large, making the elicitation process quite lengthy and 
f) the decision maker may be unable to give preference statements concerning 
complex outcomes. To address issues a) and b), we envisage to incorporate 
argumentation as in [Dung, 1995] in the measurement method, as argumentation 
indeed allows to represent uncertain and conflicting knowledge. In this chapter, 
again, arguments will be treated as justified claims [Krause et al., 1995]. To 
address issue b), we assume given a set of objectives (positive and negative) 
A partial order is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. 
2A total order is a partial order that is total, i.e. such that every pair of elements of the 
set can be compared. 
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goals G and assume that each outcome is a set of goals. These assumptions 
are compatible with the use of basic influence diagrams in Chapter 3. Indeed, 
the goals of an influence diagram are the only literals that have an influence 
on the overall satisfaction of the decision maker. This is the reason why we 
may restrict our attention to goals. We also restrict the scope of arguments to 
single goals (instead of outcomes in the powerset of G). By doing so, we resolve 
issues e) and f). By forcing the decision maker to use arguments justifying 
his claims, we understandably also put a limit to dishonesty, thus partially 
resolving issue d). Finally, although issue c) cannot really be resolved, we will 
show that, by representing the decision maker's opinion in the simple form of 
an abstract argumentation framework [Dung, 1995], it will be quite easy for 
the decision maker to revise his beliefs (modeled as arguments) and update his 
value function over time. In a nutshell, we believe that argumentation can bring 
practical value and add substantive goodness to the measurement process. 
4.2 Modeling opinions about goals by abstract 
argumentation 
In the previous chapter, we have seen how to compute outcomes and, in par-
ticular, the positive or negative goals satisfied in each one of them. Goals in 
the terminology of basic influence diagrams (Chapter 3) are the literals which 
directly affect the decision maker's satisfaction, so that the value V(x) of an 
outcome x should logically only depend on the set of goals satisfied in x. We 
thus restrict our attention to value functions defined over sets of goals. We as-
sume that G is the set of all literals of goal nodes from a basic influence diagram. 
The set of positive goals (corresponding to nodes labelled with the symbol +) 
is denoted G+ and the set of negative goals (corresponding to nodes labelled 
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labelled with the symbol -) is denoted G.  We define 3  
Definition 4.1. Every outcome x E X is a subset of G: x C G. 
For instance in the umbrella problem from Chapter 3, the set of goals is 
G = {dry, —dry, loaded, —iloaded} 
and the set of outcomes is 
X = {{dry, loaded}, {dry, —loaded}, {—dry, —loaded}} 
Note that not all subsets of G are outcomes. For instance in the previous 
example, {} and {—dry, loaded} are not outcomes. 
In order to ease and ground practically the process of reasoning about the 
desirability of goals, the decision maker is asked to specify a discrete scale of 
desirability, defined as 
Definition 4.2. A scale of desirability is a set of the form 
S = {v , v2, • • • v N} 
where N > 1, 	,vN E IR (or simply Q or Z) and vi < v2  < • • • < vN • 
N corresponds to the number of levels of desirability needed to describe the 
goals in G. By convention, positive levels of desirability must correspond to 
desirable goals in G+ and negative levels to undesirable goals in G— . Each vi is 
given an interpretation in natural language, such as slightly, fairly, mildly, quite 
and extremely desirable/undesirable and the absolute value of vi must be set 
by the decision maker so as to reflect the intensity in desirability/undesirability. 
31n Chapter 3, outcomes of decision tables are subsets of L. The outcomes in this chapter 
are simply the intersections of the outcomes of the decision table with the set of goals G. 
93 
Thus, the scale must be such that if vz < v3 , then vi is interpreted as less 
desirable than v3 . For example, we may adopt a basic scale of desirability 
S = {v1 , v2 , v3 , v4} with values in Q, where 
• v1  = —1 is interpreted as quite undesirable, 
• v2 = —0.25 is interpreted as fairly undesirable, 
• v3 = +0.25 is interpreted as fairly desirable, and 
• v2 = +1 is interpreted as quite desirable. 
As we will see in definition 4.3 below, we will use positive elements of the 
scale S to assess the desirability of positive goals in G+ and negative elements 
to assess the desirability of negative goals in G.  
Once the scale is in place, the decision maker is invited to formulate a col-
lection of arguments. Every argument is interpreted as a justified claim. We 
assume given some language L (set of literals closed under negation 	suitable 
for expressing justifications for arguments. To build a value function on X, we 
may restrict ourselves to only two types of claims, leading us to distinguish be-
tween two categories of arguments, viz. value and mitigation arguments. Value 
arguments serve to express the desirability of goals, and mitigation arguments 
to express doubts concerning the justification of value arguments. 
Definition 4.3. A value argument a is a pair (Ja , Ca ), where 
• Ca the claim in the form of a pair (ga , va ) E G x S stating that goal ga 
has desirability va and which verifies va > 0 if 9a E G+ and va < 0 if 
ga G G— • 
• Ja E L is a justification for the claim Ca . 
Definition 4.4. A mitigation argument m is a pair (J,,Cm ), where 
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• Cm is a claim of the form 	where J is the justification of some value 
or mitigation argument. 
• Jm E L is a justification for the claim Cm . 
Intuitively, given a mitigation argument (Jm , Cm ), 	= 	states that the 
justification J is invalid or erroneous. 
The decision maker must provide a set A of value arguments and a set M 
of mitigation arguments. In the umbrella problem, the set of value arguments 
A could be {al , a2, a3 , a4} as defined below 
• al = (ill, (dry, +1)): "it is quite desirable to stay dry during the walk 
because I am ill" 
• a2 = (ill, (-dry, —1)): "it is quite undesirable to be wet during the walk 
because I am ill" 
• a3 = (tired, (loaded, —0.25)): "it is fairly undesirable to be loaded during 
the walk because I am going to be tired" 
• a4 = (tired, (loaded, 0.25)): "it is fairly desirable not to be loaded during 
the walk because I am going to be tired" 
The set of mitigation arguments M could be {mi , m2 , m3} as defined below 
• mi = (pills, --All): "I won't be ill anymore during the walk because I have 
taken pills to recover from my flu" 
• m2 = (badilu, 	"the pills I have taken will be ineffective because I 
have a really bad flu" 
• m3 = (breaks, —.tired): "I won't be tired during the walk because I am 
planning to have several breaks" 
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Given any sets of value and mitigation arguments A and M, we can construct 
an abstract argumentation framework [Dung, 1995] (see Chapter 2) as follows 
Definition 4.5. F = (Arg, att), where Arg = AU M and 
att = {(x,Y) x = (Jx,Thly) E 	= (41 Cy) E AU M} 
The abstract argumentation framework corresponding to our running exam-
ple is shown in Figure 4.1. 
al 	a2 	a3 
ml 	 m3 
m2 
Figure 4.1: Value and mitigation arguments for the umbrella problem. 
The framework is constructed so that mitigation arguments attack value ar-
guments and mitigation arguments can attack one another or value arguments. 
However, value arguments do not attack one another. This means that we use 
attacks to undermine arguments but do not have rebuttals. Indeed, the frame-
work is an abstract model of the information available to the decision maker. 
Value arguments represent information that directly relates to the value of his 
objectives, and mitigation arguments capture the decision maker's uncertainties 
about his objectives. Attacks by mitigation arguments against value arguments 
cast doubt on the validity of value arguments. In the next section, we explain 
how to precisely obtain an estimation of the strength of arguments in any ab-
stract argumentation framework. Then, in Section 4.4, we will use this notion 
of strength on value arguments to determine value functions. 
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4.3 	Strength of arguments in abstract argumen- 
tation frameworks 
Several notions of argument strength have been proposed in the literature on ar-
gumentation. One distinguishes between the so-called intrinsic and interaction-
based measures. The term "intrinsic" is used to refer to approaches such as 
[Pollock, 1992; Krause et al., 1995; Ambler, 1996; Parsons, 1997; Prakken and 
Sartor, 1997; Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998; Pollock, 2001; Kohlas et al., 2002] 
whereby the strength of an argument is independent of its interactions with 
other arguments, i.e. the arguments that attack or are attacked by it. Those 
approaches have been discussed in Chapter 2. On the other hand, the term 
"interaction-based" refers to measures whereby the strength of an argument 
depends on the arguments attacking it (the attackers), the attackers of its at-
tackers (the defenders), etc. Amongst interaction-based measures, one can dis-
tinguish between qualitative [Dung, 1995; Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999] and 
quantitative [Besnard and Hunter, 2000; Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005; 
Matt and Toni, 2008b] measures. We refer to interaction-based measures that 
are quantitative as dialectical measures and define a new dialectical measure 
exhibiting a number of intuitively appealing properties. 
Our dialectical measure is defined for any given abstract argumentation 
framework F = (Ary, att) and some fixed argument x E Arg, as the value 
of a two-person, zero-sum game of strategy with imperfect information called 
(F, x) game of argumentation strategy and played according to rules described 
in the next subsection. Games of strategy were first introduced by [Borel, 1921]. 
It was then von Neumann who defined the concept of value of a game through 
his famous minimax theorem [von Neumann, 1928]. We first give the rules of 
a game of argumentation strategy (Section 4.3.1). We then explain how the 
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value of this game and the strength of an argument are defined (Section 4.3.2) 
and computed (Section 4.3.3). Finally, we study the properties of this measure 
(Section 4.3.4). 
4.3.1 Rules of the (F, x) game of argumentation strategy 
The game involves two players called proponent and opponent of x. The ar-
gument x as well as the set of arguments Arg and the attack relationship att 
between arguments are revealed to both players. The role of the proponent is 
to form an opinion P to defend x. The opponent must form an opinion 0 to 
defeat the proponent. We assume that P and 0 are sets of arguments. We call 
in this chapter 4 
Definition 4.6. An opinion is a subset of Arg. 
The players must choose their opinion secretly. The proponent of x is forced 
to choose an opinion embracing x, which means that P must contain at least x. 
Definition 4.7. The proponent's strategy is an opinion P that contains x 
and the opponent's strategy is any opinion. 
The players then simultaneously reveal their opinions. A certain amount of 
money called indifferently payoff or reward and denoted (1)(P, 0) is then paid by 
the opponent to the proponent. This amount depends on the attacks existing 
between the arguments contained in P and 0. Thus, for any sets of arguments 
A and B, we write BI-T A to denote the set of attacks from A against B in the 
abstract argumentation framework F: 
friT A = {(a,b) I a E A,b E B,(a,b) c attl 
4 This is strictly speaking an abuse of notation, as the term opinion was used in Chapter 3 
to denote sets of assumptions. 
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We also denote IBF'—'4 I the number of attacks from A against B. To calculate 
the payoff, we use the function f : N --> [0,1] defined Vn E N as 
f (n) = nn+ 	1  
This function f has the advantage of being monotonic increasing and to range 
from 0 to 1 as the number n of attacks considered ranges from n = 0 to infin-
ity. As a result, the following notion of reward (and subsequently of strength) 
remains bounded between 0 and 1, no matter how many attacks exist between 
the strategies of the two players. 
Definition 4.8. The proponent's reward/payoff 0(P, O) is determined as 
follows: 
• if P is not a conflict-free extension in F, then 0(P, O) = 0 
• if P is conflict-free and 0 does not attack P in F, then 5(P, O) =1 
• otherwise 
cb(P,O)= 2 [1+ f (107,P I) — f (11=7 ° Di 
The function 0 chosen is the only affine function in the variables f (10 . P I) 
and f (I '1-'7°1) which is equal to 
• 1 when f (10`T P 1) = 1 and f (IPV°1) = 0 
• 1/2 when f (1017P I) = f (IP;7° I) 
• 0 when f (10 P1) = o and f (1.PF°1) =1 
In the abstract argumentation framework F used for the umbrella problem 
(see Section 4.2) and the argument x = al , the proponent may choose the 
strategy P = {al , m3} and the opponent the strategy 0 = {mi}. P is conflict-
free and 0 attacks P. There is one attack (m3 , ml ) from P to 0 and one attack 
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(m i , a l ) from 0 to P, so the reward for the proponent is 
„ 1 o(P, 0) = [1+ f(1) - (1)] = 
Note that the rules and payoff of the (F, x) game are set so as to drive the 
players according to three natural principles of rationality in dialectic: 
1. to properly defend the argument x, its proponent should form an opinion 
embracing x and avoid self-contradiction, 
2. the role of the opponent is to form an opinion which attacks the propo-
nent's opinion, and 
3. in a dispute, it is better for each party to maximise the number of attacks 
against his adversary and to minimise the number of attacks from him, 
for the simple reason that opinions are weakened by attacks. 
4.3.2 Value of the (F, x) game of argumentation strategy 
Let {P1, ..., Pm} denote the set of possible strategies of the proponent (all the 
subsets of Arg containing x) and {01, ..., 07,} the set of possible strategies of the 
opponent (all the subsets of Arg). Let us denote ri,3 = 0(Pi , 0j) the payoff when 
the proponent plays with the strategy Pi and the opponent with Op as given in 
definition 4.8. Assume that, each time they play the game (a round), the players 
choose their strategy randomly according to some probability distributions X 
and Y fixed in time, where X = (x1 , . , x,,,) is the vector whose component 
i corresponds to the probability x, for the proponent of playing Pi and Y = 
(y1, 	, yam ) is the vector whose component j corresponds to the probability yi 
for the opponent of playing O. X and Y are called mixed strategies. The 
proponent's expected payoff is equal to the opponent's expected loss (this is 
why the game of argumentation strategy is said to be a zero-sum game) and, 
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according to the definition of expectation in probability theory and given the 
probabilistic independence of the strategies chosen by the players, is equal to 
n 
E=EE 
i =1 j =1 
Using the vectors X = (xi ) and Y = (yj) and matrix R = ((r,,a )) we can 
write more compactly that E = X'RY, where X' is the transpose of X. If 
the proponent randomises his strategies according to X, he can expect at least 
miny X`RY. The optimal X will make his expectation at least greater or equal 
to maxx miny X'RY. Similarly, the opponent can reduce the expectation of 
his loss to at most miny maxx X'RY. The minimax theorem [von Neumann, 
1928] states that 
Theorem 4.1. There exists a unique value v E R such that 
max min X'RY = min max X'RY = v 
X Y 	Y X 
v is called the value of the game. This value can be interpreted both as 
the expected payoff that is guaranteed to the proponent and as the maximal 
expected loss of the opponent. We adopt 
Definition 4.9. The strength sF(x) of argument x in F is the value of the 
(F, x) game of argumentation strategy. 
4.3.3 Computing the value of the (F, x) game of argumen-
tation strategy and the strength of x 
The technique used for computing the value of two-person zero-sum games with 
imperfect information is described in textbooks on operations research [Hillier 
and Lieberman, 1995] and is based upon linear optimisation. Linear optimisa- 
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tion problems can be solved using the simplex algorithm [Dantzig et al., 1955] 
or more efficient polynomial time methods [Khachiyan, 1979; Karmarkar, 1984]. 
Using this technique, the strength sF (x) of x in the abstract argumentation 
framework F is the maximal value that the variable xm+4 can take when it is 
subject to the following linear inequality constraints: 
Vj E {1, 	, 	: E ri,i xi — xrii+1  > 0 
i=i 
E x• =1 
i=1 
, xm > 0 
A mixed strategy X = (x1, . , x ni ) for which xr,,,+1 is maximal is referred to as 
optimal mixed strategy. 
As an illustration, let us examine in detail the case of F = (Arg, att) where 
Arg = , b} , att = {(a, b)} and x = b. The proponent strategies are {Pi, P2} 
with P1  = {b} and P2 = {a, b} . The opponent strategies are {01, 02, 03, 04} 
with 04 = 0, 02 = {b}, 03 = {a, b} and 04 = {a}. The proponent's payoff 
matrix is 
( 1 1 0.25 0.25 ) 
0 0 0 	0 
and the optimisation problem to solve to compute sF (b) is to maximise 13 
R= 
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subject to the constraints 
Xi - X3 > 0 
Xi - X3 > 0 
0.25x1  — x3 > 0 
0.25x1  — x3 > 0 
xi + x2 = 1 
xi, X2 > 0 
which can be simplified as the problem of maximising x3 subject to the con- 
straints 
0.25x1  > x3  
x1 ± x2 = 1 
xi, x2 > 0 
with obvious solution x3 = 0.25 obtained for the mixed strategy X = (x1 , x2 ) = 
(1,0). Thus sF (b) = 0.25. X is an optimal mixed strategy, thus the proponent 
of b should always play P1  = {b} and never play P2 = {a, b}. Indeed, {a, b} is 
not a conflict-free opinion and always leads to a null reward. 
Other examples of argument strength in elementary argumentation frame-
works are provided in Table 4.1. In order to obtain the values in this table, for 
each one of these frameworks F and each argument x in F, we have constructed 
the (F, x) game payoff matrix R = ((r,,3)) where r2,3 = 	03 ) and computed 
the game's value using the simplex algorithm. Figure 4.2 represents graphically 
the results obtained with the last framework of the table. The proponent's op-
timal mixed strategies corresponding to these values are omitted for simplicity, 
but can be summarised in short as follows: 
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• playing {a, f} with probability 1 for argument a (i.e. all the elements x: 
of the optimal mixed strategy X* = (4) are equal to zero except for the 
index i such that P., = {a, f} for which x: = 1), 
• {b} with probability 1 for argument b, 
• {a, c, fl with probability 3and {a, c} with probability al for argument c, 
• {b, d} with probability 1 for argument d, 
• {b, e} with probability 1 for argument e and 
• {f} with probability 1 for argument f. 
The qualitative ranking obtained is in decreasing order of strength 
sF (f)> sF(a) = S F (b) = S F (d) > SF(C) > sF (e) 
This ranking is different from the one obtained using the dialectical measure by 
[Besnard and Hunter, 2000] and [Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005], where 
sF (f)> S F (d) > sF(a) = S F (b) > SF(e) > SF(C) 
In the next section, we will identify properties of our notion of strength with 
respect to qualitative interaction-based measures of acceptability as in Dung 
[Dung, 1995]. The dialectical measures of [Besnard and Hunter, 2000] and 
[Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] do not exhibit these properties, as, in the 
earlier example they rank argument e higher than argument c despite the fact 
that c is contained in the stable extension {a, c, f} and e is not contained in any 
admissible extension of F. 
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arguments 	 attacks 	 strength values for arguments 












{(a,b), (c,b), (d,c)} 
{(a,b), (c,b), (d,b), (b,d)} 
{(a,b), (c,b), (d,a), (e,c)} 
{(a,b), (b,c), (c,d), (d,e), (e,f)} 




1, 0.25, 0.25, 1 
1, 0.167, 1, 0.625 
0.25, 0.5, 0.25, 1, 1 
1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.386, 0.5, 0.425 
0.5, 0.5, 0.417, 0.5, 0.25, 1 
Table 4.1: Examples of argument strength. 
0.5 Erb 0.5 
C0.417< e 	 f 1.o 
I 
d 0.5 
Figure 4.2: Argumentation framework with strength labels. 
4.3.4 Properties of the argument strength measure 
We consider three kinds of properties of our dialectical measure of argument 
strength (definition 4.9): 
1. elementary properties which directly derive from the rules of the game of 
argumentation strategy and the minimax theorem 4.1, 
2. properties related to some notions of acceptability as in abstract argumen-
tation, and 
3. dynamic properties, when the given abstract argumentation framework 
changes. 
While presenting these properties we take as given an abstract argumenta-
tion framework F = (Arg, att) and an argument x E Arg. 
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Elementary properties 
The strength of an argument is comprised between zero and one. 
Property 4.1. 0 < sF (x) < 1 
Proof. Trivially, by definition 4.8, V(i, j), rto = 0(15,,03 ) E [0,1]. Thus, for 
every mixed strategies X and Y, since X and Y are probability distributions, we 
also have X'RY E [0,1], which implies 0 < miny X'RY and maxx X'RY < 1. 
Therefore, we have 
0 < max min X'RY and min max X'RY <1 — X Y 	 Y X 
By the minimax theorem 4.1, 0 < v < 1, and thus v = sF (x) E [0, 1]. 	0 
The strength is minimal and null when the argument attacks itself. 
Property 4.2. sF(x) = 0 if and only if x attacks itself. 
Proof. 	sF (x) = v = miny maxx X'RY = 0 implies that 3Y* = (y;) such 
that VX, X'RY* < 0. This holds notably for any X = ei (the vector whose 
components are all equal to 0 except the ith one which is equal to 1). Hence, 
Vi, Ei 	< 0. Since ri ,iy; > 0, it is clear that V(i, j), ri,iy; = 0. Y* is a 
probability distribution, so there exists k such that y;,, > 0. It is then necessary 
that, Vi, ri, j, = 0. Since trivially, by definition 4.8, 0(P, 0) = 0 if and only if 
P is not conflict-free, then Vi, P., attacks itself. In particular, Pi = {x} attacks 
itself, which means that x attacks itself. 
If x attacks itself, then all proponent strategies in the (F, x) game are 
non-conflict-free sets of arguments. Since P attacks itself implies 0(P, 0) = 0 
for any 0, we have R = ((0)), v = 0 and sF(x) = O. 	 0 
The strength of an argument is maximal and equal to one when the argument 
is not attacked. 
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Property 4.3. s F (x) = 1 if and only if there exists no y E Arg such that 
(y, x) E att. 
Proof 	If s F (x) = v = 1, then we have maxx miny X'RY = 1. Y ranges 
over the set of all real-valued probability distributions which is larger than the 
set Z of all zero-one valued probability distributions. Thus, VX, 
min X'RY > min X'RY 
YES 
Therefore, maxx miny Ez X'RY > maxx miny X'RY = 1. This can be rewrit- 
ten as maxx mini Ez r ioxi > 1. 3X* = (x'n such that mini Ei 	> 1, 
i.e., Vj, 	r,,34 > 1. Since, V(i, j), 	< 1 (trivially by definition 4.8) and 
X* is a probability distribution, then, Vj, Ei r i ,3 x: < 1, so that in fact, V j, 
Ei r,,3 x: = 1. This may only hold if, V(i, j), ri < 1 = x: = 0. X* is a 
probability distribution, so there exists k such that 4 > 0. By contraposition 
of the previous implications, Vj, 	< 1), i.e. r k ,3 > 1. Since (/) is bounded 
up by 1 by definition 4.8, then Vj, rk,3 = 1. Since 0(P, 0) = 1 if and only if P is 
conflict-free and 0 does not attack P (by definition 4.8), Pk is conflict-free and 
Vj, 03 does not attack Pk. x E Pk by definition 4.7 of a proponent's strategy, 
so there is no opponent strategy, and thus argument, that attacks x. 
By selecting strategy {x} with probability 1, then by definition 4.8, the 
proponent has a guaranteed payoff of 1 irrespective of what the opponent does. 
Therefore, s F(x) = v > 1. by property 4.1, sF (x) = 1. 	 0 
Properties related to the acceptability of the argument 
Here, we relate the strength of an argument to the acceptability of the extensions 
that contain the argument, where an extension is a set of arguments. Such 
extensions can be used by the proponent as strategies to defend the argument. 
We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for the definitions of the notions of acceptability 
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for abstract argumentation that we use in the remainder of this section. Here, 
we denote by n(x) the number of attacks against x and by k the out-degree of 
F, defined as 
Definition 4.10. The out-degree of F is the number k of maximal out-going 
attacks of an argument in F, i.e. 
k = max I{bI(a,b) E att}l 
aEArg 
For instance, in the framework of Figure 4.2, the out-degree is k = 2, since 
b attacks a and c and all the other arguments attack at most one argument. 
When an argument x does not attack itself, its strength is bounded below 
by a value that is inversely proportional to n(x), which means that x may have 
a strength closer to zero as n(x) becomes large. Its strength is also bounded 
above by a decreasing function of n(x) which takes the value 1 for n(x) = 0 
and converges towards 1/2 as n(x) 	+oo. Thus, the strength of x may still be 
close to 1/2 even if n(x) is large. This is formalised in the following 
Property 4.4. If x is contained in a conflict-free extension, then 
> sF (x) > 1  2(
n(
n(x)+ 1) — 	2(n( x) + 1) • 
Proof. If there exist n(x) attacks against x, then there exists an opponent strat-
egy 0 with n(x) arguments attacking x. For this strategy 0 and any proponent 
strategy P, there exists at least n(x) attacks from 0 against P. Thus, denoting 
by f (oo) = 	 f (n) = 1, we have 
0(P, O) < [1 + ADO — An(x))] =1 — f(n(x)) 
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Thus, by always playing 0, the opponent can secure a strict maximum loss of 
1 — 1 —2 f 	
_  n(x) 2  
	
(n(x)) 	2(n(x ) 4- 1) 
On the other hand, by always playing with the strategy P = {x} which is 
conflict-free, the proponent can secure a minimum reward of 
1 	 1 	n(x) 	1 
—2 	+ f (0) — f(n(x))] — 2 [1 n(x) +1 ] = 2(n(x) +1) 
0 
As an example, in the framework of Figure 4.2, x = e is contained in a 
conflict-free extension and n(x) =1 so 
31 
4 sF(e) 
Indeed, we have computed s F (e) = 0.25. 
With respect to standard extension semantics in abstract argumentation 
frameworks, n(x) is without loss of generality always reducible to at most 2 
[Dunne, 2007]. Such reductions not only lead to changes in the inequalities 
(obtained by the previous result) that bound the strength of arguments, but also 
have an impact on the strength of the arguments. For example, the arguments 
a and a are equivalent with respect to the frameworks on the left (F) and the 
right (F') hand side of Figure 4.3, where n(x) = 4 and n(x) = 2 respectively, 
although sF (a) = 0.125 and s F , (a) = 0.216. By reducing the number of attacks 
against a from 3 in F to 2 in F', one increases its strength. 
If an argument can be defended by an admissible opinion, then we can obtain 
a better lower bound on the strength of that argument than in the case where 





Figure 4.3: Equivalent arguments with distinct strength. 
lower bound is remarkably equal to 1/2 when the out-degree is k -= 1. 
Property 4.5. If x is contained in an admissible extension, then 
1 	k + 3  sF(x) — max (2(1 +
1
n(x))' 1 + \/Tc' 4(k + 1)) 
Proof. There exists an admissible extension P that contains x and that the 
proponent can choose. Thus, for every opponent strategy 0, P is conflict-free 
and attacks all the arguments contained in 0 that attack P. Namely, for every 
argument of 0 that attacks P, there is at least one counter-attack from P 
against that argument. In the worst case for the proponent, every argument in 
0 — P attacks P with k different attacks. Thus, 
	
c5(P, 	[1 + f(10 — PI) — f (klo — -1 )] 
For every t > 0, let 
1 	 1 	 kt , gk(t) = —2 [1 + f(t) — f (kt)] = —2 [1 + t+1 	kt + 11 
We have 
dgk 1  1  9k(t) = — = [ dt 	2 (t + 1)2 	(kt +1)
2] 
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The minimum of gk is thus attained for t such that 4(0 = 0, i.e. 
1  
	
(t + 1)2 	(kt + 1)2 
whose positive solution is t = 1/VT. Thus, for every t > 0, we have gk(t) > 
gk(1/ VT) and consequently 
1 	11 VT 	k*11VT  , 	1 gk(t) > —[1 + 
2 1+1[IT ks=1/VTc+1 1+VT 
By playing always P the proponent of x can secure a payoff of at least 
1 
1 + VT 
Notice that t = 10 — P1 is always an integer. If t = 0, then 0 does not attack P 
and 0(P, 0) = 1. Otherwise t > 1. In that case, k > 1. Then 1/V < t. Since 
gk is monotonic increasing for the values of t > 1/VT, we also have 
cb(P, 0) > 1 [1 + f (1) — f(k)i = 4(k + 1) 
So for that same strategy P, the payoff is also guaranteed to be at least 
k + 3  
4(k + 1) 
Since P is conflict-free, {x} does not attack itself and by playing always {x}, 
the proponent can also secure a payoff of at least 
1 
2(n(x) + 1) 
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The same lower bound holds a fortiori if we know that x is contained in 
a preferred, stable, complete, grounded or ideal extension, since all of these 
extensions are necessarily also admissible (again, see definitions in Chapter 2). 
For instance, in the framework of Figure 4.2, x = c is contained in the stable 
extension {a, c, f }, k = 2 and n = 1 so 









We have indeed computed that sF (c) = 0.417. 
This dialectical measure of argument strength can be said to be "compati-
ble" with the classical notions of acceptability of abstract argumentation insofar 
as the strength of arguments contained in admissible extensions is always guar-
anteed to be above a certain level (given by the previous property). However, 
the measure is finer-grained in that it allows to rank the arguments that are 
contained in a conflict-free extension without being contained in any admissible 
extension. 
Dynamic properties 
For any argument a E Arg such that (a, x) att, we denote 
F+(a,x) = (Arg, {(a, x)} U att) 
We also say that an argument a is superfluous with respect to x if forbidding the 
proponent of x to play with opinions containing a does not decrease the value 
of the (F, x) game. Given two frameworks F = (Arg, att) and F' = (Arg', att'), 
we say that F and F' are disjoint when Arg n Arg' = 0. We finally define for 
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any frameworks F and F' the sum 
F + 	= (Arg U Arg', att U att') 
We consider below a number of properties defined in terms of these notions. 
As sanctioned by the property 4.6 below, adding an attack against an argu- 
ment reduces its strength. For example, in Figure 4.4, the attack (b, a) reduces 
the strength of a from 1 to 1/2. 
al ------b 	a0.5 
Figure 4.4: Example of attack reducing the strength of an argument. 
Property 4.6. s F+( ,,)(x) < s F (x) 
Proof. The sets of strategies available to the proponent and opponent are the 
same in the (F,x) and (F+(a ,x) ,x) games. Let P and 0 be some proponent 
and opponent strategies. Note that P. V° C Pp,-*°(.x)  and either OF P = CYT+P(„)  
(if a 0 P) or P attacks itself in F±(,,,„) (if a E P). By monotonicity of f, 
in any case (a E P or a 0 P), 45 F+( „)(P,O) < OF(P, 0). It follows that 
s F+( . )(x) < sF(x). 	 0 
A sanctioned by property 4.7 below, an argument becomes stronger (respec-
tively weaker) when it attacks more arguments, if the newly attacked arguments 
are superfluous (respectively not superfluous) for its defence. For example, in 
Figure 4.5, e is superfluous with respect to c since we know that the optimal 
mixed strategy for defending c consists in playing with only {a, c, fl or {a, c} 
(see Section 4.3.3) and e is not contained in any of these two extensions. The 
newly added attack from c against e (right hand side of Figure 4.5) does not 
decrease the strength of c (this strength is 0.417 before and after adding the 
attack). However, a is not superfluous with respect to c since a is contained in 
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all of the strategies ({a, c, f} and {a, c}) optimally played to defend c, and one 
can observe in Figure 4.6 that the newly added attack from c against a (right 
hand side of Figure 4.6) reduces indeed the strength of c from 0.417 to 0.25. 
a< 	> b 	 a< 	> b 
Figure 4.5: Adding an attack against a superfluous argument. 
	›-b 	 a 	< ) b 
C0.417-s e<---f CO 	 f 
Figure 4.6: Adding an attack against a non-superfluous argument. 
Property 4.7. It holds that 
• if a is superfluous with respect to x, then sF,(xo(x)> sF (x), and 
• if a is not superfluous with respect to x, then sF+(xo (x) 5 sF(x). 
Proof. If a is superfluous with respect to x then there exists an optimal mixed 
strategy X* = (xi) for the (F, x) game such that, Vi, x: > 0 = a (I Pi . Let 
then P be an "active" strategy under X*, i.e. P = P. and et: > 0. Then, VO, 
we have OF g  P 	 = 	(if it is not the case that x E 0 
and a E P) or P attacks itself in KF( x,a ) (if x E 0 and a E P). The last 
case cannot occur, indeed a is assumed to be superfluous with respect to x, 
P is assumed to be an active strategy and thus a 0 P. So, by monotonicity 
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of f, OF (P,O) 5_ OF+(,) (P,0). Since a V P, P is conflict-free in F iff P 
is conflict-free in F±(x,a) and 0 attacks P in F if 0 attacks P in F+(x ,,,,). 
Therefore, we have proved that for every active strategy P under X* we have 
OF(P, 0) < 	(P, 0). By playing with X* in the (F±(x,a ), x) game, the 
proponent can secure a payoff of at least sF(x). Hence, sF,( .,.) (x)> sF (x). 
If a is not superfluous with respect to x, then the proponent of x must play 
strategies containing x but not a, as all strategies containing both x and a are 
non-conflict-free in F+(x,a) and result by definition 4.8 in a payoff that is zero. 
Since the proponent of x is restricted to playing only with strategies containing 
x but not a and a is not superfluous with respect to x, the proponent's payoff 
sF (x) is reduced by definition of the term superfluous. 	 0 
As sanctioned by property 4.8 below, adding an attack against an attacker of 
some argument increases the strength of that same argument. For example, in 
Figure 4.7, the addition of the attack (c, a) against the attacker a of b increases 
the strength of b from 0.25 to 0.5. 
a—›-bo.25 
Figure 4.7: Adding a defender to an argument. 
Property 4.8. If y attacks x in F, then s_p_k.0 (x) > sF (x). 
Proof. The sets of strategies of the players are the same in the (F, x) and 
(F+( ,, y) ,x) games. We have OF P C OF7,P( 	(if z E P and y E 0) and 
01`TP = 0'171:1L0 (otherwise). We also have Pi-7° C Pk-+° y) (if y E P and z E 0) 
and Pp-° = PF'-+° ) (otherwise). Note that if y E P then P attacks itself in (.0, 
both F and .17+(,,y ). So, OF(P, 	q5F+( .,v) (P,O) and sF (x) < sF+(z , y)(x). 0 
The strength of an argument only depends on the arguments that are related 
to it in the dialectical sense. Formally, 
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Property 4.9. If F = (Arg, att) and F' = (Arg', att') are disjoint and x E 
Arg, then SF+F ,(X) = SF(X). 
Proof. Let us denote by 
• vF the value of the (F, x) game 
• vF+F' the value of the (F F', x) game 
vF-FF'(P • C Arg) the value of a variant of the (F F', x) game where the 
proponent is restricted to play only with strategies P c Arg 
• VF+Fv(0 C Arg) the value of a variant of the (F F', x) game where the 
opponent is restricted to play only with strategies 0 C Arg 
The gain of a player cannot strictly increase by restriction of his set of possible 
strategies. Thus, 
• for the proponent's gain, we have VF+F ,(P C Arg) < VF+F', and 
• for the opponent's gain, we have —vF+F ,  (0 C Arg) < —vF4,F , , or equiv-
alently, VF+F ,(0 C Arg) > vF+F ,  • 
In the (F+F', x) game, if one player plays only with strategies that are subsets of 
Arg, then his adversary wins or loses nothing by also playing with strategies that 
are subsets of Arg, since the arguments in Arg' neither attack these strategies 
nor are attacked by them. So, we also have 
• VF+F ,(P C Arg) = t)p-, and 
• VF+F ,(0 C Arg) = VF. 
In summary, 
VF+F' > VF±F,(P C Arg) = VF = VF±F,(0 C Arg) ?_VF-FF' 
so that VF+F ,  = VF• 	 ❑  
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This last property is quite useful, as it allows to distribute the computation 
of the strength in frameworks that have disjoint components. 
4.4 	Social welfare-based aggregation of value ar- 
guments 
In the previous section, we have defined an argument strength measure sF for 
any abstract argumentation framework F. Here, we consider frameworks of the 
kind described in Section 4.2. There, arguments are either value or mitigation 
arguments. Figure 4.8 shows the strength of arguments given in Figure 4.1, 
Section 4.2. 





a3 0.25 	a4 0.25 
17  
m31 
Figure 4.8: Strength of arguments in the umbrella problem. 
In this section, we define a method for aggregating value arguments using 
this notion of strength to weigh arguments. 
Conceptually, the issue of aggregating value arguments is similar to the one 
of aggregating the individual preferences of a society or group of individuals 
{al , 	, ak.}. In the areas of Social Welfare and Economics, influential works 
such as [Fleming, 1952], [Harsanyi, 1955] and [Dyer and Sarin, 1978] have iden-
tified rational preference aggregation rules. Fleming and Harsanyi were the first 
to argue (both mathematically and philosophically) in favour of simple classes of 
social welfare functions. These social welfare functions are linear weighted com- 
binations of individual preference functions over outcomes Val , 	, Vak : X -4 R, 
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{va if ga E o 
Va (o) = 
0 otherwise 
defined as 
V = E A., Va, 
i=i 
The weights A„, , • • • , 	E R4 are called interpersonal weights. Each weight Act 
represents the social importance of ai , i.e. the value taken by the social welfare 
function V when only the preference of individual ai is taken into account. 
We suggest to draw a parallel between individual preferences and value argu-
ments, as well as between interpersonal weights and the strength of arguments. 
These analogies suggest that value functions can be constructed in the same 
way as social welfare functions. In this perspective, value and mitigation argu-
ments constitute a society in which the social importance of value arguments 
corresponds to their dialectical strength and mitigation arguments play the role 
of counter-powers that regulate the importance (given by the strength) of value 
arguments. 
Given a set A of value arguments as in Section 4.2, we define 
Definition 4.11. For each value argument a = (Ja ,Ca ) E A where Ca = 
(9., v.), the individual value function Va : 2G  —> IR is defined, Vo C G, by 
	
Equivalently, Va (o) = va L(ga ), where 10 : G 	{0, 1} is the characteristic 
function of the set o. Since mitigation arguments do not constitute statements 
directly concerning outcomes, we define V, = 0 for every in E M. Choosing as 
interpersonal weight Aa for each argument a E Arg = AU M the strength sF(a) 
of a, we obtain for every outcome o C G 
v(0) 	E s F (a)Va (o) = 	s F (a)Va (o) 
aEArg 	 aEA 
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This finally gives us 
Definition 4.12. The dialectical value function V is given for every out-
come o by 
V(o) = 	s F (a)Va(o) 
aEA 
Applying this formula to the umbrella problem, we obtain 
• V({dry, loaded}) = 0.5 * (+1) * 1 + 0.5 * (-1) * 0 + 0.25 * (-0.25) * 1 + 
0.25 * (+0.25) *0 = 0.5 - 0.25 *0.25 = 0.4375 
• V({dry, -, loaded}) = 0.5 * (+1) * 1 + 0.5 * (-1) * 0 + 0.25 * (-0.25) * 0 + 
0.25 * (+0.25) *1 = 0.5 + 0.25 * 0.25 = 0.5625 
• V({-,dry, -loaded}) = 0.5 * (+1) * 0 + 0.5 * (-1) * 1 + 0.25 * (-0.25) * 0 + 
0.25 * (+0.25) *1 = -0.5 + 0.25* 0.25 = -0.4375 
As intuitively expected, 
V({dry, -,loaded}) > V({dry,loaded}) > V({-,dry, -loaded}) 
We are now going to study the properties of dialectical value functions. 
Let V be a dialectical value function and let us consider the preference 
relation r induced by V. This relation is defined Vo, o' C G as o o' if and 
only if V(o) > V(o'). For every value argument a, we also use the individual 
preference >a defined for any outcomes o and o' as o >a o' if and only if 
Va (o) > Va(o) and read ` o is strictly preferred to o' according to a'. Since V is 
by construction a linear social welfare function, the following three properties 
hold (refer to [Fleming, 1952] for the proofs of these results). 
Property 4.10. The preference relation is a total order on X . 
Namely, dialectical value functions induce rational preferences. 
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Property 4.11. If o >a  o' and — ,(o' ›-b o) for every b 4  a, then o >- o'. 
Namely, if the preference induced by an argument over two outcomes does 
not conflict with the preference induced by any other argument, then the pref-
erence induced by the dialectical value function agrees with that argument. 
Property 4.12. If o >Th„ o' and o' >-- b o, Va (o) — Va (o') = Vb(o') — Vb(o), and 
neither o 	o' nor o' >--, o for every c a b, then o >- o' if 8F(a) > sF (b). 
Namely, when there is a conflict between the preferences induced by two 
arguments a and b and the preferences induced by all other value arguments c 
are indifferent, the preference induced by the dialectical value function depends 
exclusively on the relative strength of a and b. 
The mathematical properties of sF imply additional properties for the di-
alectical value function V. These properties are expressed in terms of 
• an argumentation framework F composed of a set A of value arguments 
and a set M of mitigation arguments, 
• an argumentation framework F' disjoint from F and composed of only 
one value argument a' and a set M' of mitigation arguments. 
We will denote VF+F‘ the value function obtained from F±F' and VF the value 
function obtained from F only. For every outcome o, we also define the set of 
value arguments in favour or pro o. 
Definition 4.13. The set of arguments pro the outcome o is 
Pro(o) = {a = (Ja , (ga ,Va )) E L x (G x S)1 ga E 0, Va ?_ 0} 
Similarly, we define the set of value arguments against or con o. 
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Definition 4.14. The set of arguments con the outcome o is 
Con(o) = {a = (Ja , (g a , 'Oa )) E L x (G x S) g a E 0, Va < 0} 
An argument pro an outcome o increases the value of o. Formally, 
Property 4.13. If a' E Pro(o), then VF H-F ,  (0) = VF(o) + SF ,  ( d)va,  > VF(o). 
Proof. 
VFH-F ,  (0) = E s,±F,va(0) = 
aEAU{a'} aEA 
SF±F ,(a)Va(0) S F±F ,(a')Va,(o) 
= E sF (a)Va(o)+ 8F , (a')Va,(o) (by prop. 4.9) 
aEA 
s (a)Va(o)+ sF ,(d)va,  (since a' E Pro(o) and thus ga, E o) 
aEA 
sF (a)Va(o) (sF'(a') > 0 by prop. 4.1, va, > 0 since a' E Pro(o)) 
aEA 
0 
Similarly, an argument con o decreases the value of o. Formally, 
Property 4.14. If a' E Con(o), then VF±F,  (0) = VF (o) + SF ,  (a')va, < VF (o). 
Proof. 
VF _FF ,  (0) = E S F+F ,Va(0) = E SF_F F ,  (a)Va(0) SF±F ,(d)17„,(o) 
aEAU{a'} 	 aEA 
8F (a)Va(o)+ sF ,(a')Va,(o) (by prop. 4.9) 
aEA 
= E sF(a)Va(o) + sF,(a')va, (since a' E Con(o) and thus ga,  E o) 
aEA 




Note that the increase or decrease of value caused by the value argument a' 
in F' depends on its strength with respect to the mitigation arguments in M'. 
The value of an outcome can be bounded below by the sum of the values of 
its arguments con and above by the sum of the values of its arguments pro. 
Property 4.15. 
< < E va 
cLEAncan(0 ) 	 aEAnpro( o)  
Proof. Since Va(o) = 0 whenever ga ¢ o, we have 
VF(o) = E s,cova(0)+ I sF(a)Va(o) 
aEAnPro(o) 	 .EAncon(0) 
We have Va(o) = va > 0 for every argument a E An Pro(o) and Va(o) = va < 0 
for every argument a E An Con(o). By property 4.1, we also have 0 < sF(a) < 1, 
consequently 
VF( 0 ) .?_ 	E s,(a)va 	E va 
aCAnCon(o) 	 aeAnCon(o) 
VF(o) C E sF(a)va 	E va 
aEAnpro(a) 	acAnpra(a)  
0 
The following four properties are deduced from the dynamic properties of 
our dialectical strength measure. Assuming a E A is a value argument of F, 
b E M is a mitigation argument of F that does not attack a and denoting as in 
Section 4.3.4 by F+(b,a)  the framework in which the attack (b, a) is added to F, 
then we also have 
Property 4.16. If a E Pro(o), then VF+( , o (o) 5_ VF(o). 
Proof. This derives directly from the fact that ga E o, va > 0 and S F+0 ,o (a) < 
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sF (a) which holds by property 4.6. 	 0 
Property 4.17. If a E Con(o), then VF+(b „) (o)?VF(o). 
Proof. This derives directly from the fact that ga E o, va < 0 and sF+( ,,„)  (a) 5.. 
sF(a) which holds by property 4.6. 	 0 
Intuitively, these last two properties mean that adding an attack against an 
argument pro an outcome reduces the value of the outcome, and that adding an 
attack against an argument con an outcome increases the value of the outcome. 
In the next two properties, we assume that a is a value argument in F, that 
m and m' are two mitigation arguments in F such that m attacks a and m' does 
not attack m in F. We naturally denote by F+( .„,,,i) the framework in which 
the attack (m1, m) is added to F. We have in this case 
Property 4.18. If a E Pro(o), then VF+( ,,, m) (o)?VF(o). 
Proof. This derives directly from the fact that ga E o, va > 0 and sF.{.( ,,,,n) (a) > 
sF(a) which holds by property 4.8. 	 0 
Property 4.19. If a E Con(o), then VF4 (n,, ) (o) 5_ VF (o). 
Proof. This derives directly from the fact that ga E o, va < 0 and 8F+(,,,,,) (a) 
sF (a) which holds by property 4.8. 	 0 
Intuitively, these last two properties mean that adding a defender to an 
argument pro an outcome increases the value of the outcome, and that adding 
a defender to an argument con an outcome decreases the value of the outcome. 
Now, we consider that F1 , . , Fk are mutually disjoint argumentation frame-
works composed of value and mitigation arguments. We show that 
Property 4.20. If F1, , Fk are disjoint and F = F1 + 	+ Fk, then 
VF =VFI  
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Proof. This derives directly from the additivity of VF with respect to value 
arguments and property 4.9 concerning the strength of arguments contained in 
mutually disjoint frameworks. 	 ❑  
This last property means that the value functions obtained from dialecti-
cally independent bodies of uncertain knowledge concerning the desirability of 
outcomes simply add up. 
Now that we have defined dialectical value functions and studied their prop-
erties, we may use them for the practical construction of value functions. In the 
next section, we construct value functions for poker playing programs. 
4.5 Value functions for poker playing programs 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, and unlike games of perfect information such as 
chess, checkers, othello and backgammon where brute-force search techniques 
have proved to be quite effective, the game of poker is nowadays still consid-
ered as a challenge to artificial intelligence, chiefly because of the difficulty of 
assessing the expected value of betting decisions. [Billings et al., 1999] provides 
an excellent account of state-of-the-art game of poker playing program archi-
tectures. Programs able to play a strong game of poker rely on knowledge and 
observation based probabilistic models of opponent players, techniques to ini-
tialise and re-weight probabilities after each round, stochastic procedures such 
as selective sampling to estimate the expected value of each betting decision, 
ways to randomise playing strategies, etc. 
Statistical studies show that the strategies adopted by human players are 
very much dependent on their psychological and emotional states [Caro, 2003]. 
For instance, risk averse players tend to fold too many hands pre-flop, greedy 
players often make exaggerated bets, non-opportunistic players easily waste pre- 
124 
mium pocket cards, patient players are better able to trap their opponents, 
aggressive players overly rely on bluffing, etc. We envisage the possibility of 
enriching existing poker playing programs with human-like psychological and 
emotional features. This can be done by re-designing the value functions used 
by poker playing programs to assess the expected value of betting decisions. 
Current programs such as Poki 2 [Billings et al., 1999] only value an outcome 
by considering the amount of money or chips gained. Following Section 4.2, we 
suggest to substitute the monetary scale with a desirability scale implicitly given 
by the last column of Table 4.2 and we model the influence of a player's psycho-
logical and emotional state on its valuation using the value arguments defined 
in that same table. Justifications here relate to various possible features of the 
player's psychological and emotional state. The claims of the argument express 
how much satisfaction or enjoyment a player gets in different circumstances. 
For instance, risk averse players most enjoy playing hands that do not put them 
at risk, as opposed to risk neutral or risk seeking players, greedy players like to 
see other players increasing the pot size (as they see it as their potential gain), 
and aggressive players have a strong desire to increase their chances of winning 
pots by frightening their opponents (bluffing). 
The mental states and strategies of poker players constantly change in time. 
Within each game, the number of opponents decreases, the size pot increases 
and the uncertainty is reduced as more community cards get revealed. Game 
after game, more players get eliminated (in tournaments), the blinds (minimum 
betting amounts) periodically increase, putting players under time pressure and 
forcing short-stacked players to take more risk, players may gain a lot of knowl-
edge about each other, etc. All these changes in the game scene have a direct 
influence on the players' mental state. These influences are modeled as argu-
ments mitigating the natural or default profile of each player. 
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justification .7„ goal g, desirability v, 
RA (risk averse) NR+ (no risk) 0.5 (desirable) 
RA (risk averse) SR — (small risk) —0.25 (fairly undesirable) 
RA (risk averse) BR — (big risk) —1 (quite undesirable) 
SR.A (slightly risk averse) NR+ (no risk) 0.5 (desirable) 
SRA (slightly risk averse) SR — (small risk) 0.25 (fairly desirable) 
SRA (slightly risk averse) BR — (big risk) —0.5 (undesirable) 
RN (risk neutral) NR+ (no risk) 0.5 (desirable) 
RN (risk neutral) SR — (small risk) 0.5 (desirable) 
RN (risk neutral) BR — (big risk) 0 (null/indifferent) 
NG (non-greedy) APV+ (add pot value) —0.5 (undesirable) 
0  (greedy) APV+ (add pot value) 0.5 (desirable) 
VG (very greedy) APV+ (add pot value) 1 (quite desirable) 
O (opportunistic) LB+ (likely best hand) 1 (quite desirable) 
O (opportunistic) UB — (unlikely best hand) —1 (quite undesirable) 
NO (not opportunistic) LB+ (likely best hand) 0.5 (desirable) 
NO (not opportunistic) U13 — (unlikely best hand) —0.5 (undesirable) 
P (patient) LIIF+ (likely best hand in future) 0.5 (desirable) 
P (patient) UBF — (nnlikely best hand in future) —0.5 (undesirable) 
NP (not patient) LBF+ (likely best hand in future) 0.25 (fairly desirable) 
NP (not patient) UBF — (unlikely best band in future) —0.25 (fairly undesirable) 
NA (non aggressive) IFC+ (increase future chances) —0.25 (slightly undesirable) 
A (aggressive) IFC+ (Increase future chances) 0.5 (desirable) 
VA (very aggressive) IFC+ (increase future chances) 1 (quite desirable) 
Table 4.2: Value arguments depending on the psychological and emotional state 
of the player. 
We propose the mitigation arguments as defined in Table 4.3. The top half of 
the table gives mitigation arguments that attack value arguments. The bottom 
half gives mitigation arguments that attack other mitigation arguments. Two 
levels of attacks seem sufficient here to express the conflicts and uncertainties 
of a game of poker player concerning the desirability of his objectives. The 
resulting argumentation frameworks can only be composed of smaller graphs 
disconnected with one another, allowing us to distribute the computation of the 
strength of the arguments (see property 4.20). Consider for example a risk averse 
(RA) but greedy (G) and very aggressive (VA) player being short-stacked and 
almost out of the table (KO), and playing against loose opponents (LO), some 
of them being also greedy players (GO). Suppose the player's hand is really bad, 
making him almost sure to lose (L). The player considers the idea of bluffing, 
but believes that due to his relative lack of experience, the bluff would most 
likely fail (BF). This entire situation would be modeled by the argumentation 
framework shown in Figure 4.9. 
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justification .4,,, claim -.J,, 
KO (short-stacked and almost out) -.RA 
LO (only loose opponents left) -.RA 
H (heads-up or very close to end of tournament) -,SRA 
SET (short-stacked but enongh time to rebuild chip stack) -.RN 
CO (a conservative opponent still in competition after flop) -.RN 
DO (need to damage stack of very threatening opponent) -.NG 
GO (several greedy opponents left) -G 
T (wish to trap opponent or look friendly) -.VG 
KO -.0 
KOO (opportunity to kick-out a short-stacked opponent) -,NO 
SA (only slim advantage over opponents) -.1= 
W (almost snre to win pot) -.ND 
SD (attempt to semi-bluff) -.NA 
SB (attempt to semi-bluff) -.VA 
B (attempt to bluff may succeed) -.NA 
BP' (attempt to bluff is likely to fail) -.NA 
BF (attempt to bluff is likely to fall) -.VA 
L (almost sure to lose hand) -.KO 
MC (some opponents are getting more conservative) -.LO 
SHO (opponent scents to have a strong hand) -.H 
ST (very strong table with experienced players) oSET 
COB (conservative opponent seems to bluff) -.CO 
ALLIN (another player has gone all in against the threatening opponent) -.DO 
W -.GO 
SHO -T 
WP (the opponent that is almost out is aweak player) -.K00 
NOB (number of outs is big) -,SA 
TOP (an opponent could have a straight, flush, full house or four of a kind) -.W 
NOS (number of outs is small) -TSB 
CALL (an inexperienced/upset opponent is likely to call you) -43 
KO -3F 
Table 4.3: Mitigation arguments depending on the playing scene. 
(VA, (I PC+ , 1))0.880 (RA, (BR-, -1))0.25 (G, (A PV+ , 0.5 ))0.25 
(BF, -.VA)0.5  (KO, -4=?A)0.25 (LO, --•RA)1 (GO, -,G) 3. 
(KO, —d3P )0.25 IC0), C (L, 
Figure 4.9: Framework modeling the uncertainties of a desperate bluffer. 
Once the argumentation framework F is constructed, one can apply the 
game-theoretic method of Section 4.3 to estimate the strength of value (and 
optionally mitigation) arguments. The strength of each argument is indicated 
in subscript and printed in bold font in the case of value arguments in Figure 
4.9. The resulting dialectical value of the outcome x = {BR— , APV+ , I FC+} 
would be here VF (x) = 0.25*(-1) +0.25*(0.5) +0.386*(1) = 0.261 ti 0.25. So, 
despite the risk involved, bluffing would still appear to be a slightly desirable 
betting decision for that desperate aggressive player. 
We recall in Figure 4.10 the general decision table generated in Section 3.7, 
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NR-P,UB — ,UBF — 
SR— , APO ,UB — UBF — 
d3 	BR — , APV+, I 	, UB — , UBF — 
u n- LBF:1- 
SR — APO UR — , LBF+ 
BR — , APO 1FC+ ,UB — LEIF+ 
dl  
d2  
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where d1 is fold/check, d2 is call and d3 is raise. We may now assess the value 
of each outcome given by that table. Suppose an opponent has raised before 
the bluffer. Then the possibility to check is discarded and d1 becomes fold. The 
results for the value of the outcomes in the corresponding table are computed 
in Figure 4.11. Of course, these results are specific to the case of a desperate 
bluffer and should not be used for different types of players nor bluffers playing 
in different circumstances. 
101 V 11.3  "2 V ‘.-.4 71,5 V IV 7 
al  NB+ , APV+. LB+ , LBO- NR+, APV+, LB,, UDF —  NB+ . LB+, LBF -1- 
d2 SR— , APV+, LB+, LBF -1- SR — ,APV+, LB+ , UBF — SR — , APO - , LB+ , LRF+ 
d3  SR— , APV+, LB+, LBF+ SR — ,APV -i- , LB+ , UBF — SR— , APO - , IFC+ , LB+ , LBF -1- 
"6 V "'8 
al  
112 
N R+ LB+ UBF — 
SR— APVT LB+ UBF — 
a3 	SR— , APV+ 	LB+ ,UBF — 
NR+ , APV+ U ,UBF — 
SR — APO ,UB — UBF — 
BR — , APV+ U13— UBF — 
N R+ , APO ,UR— LBF+ 
SR— APV+ ,UB — LBF+ 
BR — APV+ ,UB — , LBF+ 
zvo V "10 ",11 V ,,,12 
Figure 4.10: Poker decision table. 
Figure 4.11: Value function for the desperate bluffer after a raise. 
In the light of this value function and if no probabilistic information con-
cerning the scenarios is available, the decisions should be compared using one of 
the criteria for decision under strict uncertainty (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, 
it is already clear that a rational bluffer would not fold in this case, as no matter 
which scenario occurs, the outcome resulting from a call is always at least as 
desirable as the one resulting from folding. Observe from the table in Figure 
4.12 that all of the four classical criteria reject that decision. In fact, Wald's 
pessimistic criterion leads to a call, while Hurwicz, Savage and Laplace's criteria 
all lead to a raise. 
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fold/check 	call 	raise 	best decision 
Wald's maximin return 0 0.125 —0.125 call 
Hurwitz optimism-pessimism index (x = 0.5) 0.0625 0.125 0.193 raise 
Savage's minimax regret 0.511 0.386 0.25 raise 
Laplace's principle of insufficient reason 0.0625 0.125 0.193 raise 
Figure 4.12: Best decision for the desperate bluffer (strict uncertainty). 
In the case of decision under risk, the best decision may vary between call 
and raise. To be fully rigorous, the decision of folding could be equally desirable 
as checking, if the probability of the event E = {w5,w7,w13, W14, W15, w16} was 
null. No matter what the probability distribution P of the scenarios is, the 
expected value of checking is always equal to E(check) = 0.125. Whether a 
raise should be preferred to a call very much depends here on the probability 
of E' = {w9 wio, wil, w12} (ending the turn with a bad hand and facing strong 
opponents) since raising under this event has undesirable consequences (with an 
associated negative value of —0.125 in units of desirability) for the player. If the 
bluffer thinks he has a fifty percent chance of avoiding this risk (occurrence of E') 
and that all other scenarios are equally likely, the expected value of a raise would 
be E(raise) = 0.125 * P({wl , w3 , w2 , w4}) + 0.511 * P({w5 , w7 , w6 , w8}) — 0.125 * 
P(E')+0.216*P({w13 , Wi4, ?Dm, wisp = 0.125*4*0.5/12 +0.511*4*0.5/12 — 
0.125 * 0.5 + 0.216 * 4 * 0.5/12 = 0.02083 + 0.08516 + 0.0625 + 0.036 = 0.2045. 
Since E(raise) > E(check) the bluffer should again prefer to raise. 
4.6 Related work 
The vast majority of existing works on value functions is in fact concerned with 
utility functions. A utility function U is a value function U : X —s R that 
has the property of representing the preferences of a subject (decision maker). 
Various types of utility functions have been studied, depending on the type (i.e. 
structure and properties) of the preference relation considered. We consider 
these here-after and then relate them to our dialectical value function. 
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In game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] for instance, rational 
players are assumed to be able to compare uncertain outcomes (risky alterna-
tives). The preference relation employed is a binary relation over the set of 
lotteries, where in a  lottery (pi, x1 ; • • • ; Pn, xn), the subject gets by definition 
the price x, E X with probability pi . The relation is assumed to be complete, 
transitive, Archimedean and to satisfy the property of independence to irrele-
vant alternatives. The expected utility theorem shows that there exists a value 
function u, unique up to scaling changes, whose expectation represents the pref- 
erence >- in the sense that for every lotteries L and L', L 	L' if and only if 
u(xi)pi 	 A value function u satisfying this property is 
called a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 
In decision analysis [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Farquhar, 1977; Fishburn, 
1979], marketing science [Hauser and Urban, 1975; Eliashberg, 1980] and psy-
chology [Goodman et al., 1979; Lee, 1971; Tversky, 1967], outcomes often corre-
spond to continuous variables such as wealth, capital or labour. The infiniteness 
of the set of outcomes X renders the measurement of von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions from a subject practically impossible (the subject indeed can-
not compare infinitely many lotteries). For this reason, behavioural assumptions 
are made concerning the subject and used to reduce the utility function to a 
special analytical form. Under such assumptions, the measurement of a von-
Neumann Morgenstern utility function boils down to the estimation of one or 
several parameters. [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976] provide an excellent account of 
these approaches. For example, the utility of a sum of gains x > 0 is of the form 
ur(x) = 1 — e' for a subject with constant absolute risk aversion r > 0. The 
parameter r can be estimated by asking the subject which probability value p 
makes the lottery (1 — p, x ; p, z) equally preferable to getting a certain reward 
of y, for some fixed amounts x < y < z. 
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In qualitative decision theory [Tan and Pearl, 1994; Bacchus and Grove, 
1996; Boutilier et al., 1999; McGeachie and Doyle, 2002], outcomes are repre- 
sented in a logical form, e.g. x = {p, q, 	y = Hp, q, 	z = 	 , 
etc. The preference relations take the form of reflexive, transitive and not nec-
essarily complete relations (i.e. pre-orders) over outcomes. These preferences 
are represented in a quite compact fashion by collections of statements of the 
form f g, meaning that any outcome x satisfying formula f is preferred to 
any outcome satisfying formula g, all literals of x and y being equal outside the 
support of the formulae f and g. The utility functions used to represent such 
preferences are called ceteris paribus utility functions. 
Dialectical value functions are not derived from a preference relation and as 
a consequence do not constitute utility functions. Dialectical value functions 
are derived from judgements of desirability, expressed in terms of value and 
mitigation arguments. Value arguments differ from preference statements in 
the sense that a) the subject does not need to be certain about their validity, 
b) they relate to the absolute desirability of goals, rather than than the relative 
desirability of outcomes or lotteries, and c) they allow the subject to examine 
his/her own uncertainties. Like ceteris paribus preferences, sets of arguments 
can be incomplete, making dialectical value functions always measurable. Our 
knowledge model based on abstract argumentation and linear value function 
makes a behavioural assumption concerning the decision maker, as done for 
the practical construction of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We 
thus essentially assume that the decision maker is able to express arguments, 
provide justifications, identify their conflicts and to assign each argument the 
importance that it deserves from a dialectical standpoint. 
In argumentation for decision making [Amgoud, 2005; 2009] (see Chapter 2), 
the arguments employed concern either the pros and cons of decisions (practical 
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arguments) or beliefs (epistemic arguments). In our approach, we focus on the 
desirability of outcomes (via value arguments) rather than decisions and thus 
do not make use of practical arguments. Value arguments can like practical 
arguments also be either pro or con. More precisely, value arguments associate 
numerical values of desirability to goals. Obviously, our goals play the same 
role as "values" in value-based argumentation [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2002; 
Bench-Capon, 2003] and our scale of desirability plays the same role as the 
preference relation assumed over these "values". We also importantly rely on 
mitigation arguments, which naturally can be seen as epistemic arguments. A 
remark that may be of interest to practitioners of argumentation for decision 
making is that Fleming's preference aggregation mechanism [Fleming, 1952] and 
the dialectical strength measure used to aggregate value arguments (see defini-
tion 4.12) can serve as a non-polar decision principle [Amgoud and de Saint-Cyr, 
2008] and so be used in argumentation for decision making to value decisions 
from sets of (accepted) practical arguments in favour or against decisions. 
Other dialectical measures of argument strength such as [Besnard and Hunter, 
2000] and [Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] may also prove useful for the 
practical construction of value functions as these measures provide different 
rankings of the arguments, as observed in Section 4.3. When the arguments 
considered by a subject are those advanced by others, it is important, in order 
to evaluate the strength of these arguments, not only to look at their dialecti-
cal structure, but also to adopt the viewpoint (knowledge-base) of the subject. 
To this effect, [Hunter, 2004] designed a measure of strength called believabil-
ity that is an interaction-based measure, in the sense that it depends on the 
attacks (undercuts) between logical arguments, but which is at the same time 
intrinsic, insofar as its computation involves the degree of entailment of the 
subject's knowledge base for the arguments considered. This measure has fur- 
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thermore the great advantage of being computationally much simpler than our 
game-theoretic notion of strength, as it can be computed by iteration on the fi-
nite tree of attackers and defenders of the argument that needs to be evaluated, 
rather than by linear optimisation. 
4.7 Summary and conclusion 
We have shown that abstract argumentation [Dung, 1995] offers an elegant 
framework for modeling the uncertain knowledge of a decision maker concerning 
the desirability of his objectives, and game theory [von Neumann, 1928] offers a 
rational way to quantify the strength of arguments in abstract argumentation. 
Moreover, we have applied Fleming's social welfare theory [Fleming, 1952] to the 
case of a "society" of value arguments to construct (by aggregation) a dialectical 
value function. We have discussed some of the practical advantages offered by 
this approach, shown the normative goodness of dialectical value functions, their 
adequacy with the decision maker's beliefs and have used them to enrich the 
strategy of poker playing programs. 
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Chapter 5 
Capturing uncertainty with 
imprecise probabilities 
The term uncertainty is generally used to denote the mental state of a subject 
who knows in which states a given object of interest can possibly be, but who 
ignores which state precisely is the true one. In the context of decision making 
under strict uncertainty or risk, the possible states w1 , 	, wn are referred to 
as scenarios and the set 12 = {wi , 	, wn} of all scenarios as universe. The 
universe is assumed to be exhaustive (containing the true state) and its scenarios 
to be mutually exclusive (no two scenarios can both be the true state). Subsets 
E C 12 are referred to as events and we say that an event E occurs when the true 
scenario belongs to E. The powerset 2ci of I/ is the set of all events. Uncertainty 
about the true scenario is most often described in terms of a Bayesian probability 
distribution quantifying the chance of occurrence of each scenario in the universe 
and allowing to estimate the probability of events. 
Broadly speaking, probability has been defined in two ways. Frequency prob-
ability [Heyman, 1950; Fishburn, 1964] interprets the probability of a scenario 
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as the limit of its relative frequency in a large number of observations. Sub-
jective probability interprets the probability of a scenario as the confidence an 
individual has in the occurrence of that scenario [Savage, 1972] and is subjective 
in that respect. Subjective probability is not necessarily based on any precise 
computation but is often a reasonable assessment made by an expert or knowl-
edgeable person. The purpose of this chapter is to present a general method for 
estimating the probabilities of scenarios and events given statistical information 
about their occurrence in the past and the opinions of experts about their oc-
currence in the future. We will thus be concerned with both the frequency and 
the subjective approaches to probability. We will consider opinions in the form 
of arguments. 
In practical decision making, the information available to a subject may 
be incomplete, imprecise, fragmentary, unreliable, vague or contradictory [Klir, 
2006]. The notion of Bayesian probability has been enlarged to cope with such 
situations. The notion of imprecise probability is used as a generic term to cover 
all mathematical models which measure uncertainty without sharp numerical 
probabilities. The probabilities obtained using the method introduced in this 
chapter will in general be imprecise. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 presents background on 
Bayesian probability, confidence intervals, imprecise probabilities and a special 
kind of imprecise probability called belief function [Shafer, 1976]. The problem 
of constructing reliable belief functions based on statistical information only is 
studied in Section 5.2. We call the resulting imprecise probabilities robust belief 
functions. Section 5.3 presents our model based on abstract argumentation to 
represent expert opinions. Section 5.4 proposes formulae for constructing belief 
functions in the general case where expert opinions are available, in addition to 
statistics. We call these belief functions dialectical probabilities. Together with 
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robust belief functions dialectical probabilities constitute the main contribution 
of this chapter. In Section 5.5, we formally justify the mathematical coherence of 
dialectical probabilities. Section 5.6 provides a detailed study of the substantive 
and normative properties of dialectical probabilities concerning the information-
theoretic indeterminacy and uncertainty of the subject. In Section 5.7, we test 
the effectiveness of dialectical probabilities in trust computing. In Section 5.8 
we discuss related work and conclude in Section 5.9. 
5.1 Background on imprecise probabilities 
5.1.1 Bayesian probability 
Bayesian probability is concerned with the probability of events, that is to say, 
with the estimation of the likelihood of their occurrence. A Bayesian probability 
distribution is a function P : S2 —> [0, 1] that is normalised 
>2,  P(w) = 1 
wEsi 
The probability of an event E C 52 is by abuse of notation denoted P(E) and 
is defined as 
P(E) = 	P(w) 
wEE 
It is often not necessary to consider all events E in 20. Any family of events is 
acceptable provided that it contains 52 and is closed under complementation 
Ee = — E 
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and finite union. For any events A and B, we say that A and B are disjoint if 
and only if A n B = 0. For any pair of such disjoint events, we have 
P(A U B) = P (A) + P(B) 
This basic property of Bayesian probability distributions is referred to as addi-
tivity. If A and B are not disjoint, we have instead 
P (A U B) = P (A) + P(B) — P (A n B) 
Given any real-valued function X : SZ —> R, the value 
Ep(X) = 	X(w)P(w) 
weS1 
is called the expected value of X. Given two events A and B with P(B) > 0, 
the conditional probability of A given B is denoted P(A1B) and defined as 
P(AIB) P(A n B) P(B) 
In the frequency approach to probability, a probability distribution can be con-
structed assuming as given a sample of N observations (often taken of size larger 
than 30) of the occurrence of the true scenario in the past 
• • • WiN E 52 
The probability derived from the sample is called statistical prior, denoted 15 
and defined by the relative frequencies 
N 
13(w) =N E/{.}(Wik) k=1 
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where Too : 	{0, 1} is the indicator function of the event {w}, i.e. 
1 	if wi, = w 
1-{w} (wik ) = 
0 otherwise 
In the subjective approach to probability, P is often not calculated by any 
precise mean but simply guessed or derived from some knowledge about the 
underlying mechanics of the random system or object of interest. 
5.1.2 Confidence intervals for relative frequencies 
In statistics [Shapiro and Gross, 1981], the reliability of an estimated relative 
frequency very much depends on the size N of the random sample available 
and is indicated using a confidence interval. The methods we will introduce 
in Sections 5.2 and 5.4 to build imprecise probabilities rely upon confidence 
intervals. This subsection explains how to obtain confidence intervals for the 
relative frequencies 25(w), where w E 11. 
Each relative frequency 23(w) is defined as the arithmetic average of N iden-
tical and independent random variables i{„}.  Each relative frequency 25(w) is 
therefore also random. Consider now the central limit theorem [de Moivre, 1718; 
Laplace, 1812; Ljapunov, 1901]: 
Theorem 5.1. If X1, 	X N is a sequence of N independent and identically 
distributed random variables with finite expectation tt and variance 0-2 > 0, then 
for N > 30, the random variable 
X — Z= 	 o- 
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where X denotes the average 
1- 	X 	. . . 	N 
= 
is approximately distributed as the standard normal distribution N.(0,1). 
Here, each random variable /{.,,,} follows a Bernoulli distribution with prob-
ability success p(w) (the true probability of w), which means that it takes the 
value 1 with probability p(w) and the value 0 with probability 1 — p(w). The 
expectation and variance of i{,„,}  are thus simple to assess 
= Ep(/{.}) 	p(wi)/{.} (wi) = p(w) 
i=1 
(72 = EX/NI — /1)2 ) = Ep(woci{w}(wi) — p(w))2 
i=1 
= (1  — p(w))p2(w) +P(w)(1  p(w))2 
= P(w)(1 - p(w)) 
Note that since Ep(i{w}) = p(w), we have by linearity of Ep [Neyman, 1950; 
Fishburn, 1964] 
Theorem 5.2. The relative frequency P(w) is an unbiased estimator for the 
true probability p(w), i.e. 
EP (
7\7 E I{w})  =P(W) 
k=1 
The central limit theorem 5.1 allows us to compute approximate confidence 
intervals for relative frequencies when N > 30. These intervals are known as 
Wilson (score) intervals [Wilson, 1927]. 
Theorem 5.3. Let x be a parameter comprised between 0 and 1. Let p(w) and 
N 
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2-5(w) be the roots of the quadratic equation in the variable p 
z2 	 Z2 
1 	-
N 
p.2 — (2p(w) + —N ) p + P(w) 2 = 0 
where we assume that p(w) < 2-5(w) and z corresponds to the 1 — x/2 percentile 
of the standard normal distribution A r(0,1). Then, 1(w) = [p(w), p(w)] is an 
approximate (1 — x)100% confidence interval for the true probability p(w). 
This means that the probability that the true probability p(w) belongs to 
1(w) is equal to (1 — x)100%. The proof of this result is given in the appendix. 
Since the bounds of the Wilson intervals are the roots of a simple quadratic 





1 ± k r z 2 
P( W ) Z2 ± Z 13(w)(1-11(w))N 	+ 441  
P(W) = 1 + kz2 
In practise, one often computes 95% confidence intervals with the 97.5% per-
centile value z 1.96. Note that the Wilson scores are not defined for 15(w) = 0 
or P(w) = 1. In the remainder, we will consequently need to assume that each 
scenario w E S2 has been observed at least one time (so that P(w) > 0) and that 
more than one scenario has been observed (so that p(w) 1). 
5.1.3 Imprecise probabilities 
It has been observed by the numerous statisticians and practitioners of probabil-
ity theory that the information needed to estimate probability could in practise 
be deficient. There exist many forms of information deficiency. Information 
may for instance be incomplete, imprecise, fragmentary, unreliable, vague or 
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contradictory [Klir, 2006]. The term incomplete is used to refer to missing 
data or to describe information that concerns only a fragment of reality. Im-
precise information corresponds to numerical data that are not sharp and are 
often represented by intervals of values. Fragmentary information corresponds 
to small, heterogeneous or disconnected pieces of evidence. Unreliable infor-
mation denotes information that is susceptible to be erroneous or misleading. 
Vague information relates to classes of objects whose boundaries are not clearly 
or explicitly stated. Finally, information is said to be contradictory when it is 
composed of mutually exclusive pieces of evidence. Notably, one may say that 
statistical information is fragmentary, unreliable and contradictory. 
Confidence interval analysis reveals that more than one probability distri-
bution is compatible with a given statistical sample. Generally, more than one 
probability distribution can be compatible with the information available to a 
subject due to information deficiencies [Klir, 2006]. Sets of possible Bayesian 
probability distributions compatible with some information are called credal sets 
[Levi, 1980]. 
Definition 5.1. A credal set is a non-empty set D of Bayesian probability 
distributions on Q. 
The minimum of an event's probability when the distribution ranges over a 
credal set is called a lower probability, and its maximum an upper probability. 
Definition 5.2. The lower and upper probabilities associated with a credal 
set D are the functions P : 2° 	[0, 1] and P : 2° 	[0, 1] defined VE C SZ as 
P(E) = inf{P(E) I P E 	P(E) = sup{P(E) P E 
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For every probability P in the credal set D and any event E, it holds that 
P(E) < P(E) < 75(E) 
and thus lower and upper probabilities are referred to as imprecise probabili-
ties. For a comprehensive presentation of imprecise probabilities, the reader 
may refer to [Walley, 1991; 1996; 2000]. Imprecise probabilities are appropri-
ate for representing uncertainty in a variety of problems where the available 
information is incomplete [Zaffalon, 2002a], imprecise [Walley and Fine, 1979; 
Zaffalon, 2002b; Kozine and Utkin, 2005], vague [Zadeh, 1978; de Cooman, 1997; 
Walley and de Cooman, 2001] or contradictory [Walley, 1996]. In general, con-
fidence intervals are not imprecise probabilities [Walley, 1991]. 
Note that Bayesian probability is a special case of imprecise probability. 
When the credal set is a singleton D = {P}, the lower and upper probabilities 
are equal to P, so that for every event E 
P(E) =P(E) = P(E) 
Thus Bayesian probability distributions exactly correspond to the imprecise 
probabilities that are precise. In general, however, lower and upper probabilities 
are distinct. Various types of imprecise probabilities which extend the Bayesian 
approach have been proposed over the past decades, such as notably 
• c-contamination models [Huber, 1981; Berger and Berliner, 1986] in robust 
statistics, 
• possibility and necessity measures [Zadeh, 1978; Dubois and Prade, 1988; 
1995; de Cooman, 1997] and belief and plausibility functions [Shafer, 1976; 
Sentz and Scott, 2002] in generalised uncertainty and information theory 
and artificial intelligence, 
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• Choquet capacities [Choquet, 1953] and imprecise probabilities induced 
by convex or norm-bounded credal sets [Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2001; 
Bertsimas and Brown, 2005; Natarajan et al., 2005] in robust optimisation. 
In the rest of this chapter, we will be essentially concerned with belief func-
tions. Belief functions form a subclass of Choquet capacities, which in turn 
belong to the family of monotone measures, as we shall see below. 
A monotone measure is a function p : 211 	[0, 1] such that p(0) = 0, 
p(52) = 1 and for every pair of events (A, B), if A C B then p(A) < ,a(B). 
Given an integer k > 2, a Choquet capacity of order k [Choquet, 1953] is a 




(_1 )1K1+1.tt 	Ai) 
3=1 	KC{1,..., 	 jEK 
K00 
for all families of k events A1, • • • , Ak C Ct• 
Property 5.1. Every Choquet capacity of order k > 2 is also a Choquet capacity 
of order k' = 2, 3, ... , k. 
The proof of this result by [Choquet, 1953] is given in the appendix. Choquet 
capacities of order 2 satisfy by definition the inequality 
(Ai u A2) p(Ai) + it(A2) - ii(A1 n A2) 
for all pairs of events (A1, A2) and are according to the previous property the 
most general capacities. These capacities form a rather large class of lower 
probabilities. 
Property 5.2. Every Choquet capacity of order 2 is a lower probability. 
The proof of this result by [Walley, 1991] is given in the appendix. Monotone 
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measures it which are capacities of order k for all integers k > 2 are called 
Choquet capacities of order oo (infinite order) and are the least general ones. 
These capacities are more commonly known as belief functions. For any belief 
function Bel, there exists a credal set D such that, for every event E, 
Bel(E) = inf{P(E) I P E 1,} 
The corresponding upper envelope is called the plausibility function PI and is 
defined for every event E as 
Pl(E) = 1 — Bel(Ec) 
Consequently, for that same credal set D, we may write 
Pl(E) = sup{P(E) I P E D} 
Fortunately, there exists an equivalent, simpler and more constructive charac-
terisation of belief and plausibility functions, that we overview next. 
5.1.4 Belief and plausibility functions 
This section introduces belief functions, which form the basis of the so-called 
Dempster-Shafer or evidence theory [Shafer, 1976]. Note that, in this thesis, we 
are not concerned with the problem of evidence combination, nor do we need 
to rely on the interpretation given to belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer 
theory. Therefore, this section is not an introduction to Dempster-Shafer theory. 
The reader interested in evidence combination may refer to the survey by [Sentz 
and Scott, 2002]. 
As seen in Section 5.1.3, belief functions form the most specific class of Cho- 
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quet capacities and as such constitute imprecise probabilities. Belief and plau-
sibility functions admit an equivalent but more constructive definition, which 
explains the important role they have played in the field of artificial intelli-
gence, especially regarding the design of expert systems. Belief functions can 
be defined in terms of evidence mass function. 
Definition 5.3. An evidence mass function is a function m : 2c/ 	[0,1] 
that verifies m(0) = 0 and 
E m(x) —1 
Cu 
Definition 5.4. A belief function is a function Bel : 212 	[0,1] such that, 
for every E C 52, 
Bel(E) = E .( x )  
xc E 
for some evidence mass function m. 
Definition 5.5. Given an evidence mass function m and its associated belief 
function Bel, the corresponding plausibility function P1 : 2° 	[0,1] is the 
dual of Bel defined for every event E C S2 as Pl(E) =1 — Bel(Ec), or equiva-
lently 
P1(E) = E m(X )  
xcn,xnEo0 
The events for which m(E) 0 are called focal sets. When all the focal sets 
of an evidence mass function are singletons, the associated belief and plausibility 
functions are equal and constitute a Bayesian probability distribution. Thus, 
Bayesian probability distributions are special belief functions, which in turn are 
imprecise probabilities. 
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5.1.5 Coherence of imprecise probabilities 
When imprecise probabilities are employed for statistical inference or decision 
making, it is useful to interpret them as rational betting prices on events, called 
coherent previsions [Walley, 1991]. Let us now introduce the notions of prevision 
and coherence. 
A gamble is any function X : ft —> R. and represents a ticket for a lottery, 
where the true scenario w is revealed and a price X(w) in units of money or 
utility is won by the participant. The true scenario is not known in advance 
by the subject, so the outcome of the lottery is uncertain, hence the name 
"gamble". Each event E can in fact be seen as a lottery with a price equal to 
1 if E occurs, and 0 if E does not occur. Formally, it is easy to see that the 
gamble corresponding to an event E is the indicator function IE : S2 —* {0,1} 
of the set E, defined Vw E 1-2 as 
{1 if w E E 
IE(W) = 
0 otherwise 
By convenience, we use de Finetti's notation and systematically write E instead 
of /E. For any gambles X and Y, we write X < Y if and only if Vw E C2 we 
have X(w) < Y(w). We define max(X) = max{X(w) w E C2}, min(X) = 
min{X(w) I w E 5-2}. Note, in particular, that 
• if E C 52, then min(E) = minwEn /E(w) = 0 
• min(Q) = minii,Eo /I-2(w) = 1 
• if E D 0, then max(E) = maxii,En /E(w) = 1 
• max(0) = maxwEn /0(w) = 0 
We define the operations of addition +, subtraction — and multiplication * 
146 
of gambles in exactly the same way as for real-valued functions, for instance, 
Vw E 5l, (X + Y)(w) = X(w)+Y(w). Finally, for any constant c E R, we denote 
with c the gamble X such that, Vw E SZ, X(w) = c. 
Given a non-empty set X of gambles, a lower prevision is a function P : X 
R and an 'upper prevision a function P : X —> R. For any gamble X E X, the 
value P(X) is interpreted as the maximum price at which the subject would 
accept to buy the lottery ticket X, and P(X) as the minimum price at which 
he would accept to sell the ticket X. 
Walley proposes two fundamental principles to characterise the rationality 
of a gambler, which together define the notion of coherence. The first principle 
states that the subject should avoid sure loss, i.e. never be sure to lose money 
by engaging in any collection of lotteries. We can formalise this principle using 
the notion of marginal gamble, defined for any gamble X as G(X) = X —P(X). 
G(X) corresponds to a transaction in which the subject pays P(X) to obtain 
X. Since P(X) is the maximal buying price for X, this transaction is still 
acceptable. Formally, we say that 
Definition 5.6. P avoids sure loss if and only if 
(k 
max EG(X j ))> 0 
j=i 
whenever the gambles X1, Xk are in X and k > 1. 
The second principle states that the subject's prices should be consistent as 
a whole. If, for some x E R, the gamble X — x is greater or equal to a positive 
combination of acceptable gambles, then X — x should also be acceptable, that 
is to say P(X) > x. This should hold for any such x, which implies that P(X) 
should be greater or equal to the quantity E(X) called natural extension of X. 
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Definition 5.7. For any gamble X : 	IR, the natural extension of X is 
E(X) = sup{x E R 3X1, , Xk E X,]Ai,...,Ak > 0 : X—x > 
	
Ai G(X 3 )} 
It is proved in [Walley, 1991] that every lower prevision that avoids sure 
loss admits a natural extension. E(X) can be computed efficiently by linear 
programming [Dantzig et al., 1955]. E(X) depends on the marginal gambles 
G(X3 ) = 	— P(X3 ) and thus it depends on the lower previsions P(X3 ) of all 
the gambles X3 E X. By taking k = 1, X 1 = X, Al = 1 and x = P(X) in the 
definition of E(X), one can see that E(X) > P(X) for every gamble X E X. 
One may conclude from this that the lower prevision of a rational gambler should 
not only avoid sure loss, but also coincide with its natural extension. 
Definition 5.8. P is coherent if and only if it avoids sure loss and coincides 
with its natural extension on X, i.e., V X E X,E(X) = P(X). 
Definition 5.9. An upper previsions P is coherent when it is the conjugate 
of some coherent lower prevision P, i.e., V X E X,P(X)= —E(—X). 
It is particularly remarkable (although far from being obvious) that 
Theorem 5.4. When X C 20, lower and upper previsions are lower and upper 
probabilities. Conversely, every pair of lower and upper probabilities are coherent 
lower and upper previsions. 
This very fundamental result was proved by [Walley, 1991]. The result allows 
to interpret imprecise probabilities as coherent previsions. 
To summarise this background section, we may simply say that belief and 
plausibility functions are imprecise probabilities and can be interpreted as ra-
tional betting prices on events. This interpretation is also valid for Bayesian 
probability, since this is a special case of belief function. 
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5.2 Robust belief and plausibility functions 
The objective of this section is to show how to construct coherent previsions, 
when the only information available to the subject is of statistical nature. These 
previsions are defined in the form of statistically robust belief functions. We 
assume given a sample of N > 30 observations 
Wii W iz) • • • 1WiN E S2 
We assume that all the conditions required for the construction of Wilson score 
intervals are satisfied (most importantly, that each scenario has occurred at 
least once and that more than one scenario has occurred, see at the end of 
Section 5.1.2). As in Section 5.1.2, the estimated relative frequency P(w) of 
each scenario w defines the statistical prior /3 : 	R where 
= N E/{.} ( W ik) 
k=1 
The relative frequencies P(w) are unbiased estimators of the true probabilities 
p(w). The Wilson score intervals are given by 1(w) = [p(w), p(w)] as in Sec-
tion 5.1.2 and are (1 — x)100% confidence intervals. The bounds of confidence 
intervals do not define imprecise probabilities [Walley, 1991]. We consequently 
search for specific confidence intervals having the property of being coherent. 
To restrict our search amongst the class of all imprecise probabilities, we 
may impose a number of requirements. One idea suggested by robust Bayes 
analysts [Blum and Rosenblatt, 1967; Huber, 1981; Berger and Berliner, 1986] 
is to impose that the credal set associated with the imprecise probability consists 
of a set of distributions D close to a given Bayesian prior probability distribution 
7r. Concretely, the credal sets considered in robust Bayes analysis are those of 
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the form 
D = {P P = (1 — c)ir eq, q E Q} 
where e E [0,1] is a fixed parameter, and Q a subset of the set P of all probability 
distributions on Q. Such credal sets are called 6- contamination models (some-
times also gross-error models or linear-vacuous mixtures), where the prior 7r is 
contaminated by the family Q with degree E. Basically, such families are used 
for modeling random processes which follow the distribution 7r with frequency 
1 — c and some unknown probability in Q the rest of the time [Walley, 1991]. 
We will consider that we have no information concerning Q c P and thus in 
the remainder make the conservative choice of the maximal family Q = P. The 
&contaminations obtained for such a credal set will be by convenience referred 
to as maximal &contaminations. A natural candidate here for the prior 7r is 
the statistical prior 25, as the relative frequencies are unbiased estimators for the 
true scenario probabilities. This now restricts our search to credal sets of the 
form 
D 	I P = (1 — + q E P} 
In order to choose an e, we impose the constraint that the interval J(w) = 
[P(w), P (w)] where 
P(w) = inf{P(w)IP = (1 — OP+ cq, q E 
(w) = sup{P(w)1P = (1 — 025 eq, q E P} 
is an approximate (1 — x)100% confidence interval. Since, for every scenario w, 
the Wilson score interval 1(w) = [2(w),p(w)] is a (1 — x)100% approximate 
confidence interval, 1(w) C J(w) as long as the following two inequalities are 
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satisfied 
p(w) > (1 — 0/3(w), P(w) < (1 — 0/5(w) 
If these conditions are fulfilled, then J(w) must a fortiori be a (1 — x)100% 
approximate confidence interval. The minimal value of c for which 1(w) C (w) 




maxmax ( 	23(t 	, 1 1,3(w)  
15(w) P(w) P(w) -13(w)) 
Property 5.3. The value given in definition 5.10 is the minimum value of c 
for which 1(w) C J(w) holds for every w E 
Proof. The inclusions hold if and only if, for every w E 
	
{2(w) > (1 - )15(w) 	
E > 1_ P(w) = 13(D)—P(w)  
<=> 	 P(w) 	15(w) 
15(1-0) 	(1 — E)p(W) 	e 	
P(w)—P(w) <- 
6 1-25(w) -=  
0 
We can show that 
Property 5.4. Let P and P be the imprecise probabilities corresponding (via 
definition 5.2 of Section 5.1.3) to the credal set given by the maximal c-contamination 
of 15 with level of contamination E as indicated in definition 5. 1 O. For every 
E C 11, 
P(E) = (1 — c)P(E) + E min(E), P(E) = (1 — c)15(E) + E max(E) 
Proof. This derives directly from the fact that inf{q(E) q E P} = min(E) and 
suplq(E)1 q E P} = max(E). 	 0 
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One can easily check that 
Property 5.5. P and P as defined in property 5.4 are belief and plausibility 
functions respectively. 
Proof. Consider the function m : 21-2 —4 [0, 1] such that 
m(X) = (1 — 025(x)6(lxi, 1) + Es(lxl, Ic1) 
where 6. is the Kronecker symbol defined for every integers i and j by 
1 	if i = j 
S(i,j) 
0 otherwise 
The function m is positive and is such that m(0) = 0 and 
E m( x ) - E 	+1 = 1 
X cc/ 	 wEfl 
So m is an evidence mass function 1. Moreover, we have for every E c 
E m( X ) = E m({w}) + Emin(E) = (1 — E) E 	E min(E) 
XCE 	wEE 	 wEE 
= (1 — c)13(E) + e min(E) = P(E) (by property 5.4) 
By definition 5.4 in Section 5.1.4, P is consequently the belief function Bel 
associated with the mass function m. By definition 5.5, the plausibility function 
1Note that ni admits as focal sets only singletons and SI 
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associated with m is given for every E C 1-2 by 
Pl(E) = 1 — Bel(Ec) = 1 — P(Ec) 
= 1 — ((1 — e)P(Ec ) + min(Ec)) (by property 5.4) 
= 1 —13(Ec) + c/5(Ec) — e min(Ec) 
= 1 — (1 —15(E)) + c(1 — /3(E)) — c min(Ec) (since /5 is Bayesian) 
= (1 — c)/5(E) + c — c min(Ec) 
We have 
1 	if Ec =12 	1 if E= O 
min(Ec) = = 1 — max(E) 
0 otherwise 	0 otherwise 
SO 
PI(E)= (1 — c)P(E)+ e — c(1— max(E)) = (1 — c)/5(E) + E max(E) 
P(E) (by property 5.4) 
which means that P is the plausibility function associated with m. 	❑  
As a result of this property, assuming given a statistical sample of N > 30 
observations and a level of statistical confidence (1 — x)100%, we have proposed 
formulae for the construction of imprecise probabilities (Bel = P and PI = P as 
in property 5.4) whose credal set is a maximal c-contamination of the unbiased 
statistical prior 23. We have defined P and P in terms of E and chosen c so that 
J(w) = [F2({w}),75({w})] is an approximate (1 — x)100% confidence interval 
of the true relative frequencies p(w) (for every w E 12). We present next an 
alternative formulation of Bel and PI in terms of the following notion. 
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Definition 5.11. The epistemic risk-aversion parameter K E R± is de-
fined as the constant such that 
K 
E 	 K +1 
We have for the choice of e made earlier in definition 5.10 
Property 5.6. 
K= 1 — c 
The imprecise probabilities derived earlier can be expressed equivalently in 
terms of K rather than e as follows: 




1 Bel(E) = K + 	(P(E) + K min(E)) , Pl(E) = K + 	(P(E) + K 
max(E)) 
We refer to Bel and P1 represented this way as robust belief and plausibility 
functions. 
As an example, let us consider again the umbrella problem. Suppose that 
over the last 30 days, there has been 12 cloudy days and 18 sunny days. Thus, 
scenario wi = {clouds} has occurred 12 times and scenario w2 = {clouds} has 
occurred 18 times. The statistical prior 13 : Cl —> [0,1] is then defined by 
12 	 18 
p(wi) = 30 = 0.4, p(w2)  =- 30 = 0.6 
Assume we want to build the robust belief and plausibility function with a sta- 
tistical confidence level of 95%, i.e. we choose x z---- 5%. The 1— x/2 percentile of 
the standard normal distribution is z = 1.96. Since the number of observations 
E 
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is N = 30, we have the following bounds for the Wilson score intervals 
z2 
Awl ) 2iNz2 z ,V75(wi)(1,713(wi))  
P(wi) = 	  = 0.246 +  
p(w1) + A-z2  +z.\/)5(tui)(1-23(wi» 	z2 gwo — 	 ' 4N 2 1 + I z2 	 = 0.577 




1 ± *Z2 	
= 0.423 N 
/3(w2) + A-z2 +zVxw2)(1-33(w2)) 	z2 	
P(w2) = 	
4N2 
1 + kiz2 	 = 0.754 
So we obtain a level of contamination e 
= ItIM max ( 	13(w) 	, 1 13(.)  13(w) — P(w)  p(w) — 13(w)) 
(13(wi) 	P(wi) 	23(w2) P(w2) P(w2) 23(w2)  
75(wr) 	-25(wo ' 	p(w2) 	' I - P(w2) ) 
= max(0.385, 0.295, 0.295, 0.385) = 0.385 
and the epistemic risk-aversion parameter 
K= 	e = 0.626 
1 — E 
If we denote by Eclouds the event {w1} and Esunny the event {w2}, the robust 
belief and plausibility functions are such that 
• Be/(Ectouds) = Ki±i 03(Eciouds) + K min(Ectoucis)) = 0.246 
• P/(Eciouds) = K+1  (P(Ectouds) + K max(Eciouds)) = 0.631 
• B el(E sunny) = K i±i (13(E sunny) K min(Esunny)) = 0.369 
• Pl(Esunny) = K1+1(15(Esunny) K max(Esunny)) = 0.754 
= max 
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Robust belief and plausibility functions are imprecise probabilities. We can 
quantify this imprecision as follows. 
Definition 5.12. The imprecision of the probability of an event E is 
A(E) = P(E) — P(E) 
Trivially: 
Property 5.8. We have A(0) = 0, 0(12) = 1 and for any event E distinct 
from 0 and ft, 
A(E) =- e = K +1 
In order to further reduce his indeterminacy (the imprecision e), the subject 
needs additional information. In the remainder of this chapter, we consider the 
case in which this information takes the form of expert opinions. 
Note that we have proposed in this section a formula for estimating the 
risk aversion parameter K when no expert opinion is available and the decision 
maker wants to guarantee with (1— x)100% confidence that the true probability 
of the scenarios w will fall within the lower and upper probabilities P({w}) 
and P({wl). Sometimes, the subject may not know what statistical level of 
confidence to choose (namely which x to choose as in the Wilson scores theorem 
5.3) and may thus wish to take K = e/(1— e) but estimate e without relying on 
the Wilson score intervals and the choice of x. In the remainder of this chapter, 
we will assume given a generic e and continue to consider that K = 	c). 
We will then show how in two different applications, viz. trust computing (see 
Section 5.7) and stock trading (see Section 6.8 in Chapter 6), an adequate value 
of e can be heuristically obtained. 
K 
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5.3 Modeling expert opinions by abstract argu-
mentation 
By an expert, we mean a person, device or system capable of elaborating argu-
ments understood as justified claims [Krause et al., 1995; Fox, 2003]. Expert 
opinions are modeled as sets of arguments. All arguments and their conflicts 
are here modeled using abstract argumentation [Dung, 1995]. As in Chapter 
4, we restrict our attention to two types of arguments only. These are forecast 
and mitigation arguments. A forecast argument is a justified claim according 
to which some event E C 11 will occur, or, equivalently, since events are seen as 
disjunctions of scenarios, a claim according to which the true scenario belongs 
to E. Mitigation arguments are used as in Chapter 4 to cast doubt on the va-
lidity of justifications. Mitigation arguments can thus attack both forecast and 
mitigation arguments. 
Formally, given a universe Q, we model the opinions of experts and their 
conflicts in terms of 
• a set of arguments Arg composed of a set A of forecast arguments and a 
set M of mitigation arguments (the sets A and M need not be disjoint), 
• a binary relation of attack between arguments att C M x Arg, all attacks 
coming from the mitigation arguments, and 
• a support function X.: A 	2° — {0} which associates to each forecast 
argument a E A an event Xa supported by a. 
For instance, consider the universe Q = {w1, w2} and the scenarios w1  
{clouds} and w2 = {clouds} obtained for the umbrella problem (see deci-
sion table in Figure 3.7, Section 3.6). Let A = {al, a2} be the set of forecast 
arguments, where 
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• al = 'there will be no clouds, because the air today is dry', 
• a2 = 'there will be clouds, because the wind is bringing humid air', 
and M = {m1} be the set of mitigation arguments, where 
• m1 = 'the humidity of the air in the wind is not so high, according to the 
measurements made by the Meteosat satellite'. 
The set of arguments is Arg = {a1, a2 , m i} and the attack relationship between 
the arguments in this set is simply att = {(mi , a2 )}. Finally, the support 
function is such that 
• X.(ai) = Xai = {w2} and 
• X.(a2) = Xa2 = {w1}. 
Since Arg is a set and not a list of arguments, arguments repeated by several 
experts are not taken into account more than once. Indeed, we want to avoid 
redundant information. Each new argument should add some information to 
the analysis of the situation. We refer to this important feature of arguments 
as complementarity. 
Concerning the attacks, note that only mitigation arguments can attack 
other arguments. However, mitigation arguments can have a double status and 
serve as forecast arguments. Therefore, it seems that one would only need 
one kind of argument here, namely mitigation arguments. The reason why we 
distinguish forecast arguments from the others is that only forecast arguments 
need to be aggregated in order to estimate probabilities. 
The support function X. only allows forecasting arguments to support the 
occurrence of an event and not to be against it. This restriction is illusory, as any 
argument against an event E can be equivalently substituted by an argument 
supporting the complement Ec = Sl — E of that event. Note also that the event 
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Xa supported by a forecast argument a cannot be empty, since the event 0 
cannot occur. 
Finally, notice that conflicts and disagreements between expert opinions are 
two distinct notions. Conflicts correspond in our model to attacks and serve 
to cast doubt on the justifications of arguments. In the terminology of argu-
mentation, our attacks are used to undermine arguments. Disagreements on 
the opposite relate to the conclusions of arguments. As an example, suppose 
Expert 1 gives an argument supporting event E and Expert 2 gives an argument 
supporting event E'. We say that Expert 1 and 2 
• totally disagree with each other when E' C EC (or equivalently E C En, 
• partially agree when E fl 	0, 
• totally agree when E = E'. 
If E C E', then Expert 2 would partially agree with Expert 1 and we may say 
that the argument of Expert 1 is overly precise for Expert 2. Conversely, Expert 
2 would say that the argument of Expert 1 is too vague. In the terminology 
of argumentation, a disagreement between arguments supporting respectively 
E and Ec would be called a rebuttal. Conflicts and disagreements are totally 
disentangled, so that two experts may 
• conflict but not disagree (they come to the same conclusion for conflicting 
reasons), 
• not conflict but disagree (they derive contradictory conclusions from the 
same empirical theory), 
• both conflict and disagree (they have conflicting reasons and draw contra-
dictory conclusions) and 
• neither conflict nor disagree. 
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Our model allows to capture both conflicts (unreliability) and disagreements 
(contradictions) between opinions, as well as their vagueness and imprecision. 
5.4 Combining statistics and expert opinions 
We now consider the problem of constructing imprecise probabilities given both 
statistical data and expert opinions. Formally, we assume given 
• a finite universe C2 = {w1, ma} of n disjoint and exhaustive scenarios, 
• a statistical sample of N observations w,„ 	, wiN E ft, 
• a generic constant c > 0 such that e < 1 and the corresponding epistemic 
risk-aversion parameter K = 	c), 
• an abstract argumentation framework F = (Arg, att) where Arg is a set 
of expert arguments partitioned into forecast arguments A and mitigation 
arguments M and att C M x Arg an attack relation between arguments, 
• a support function X.: A —> 20 — {0} associating to every forecast argu-
ment a an event Xa supported by a, and 
• a measure of argument strength sF : Arg —> [0,1]. 
We will deploy the notion of strength given in Chapter 4. From the universe 
0 and statistical sample w21 , 	,wiN , we derive the unbiased statistical prior 
: 	[0,1] as in Section 5.1.1. 
Expert opinions bring additional information to the subject which is needed 
to reduce his indeterminacy A(E) = E (as discussed at the end of Section 5.2). 
It is thus important to quantify this information. This can arguably be done in 
several ways. A subject may perfectly believe that expert opinions are highly 
valuable or that they have no value at all (with respect to the statistical data 
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available). Both attitudes are perfectly acceptable. A subject may also choose 
to assign equal value to all forecast arguments, or wish to discriminate between 
them, for instance by looking at their individual strength, etc. We will 
• adopt the convention that the amount of statistical information counts as 
1 unit, 
• make the assumptions that the information contained in a forecast argu-
ment is proportional to its strength and is equal to VA * sF (a) units, where 
VA E R+ is a new subjective parameter interpreted as the informational 
value of forecast arguments per unit of strength, and 
• assume that, by complementarity, the informational value of forecast ar-
guments is additive. 
Under these assumptions, we define 
Definition 5.13. The amount of information of the forecast arguments 
is 
IA = VA E sF (a) 
aEA 
Definition 5.14. The total amount of information available is 
I = 	-I- 1 
Like the parameter E, we will present several ways for helping the subject to 
choose VA in practical applications, or, in other words, to give expert opinions 
the right level of importance. Basically, VA can be set by 
• estimating the reduction of the frequency of error € due to the arguments, 
• imposing a constraint on the amplitude of the bias introduced by the 
arguments on the statistical prior P, or 
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• plotting the variations of the long-term average performance of the deci-
sion maker (using a realistic benchmark) with respect to VA and choosing 
for VA the value that yields the optimal performance on the benchmark. 
The expressions proposed in section 5.2 to construct robust belief and plausi-
bility functions from statistical data can be generalised to the case where expert 
opinions are also available. The generalisation of this result yields to a another 
formula that is what really embodies the contribution of this chapter. We define 
the dialectical lower and upper probabilities P and P as 
Definition 5.15. The lower and upper dialectical probabilities P and P 
are defined for every event E C It by 
E(E) = K 	+ I  HE) + VA aEA 
sga)fi(ERG)+ K min(E)J 
1  
P(E) = K + I k(E) + V
A 	sF(a)fi(E1X,,)+  K max(E) 
aEA 
Each term of the form fi(EiXa ) corresponds to the prior conditional probabil-
ity of E given the event supported by a. Recall that this conditional probability 
is given by 
gEIX,) = P(E n X a )  
Each conditional probability 15(EiXa) is weighted by the informational value 
VAS F (a) of the forecast argument a. Therefore, each forecast argument adds a 
bias to the statistical prior that is proportional to its informational value. It is 
easy to see that 
Property 5.9. When VA = 0 or when A = 0, the dialectical lower and upper 
probabilities are equal to the robust belief and plausibility functions respectively. 
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Dialectical lower and upper probabilities thus generalise robust belief and 
plausibility functions. 
As an illustration, let us consider again the umbrella problem. The argu- 
ments Arg = 	a2, mil and attacks att = {(mi,a2)} are as in Section 5.3. 
The event supported by al is Xal  = {w2} = Esunny and the event supported 
by a2 is Xa2 = {w1} = E clouds • The strength of al is sF (al ) = 1 since al is 
not attacked and the strength of a2 is sF(a2) = 0.25 since a2 is attacked by 
the argument ml and a2 does not counter-attack ml. Choosing for instance 
VA = 2, the total amount of information of the forecast arguments is 
A -= vA E sF(a) = 2.5 
aEA 
The total amount of information available is I = IA + 1 = 3.5. The epistemic 
risk-aversion parameter chosen is K = 0.626 as in Section 5.2, thus we still 
assume a 95% statistical confidence level. Observe that we simply have 
• P(EcloudsIXoi) = 0 
• 13(EcloudsrX122 ) = 1 
• P(Esunnyl-Kai ) = 1 
• 13(E sunnyWa2 ) = 0 
The dialectical lower and upper probabilities are such that 
• E(Eciouds) — K+1 [i3(E) + VAsF(a2) + 0] = 0.218 
• 75(Ectovds) = Kl±i [p(E) + VAsF(a2) + 	= 0.370 
• /2(Esu„y) = Kl±/ [13(E) + VAsF(al) + 0] = 0.630 
• Tj(Esunny) = K1+1 [15(E) + VAsF(al) + 	= 0.782 
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5.5 Coherence of dialectical probabilities 
In this section, we show that dialectical probabilities (given in definition 5.15) 
are coherent previsions, as defined in Section 5.1.5. In order to prove this result, 
we establish that 
1. upper dialectical probabilities are the dual of the lower ones, 
2. lower dialectical probabilities avoid sure loss, and 
3. lower dialectical probabilities coincide with their natural extension. 
The first point is fairly easy to establish. 
Property 5.10. For every event E C Si, P(E) = 1 — P(Ec). 
Proof VE C 11, it holds that 
• P(E) = 1 — P(Ec) 
• 15(EIXa) = 13(EnX n.) p(x„) 	gx“) 	= 1  — 13(Ec IXa) 
• max(E) = 1 — min(Ec) 
Therefore, by substitution 




[(1 — 15(EC)) + VA E sF(a)(1 --15(Eva )) + K(1 — min(Ec)) K  aEA 
= 
K + I 
1 	[ 1 + VA EsF (a) + 
aEA 
1 
K + I HEc ) + VA E sF(a)23(Ec 1X -a) + K min(EC )1 
aEA 
= 1 — P(Ec ) 
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Before we prove the second point, let us first introduce the following notion: 
	
Definition 5.16. The biased prior PA : 52 	[0, 1] is given Vw E 5/ by 
PA(w) = - P(w) + VA E sF(a)f(wix.)] 
aEA 
We may now rewrite the dialectical probabilities in terms of 75A, a follows: 
Property 5.11. The lower and upper dialectical probabilities are equal to 
1 	 1  P(E) = K + i ( Ii3A(E) + K min(E)) 15(E) = K + I (- TPA (E) + K max(E)) 
We will use this property to prove that lower dialectical probabilities avoid 
sure loss. 
Property 5.12. For any collection of events X1,...,Xk C 51: 
(k 
	 k 
max EG(xj) = mzEpci(w) — /2( x-A ? 0 
j=1 	 j=1 
where G(X) is the notation used for the marginal gamble X — P(X) (defined 
in Section 5.1.5). 
Proof. Since G(11) = S2 — P(C2) = 1 — 1 = 0, we may assume without loss of 
generality that Vj E {1, ..., k}, X 3 C Q. For every event X3 C 5/, we have 
min(X3 ) = 0 so the expression of the lower probability for X 3 simplifies to 
13(X3) = K + 1 [13(X 3) + VA E sF (a)f3(Xi IXa )] 
aEA 
Since, by property 5.11, VX3 
.12(X.2) = K + I (-115 A(Xj)+ K min(Xj)) 
165 
we may write that 
k 	k 
G(X3) E (x, II5A(Xj) ) 
K +I j=1 	3=1 
Let us then consider the gambles g : 	R. and f : 	JR defined Vw E Q as 
g(w) = 	(X ) 	K + I 
Ii3A(XJ)) 
f (w) = 
Obviously g > f. To prove that P avoids sure loss, we must prove that 
maxwEn g(w) > 0. Since g > f, it is sufficient to prove that maxwEn f(w) > 0. 
Observe that by linearity of the expectation operation: 
EPA (f) E (E„ (x3) EPA (PA(xj ))) 
j=1 
Since the expectation of a constant gamble is equal to that constant: 
EPA(f) = E (EpA (x.i) - PA(Xj)) 
j=1 
Finally, since the expectation of an event is equal to its probability: 
EpA (I) = 	(i3A(XJ)-75A(xj))= 0 
j=1 
We have found a non-null positive combination of values of f that is null. This 
would not be possible if all the values of f were strictly negative. Thus, one of 
them is positive or null, and so is a fortiori the maximum of f. This concludes 
the proof. 	 0 
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Since dialectical lower probabilities avoid sure loss, they admit a natural 
extension E. Before proving that dialectical probabilities coincide with their 
natural extension (on events), we are going to derive closed-form formulae for 
E(X) and E(X) valid for any gamble X. 





E(X) = K+ (I.E13,(X)+ Kmin(X)) , E(X) = K+ (I.E15,(X) + K max(X)) 
Proof For any X : 	IR, E(X) is defined as the solution of the linear opti-
misation problem which consists in maximising the variable x 2 subject to the 
positivity constraints Aj > 0 and Vw E 
x( w ) -x> E Ai(x j(w ) _p( x j)) 
x, csa 
(see definition 5.7 in Section 5.1.5). The inclusion X j C S-2 can be replaced by 
a strict inclusion since the marginal gamble G(S)) = SZ — P(12) is null. Gambles 
X are now seen as vectors of dimension n = PI with components X, = X(wi ), 
(X, Y) denotes the canonical scalar product X'Y, where X' is the transpose of 
X. With these notations, the lower probability P(X3 ) for every event X3 C St 
can be rewritten 
I-75A  p(x.,)= ( K + I' Xj) 
Let us introduce the linear form a : Rn IR defined VX E Rn as 
c(X) = ( 	 X) 
K + 
By linearity and using the a notation, the earlier inequality constraint is equiv- 
2x is a generic variable here and has nothing to do with the x used in theorem 5.3 and 
thereafter to define confidence intervals. 
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alent to 
X —x> E A3 X3 —U E A3x3 
	
x,c5i 	X, cS1 
The set of all positive combinations of X3 C ct is equal to (R+)n, so that our 
problem is equivalent to maximising x such that X — x > Y — v(Y) for some 
Y E (R+)n. Denoting by (ei , 	, en ) the canonical basis of Ilan, whereby each 
e, is the vector whose i-th component is equal to 1 and all other components 
are null, and o-3 = o-(ej), the solution x* of the problem is given by 
X* = max min 	xi — (yi — E a-i y j ) = max E cri yj  + min (xi — yi) 
yi>0 	 yi>0 	 iE{1,...,n} j=1 	 i=1  
Clearly, the value of x* is unchanged if we add the further constraint that the 
values of x,— y, should all be equal to the same value m. The value of m would 
then be such that m = xi — yi for all i and since y, are positive, m must satisfy 
m < min(X). Substituting y, by x, — m, we obtain 
X* = 	max 
m<min(X) 
n 
(E 	— 	+ 
. 
3=1  j=1 
+ 	max m 
m<min(X) 
(1 
= E 0-i x ; + min(X) 1 — E 	=  +  Ei3,, (X) + K + min(X) 
j=i 	 j=i 





 (IE25,(X) K min(X)) 
E(X) is equal to the conjugate —E(—X), so 
E(X) = K +  (/E15„ (X) + K max(X)) 
1  





We can now prove that lower dialectical properties coincide with their natural 
extension: 
Property 5.14. VX C S2, E(X) = P(X). 
Proof. It is easy to see that, for any X C SI, 
Ei5A(x) = E pA(w)x(w) = EPA(w) =PA(X) 
wES2 	 wEn 
The property thus follows directly from property 5.13 and definition 5.15. ❑  
It trivially follows from properties 5.10, 5.12 and 5.14 that 
Theorem 5.5. Dialectical probabilities are coherent. 
It is particularly remarkable that coherence holds independently of the dis-
agreements and conflicts existing between the expert's opinions. Since they are 
coherent, dialectical probabilities inherit all the normative properties of coher-
ent previsions. For completeness, we recall from [Walley, 1991] the main list of 
properties verified by P and 15 for any events A, B, A1 , . . , As , B1 , . , 
1. 0 < P (A) < P (A) < 1 
2. P(0) = P(0) = 0, P(S2) = P(11) = 1 
3. if A D B, then P(A) > P(B) and P(A) P(B) 
4. P(A U B) < P(A) + P(B), (A U B) < -.13(A) + P(B) (see also prop. 8) 
5. if A nB = 0, then P (AU B) > P(A)+P(B) and P(AUB) > P (A) +P(B) 
6. P(A) P(B) < 1 + P(A n B), and if A U B = 11, then P(A) + P(B) > 
1 +P(AnB) 
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7. IP (A) — P(B)1 5 P(AAB), 1P(A) — 115' (B)I < P(ALB) 
8. P(A) + P(B) < P(Au B) + P(A n B) <P(A) + P(B), 
P(A) + P(B) <P(A U B) + P(A n B) <P(A) + P(B), 
P(A u B) + P(A n B) < P(A) + P(B) < P(A u B) + P(A n B) — the 
inequalities in property 4 can thus be made tighter as follows: P(Au B) < 
P(A) + P(B) — P(A n B) and P(A u B) < P(A) + P(B) — P(A n B) 
9. if P(A8 AA) —# 0 as s oo, then P (As ) P(A) and P(A5 ) P(A) 
10. P(U sj=i A;) 	,s.=1  P(A; ) and if 	A3 are disjoint, then P(Usi=i Aj) > 
Esi=if(Ai) and  P(U71  Ai) E7=1f(A.;) 
11. (VA i , ...,).> 0 and E R) 
if B >E j=1 A;A; + u, then P(B) > E38 =1 A J P(24; ) + 
if B < E sj=1  A ; A; + ,u, then P(B) < E s  j=i A;P(A;) + 
12. if A l , ..., A, ,131, 	> 0 and E8  =i AjAi < 	/31Bi , then Es-1  A j P(Ai ) < 
i31P(B1)+ 	A(Bi) and AiP(Ai) + Ej=2 AjP(Aj) ET-1 AP(Bi) 
5.6 	Properties of dialectical probabilities 
The aim of this section is to gain insight on dialectical probabilities and show 
some of their information-theoretic properties. 
Dialectical lower and upper probabilities remain very similar to robust be-
lief and plausibility functions. To see this, remark that the biased prior PA 
introduced in the previous section (see definition 5.16) defines a Bayesian prob-
ability distribution 5A : ci —> [0, 1]. Then we may see dialectical lower and 
upper probabilities as the imprecise probabilities associated with the credal set 
DA = {P I P = (1  — €.4) + €Aq,q E 
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which is a maximal CA-contamination of PA with level of contamination 
K 
EA= K+I 
Therefore, PA  still plays the role of prior. Because PA is different from P, we may 
say that PA has a statistical bias. This bias is caused by the forecast arguments. 
This bias shall hopefully make PA a better prior than the statistical prior P. 
Remark that the dialectical probabilities can be rewritten as follows: 
Property 5.15. VE C St, 
P(E) = (1 — EA)PA(E) + EA min(E) 
P(E) = (1 — EA )PA (E) + EA max(E) 
Proof. This directly derives from property 5.4 and the fact that dialectical lower 
and upper probabilities are the imprecise probabilities associated with the max- 
imal CA-contamination of PA . 	 0 
Clearly, since the imprecision of the probability of events is defined as (E) = 
P(E) — P(E) (see definition 5.12 in Section 5.2) 
Property 5.16. A(0) = 0, (Q) = 0 and for every E such that OCEC12, 
A(E) = EA 
Proof. This derives directly from property 5.15 and the fact that min(0) = 
max(0) = 0, min(S1) = max(Q) = 1 and for every event E distinct from 0 and 
min(E) = 0 and max(E) = 1. 	 0 
Thus, EA measures the indeterminacy of the subject. 
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Property 5.17. For a fixed value of the epistemic risk-aversion parameter K 
and a fixed argumentation framework F, it holds that 
1. EA < e, and 
2. C A is a decreasing function of VA . 
Proof. Since I =1+ IA by definition 5.14 and .1-A = VA EaEA sF(a) > 0, we 
have I = IA + 1 > 1 and EA = K/(K + I) < KI(K + 1) = E. IA and I increase 
with VA, SO CA decreases with VA. 	 ❑  
So, as we expected, the informational value of arguments reduces the indeter-
minacy of the subject (expert opinions allow to make probabilistic estimations 
more precise). 
Theorem 5.6. Dialectical probabilities are the belief and plausibility functions 
whose evidence mass function mA : 2c2 —> [0, 1] is defined for every event X as 
mA(X) = (1— eA)PA(X)b(IX1,1) + AO (IA - 1,1E2 1) 
Proof. This directly derives from the proof of property 5.5 and the fact that di- 
alectical lower and upper probabilities are the imprecise probabilities associated 
with the maximal EA-contamination of PA. 	 ❑  
Belief and plausibility functions have been extensively studied within gen-
eralised information theory [Klir, 2006] where measures of indeterminacy and 
uncertainty have been developed. For any belief and plausibility functions with 
associated evidence mass function m, the indeterminacy of the subject is given 
by the generalised Hartley measure 
GH = 	(B)10g21B1 
SCSI 
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The previous theorem allows us to compute the information-theoretic indeter-
minacy of the subject in the case of the dialectical probability. 
Property 5.18. The information-theoretic indeterminacy is 
GH = EA log2 PI 
Proof. For every B C S/ which is not a singleton or Il, we have mA(B) = 0. 
For every singleton B = {w}, we have IBS = 1 and loge 1B1 = 0, so GH = 
mA (5-2) log2 1Q1 = €A log2 IC/I ,• 	 0 
The information-theoretic indeterminacy is thus proportional to the inde-
terminacy EA and the proportionality factor which is equal to log2 111 increases 
with the total number of scenarios. 
Moreover, when I << K, the indeterminacy cA = K/(K + I) is close to 1 
and GH log2 1521, which remarkably corresponds to the classical expression of 
the Hartley measure [Hartley, 1928]. This reflects the state of a subject that is 
almost completely ignorant about the true probability distribution of the sce-
narios. When more information is available, the imprecision and indeterminacy 
decrease inversely proportionally to I. Thus, the quantity I truly plays the 
role of total amount of information contained in the statistical sample and the 
expert opinions from the subject's viewpoint. In particular, K is the value of 
the amount of information I for which the imprecision is reduced from 1 to 1/2. 
Namely, the epistemic risk-aversion parameter K represents the "half-life" of 
the subject's indeterminacy. Let €A(I = s) stand for the value of EA when I is 
set to s. Then: 
Property 5.19. €A (I = K) = 1/2. 
Proof. C A(I = K) = K 1(K K) = 1/2. 	 0 
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More generally, the subject's indeterminacy E A depends on the total amount 
of information I in the following way. 
Property 5.20. It holds that 
• for any integer n > 0 
EA(I = (n - 1)K) = 771,1  
• EMI = s) = 
• EA(I = s) 	K/s 
Proof. EA(I = (n - 1)K) = K 1(K + (n - 1)K) = K/(nK) = 1/n. Since the 
function s F-> K 1(K + s) is contiuous in the neighbourhood of s = 1, we have 
lim,i EA(/ = s) = K 1(K + 1) = E. E A(I = s) = K 1(K + s) 	K/s. 0 
Thus, the indeterminacy is maximum and equal to c when there are no argu-
ments and varies inversely proportionally with the total amount of information 
available. K is the quantum of information necessary to reduce the indetermi-
nacy from 1/n to 1/(n + 1), for any integer n > 0. 
We know that indeterminacy €A monotonically decreases with the amount 
of information IA provided by the experts. Since IA is by definition additive 
over the forecast arguments, we can qualitatively predict the value of the inde-
terminacy depending on the strength and acceptability of these arguments. 
Property 5.21. 
K 	 K  
K + VA IAI+ 1 < CA < K +1 
Proof. For every forecast argument a E A it holds that 0 < sF (a) < 1, so we 
have 0 < IA < VA 	Hence the result. 	 0 
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When K and VA are fixed, this allows to determine a lower bound on the 
number of forecast arguments to elicit from experts in order to have a sufficiently 
low probabilistic imprecision. For instance, if one has K = 1 and VA = 1, one 
always needs at least three forecast arguments to obtain A(E) = 20% precision 
and at least eight forecast arguments to obtain A(E) = 10% precision. 
The indeterminacy is minimal when all forecast arguments have a strength of 
one, i.e. when none of them is mitigated (the experts have no doubt concerning 
their forecasts). The indeterminacy is maximal when either 
• VA = 0 (the experts are not trusted by the subject), 
• A = 0 (the experts do not have any opinion), or 
• every forecast argument attacks itself 3 (all given forecasts contradicts 
themselves). 
We can use our knowledge of the impact of the acceptability status of ar-
guments on their strength (see Chapter 4) to obtain a tighter upper bound for 
indeterminacy. 
Property 5.22. The indeterminacy is bounded up by 
EA < K/ K + VA E AF (a) + 1)  
aEA 
where for every forecast argument a, 
.1F (a) = 
{max ( 2(n(x1)+1) , 1+1-0-, , 4(++33.) ) if a is contained in an admissible extension 
	 if a is only contained in a conflict-free extension 2(n(x)+1) 
Proof. This directly derives from properties 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4. 	❑  
3Forecast arguments may be mitigation arguments too and thus attack themselves. 
175 
When K, VA and F are fixed, this allows to determine a guaranteed level 
of precision without having to compute the precise strength of each forecast 
argument. Instead, one simply needs to identify the conflict-free and admissible 
arguments. For instance, if one has K = 1, VA = 1 and the framework F has 
an out-degree k = 1 and the maximum number of attacks against an argument 
is n(x) = 2, then each conflict-free forecast argument has a strength of at least 
sF (a) = 1/6 and each admissible argument has a strength of at least sF (a) = 
1/2. Thus, with three admissible forecast arguments the level of precision that 
is guaranteed is A(E) = 29% and the level of precision guaranteed with three 
conflict-free arguments is only LX(E) = 40%. 
Other bounds on the indeterminacy can be obtained when the framework is 
a disjoint union of frameworks F = 	 Fk . Recall that the geometric 
mean of xl , 	, xk E R is defined as 
H(xi, • • • ,xk) = ... 	 xk 
We have 
Property 5.23. If F is the disjoint union of 	 then 
-11  (6.41, 	EAk ) < EA < Min(E A,, • • • EAk ) 
where E A denotes the indeterminacy of the subject when only the opinions from 
the framework F2 are considered. 
Proof. If the given abstract argumentation framework F = Fl + . + Fk where 
Fl = (Aryl , atti), 	, Fk = (Argk , att k ) are mutually disjoint frameworks (see 
the study of dynamic properties of the strength measure in Section 4.3.4), then 
by property 4.9, for every a E Ft , we have sF(a) = sF, (a). Denoting A1, • • • , Ak 
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the sets of forecast arguments in F1, ... F. respectively, we have 
EA = K/ (K + VA E 
i=1 aEAi 
EA can be expressed in terms of the quantities 
F, (a) + 1) 
K 
EA, — K + VA ErLEA, Fi (a) + 1 
by 
1 
6A = 	 (k 1)(1 + 1+) 
Hence the inequality 
VA1' • • • EA k) 	EA 
For every i, it is also clear that C A < EA,, thus 
CA < mil-1(6AI , • • • , 6Ak 
0 
This allows to get an idea of the level of precision one can obtain by merg-
ing the probability estimations made independently by several experts. For in-
stance, if one has three groups of experts using independent bodies of knowledge 
to formulate their arguments and the precision of their probability estimates are 
20%, 30% and 40%, then by merging their opinions one can guarantee that the 
new precision will be comprised between 9.2% and 20%. 
Based on the generalised Hartley measure a measure of uncertainty is also 
defined in Dempster-Shafer theory. This is called strife or generalised entropy 
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and defined for any belief function with evidence mass function m as 
ST = GH — Z 
where 
Z = E m(x) log2 (E m(Y)IX n Y1) 
XCII 	 YCS1 
In the case of the dialectical probability, 
Property 5.24. The generalised entropy or strife is 
ST = EA log2 (1 	+ €A1(pl 1 _ 1)) tun.(1  — EA)/5A (w) log2 ((1  — EA)23A(w) + E A) 
Proof. The evidence mass function of dialectical lower and upper probabilities 
(see theorem 5.6) is such that m A(B) 0 only if  IBI = 1 or B = a Thus, it 
holds that 
Z = 	A ({W}) 10 g2 ( m A({w}) + mA(1l)) 
wES2 
+mA(I) log2 ( 
wES2 
A({w})+InA(9)191) 
Since mA is normalised, we have in fact 
Z = 	A({w}) log2 (mA({w}) + rnA(C-2))+7nA (11) log2  (1 + mA(l) (191 — 1)) 
wES2 
Since, by theorem 5.6, mA({w}) = (1 — €A)15A(w) and mA(S2) = EA , we obtain 
Z = E (1 — EA)13A(w) loge «1 — EA)25A(w) + EA) + EA 10g2 (1 + C A(19 1 — 1)) 
wES2 
Since GH = EA loge PI by property 5.18 and by definition ST = GH — Z, we 
178 
get 
ST = EA log2 ( 1 EA(IC-11  pl 	 — EAVA(w) loge ((1  — €A)154w) ± EA) 
0 
In particular, if I >> K, then EA < 1 and we have 
ST 	— E (w) log2 /3 A (w) 
wait 
which remarkably corresponds to the classical expression of entropy [Shannon, 
1948]. We will resist the temptation to investigate the significance of this re-
sult. [Klir, 2006] explains indeed that the strife ST is not a good measure of 
uncertainty, as it is not sub-additive, and suggests to use instead the maximum 
Shannon entropy, defined for any imprecise probability with credal set D, as 
= max — E p(w) log2 p(w) 
pED 
wESZ 
Expert opinions may reduce the indeterminacy EA by bringing in new informa-
tion (increasing the total amount of information I), but this does not necessarily 
decrease the subject's uncertainty (measured by either ST or S). Information 
is what decreases the indeterminacy EA and is necessary (although not suffi-
cient) to reduce the uncertainty, since information may sometimes increase the 
uncertainty by making the biased prior PA closer to the uniform probability 
distribution u : 52 —> [0,1], defined Vw E 1-2, as u(w) = 1/IR and whose entropy 
S(u) = log2 IQ is maximal. 
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5.7 Application to trust computing 
Belief functions have been used as a mathematical model of trust in distributed 
reputation management [Yu and Singh, 2002]. Since dialectical probabilities 
are belief functions, we may use them for computing trust. Belief functions for 
trust are usually derived from statistical data only. We show that, for some 
adequate choice of the epistemic risk-aversion parameter K, the robust belief 
function of Section 5.2 coincides with the belief function normally employed in 
Yu & Singh's model. We are also naturally interested in comparing these belief 
functions to dialectical probabilities and see whether arguments add value to 
the purely statistical method. 
5.7.1 Background on the evidence-based trust model 
The model developed by [Yu and Singh, 2002] is called the evidence-based trust 
model. This model uses belief functions as a mathematical model of trust. This 
model is based upon a simple universe SZ = {T, 	where T (respectively --,T) 
means that the subject or agent a, (called the evaluator) can consider a given 
agent a3 (called the target) to be trustworthy (respectively untrustworthy). The 
belief of a, concerning a3 is modeled by a belief function Bel : 2c1 	[0,1]. The 
value Bel({T}) = m({T}) is interpreted as the trust of a, in a3 and Bel (1—T1) = 
m({—T1) as the distrust. The cautiousness or risk aversion of the evaluator is 
modeled by a parameter denoted p comprised between 0 and 1. The evaluator 
decides to trust the target if and only if trust exceeds distrust by the threshold 
value p, that is to say, if and only if 
m({T}) m({—iT}) > p 
The target may for instance, endorse the role of a service provider (as is the 
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case in grid computing). For each interaction, it is assumed that the quality 
of the service provided by the target can be quantified by the evaluator. We 
denote by q the service quality below which the service is deemed too poor and 
by Q the service quality above which the service is deemed satisfying. Naturally, 
q must be strictly smaller than Q. When the quality is strictly greater than q 
but strictly smaller than Q, the service quality is said to be inappreciable. 
In the evidence-based trust model, the evaluator knows 
• N- the number of times the service quality was too poor 
• N+ the number of times the service quality was satisfying 
• N? the number of times the service quality was inappreciable 
• N = N- + N+ + N7 the total number of past interactions with the target 
Finally, the belief function Bel used by Yu & Singh to compute trust is deter-
mined by the evidence mass function m : 20 —> [0,1] where 
N? 
	
m(0) = 0, m({T}) = —N 	m({-T}) -N— - m(S1) = —N N ' N 
5.7.2 Robust belief functions for trust 
Each time the service quality is too poor counts as one occurrence of the scenario 
and each time the service quality is satisfying counts as one occurrence of 
the scenario T. We therefore consider the statistical prior 13 : Sl -4 [0, 1] defined 
on 11 = {T, -J.} as 
N+ 	 N- 
/5(T) = N+ 	N _ P(HT) N+ + N- 
The definition of the robust belief function relies upon that statistical prior. 
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Theorem 5.7. If K = N? /(N — N?), then the robust belief function coincides 
with Yu & Singh's belief function. 
Proof. The evidence mass function of the robust belief function is 
m(0) = 0, m({T}) = (1 — c)25(T), m({—,T}) = (1 — c)15(-1'), m(fl) = c 
Yu & Singh's belief function has an evidence mass function defined as 
N — 
nii(0) = 0, m'({T}) = N 
N+ 
 , m'a—iT1) -= N , m'(5/) 











— 013(T) - (1 
— c)13(---,T) = (1 
N
.1‘,.r7 
	N+ N+  
a ({T})  
= m'({-,T})1  
) N+ + N — 




) N + 	N — + N 
m(1h) = c = 
1NT,  
	  = 1N± = m (SI) 
K +1 N - -? 	 +1 - N? + N — N? N 
0 
Robust belief functions consequently generalise Yu & Singh's belief functions 
to any value possible value of K. In the remainder, we will assume that K 
is however fixed to the specific value given in theorem 5.7 in order to allow 
experimental comparisons between m = m' and mA. 
5.7.3 Arguments for reasoning about trust 
Statistics provide information about the past behaviour of the target, whilst 
arguments can provide information concerning its future behaviour. In grid 
computing, the arguments of interest may pertain to various dimensions of 
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trust such as the availability, security, privacy and reliability of services. For 
each such dimension, the idea is to build arguments from the content of the 
contract linking the target to the evaluator. We consider a simple abstract 
argumentation framework F per dimension, having as possible arguments 
• don't trust the target because there is no guarantee specific to that 
trust dimension given in the form of a contract clause 
• T: trust the target because there exists a guarantee specific to that trust 
dimension given in the form of a contract clause 
• V: don't rely on contract clauses concerning this trust dimension because 
the target has usually violated them in the past 
For each trust dimension d, either there exists a contract clause concerning d 
and T is put into F, or there does not exist such a clause in the contract and 
we put instead 	in F. If there is a contract clause, and, in the past, we have 
observed that when there was such a clause, d did not have an acceptable level 
in a majority of cases at execution time, then we also put in F the argument V 
as well as an attack from V against T. Consequently, each individual framework 
contains only one or two arguments. 
5.7.4 Dialectical probabilities for trust 
We thus define one dialectical probability per trust dimension. We want to 
allow the evaluator to decide separately if the target can be trusted with respect 
to each dimension and consider that the evaluator eventually decides to trust 
the target if and only if it decides to trust the target with respect to all four 
dimensions (availability, security, privacy and reliability). 
In order to build a dialectical probability, we need to choose a value for the 
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parameter VA (see Section 5.4). We choose 
VA = 23(T) — 1 5—.(T)  
p- (T 
whereby 25_,,(T) corresponds to the probability of the target being trustworthy 
given that there is no contract clause, defined as 
P-c(T)= N-t, + N=7., 
where we denote by 
• Ar_tc , the total number of times the service quality was satisfying and there 
was no contract clause, and 
• 1V_Te , the total number of times the service quality was too poor and there 
was no contract clause. 
For this choice of VA, the biased prior PA (see definition 5.16 in Section 5.5) 
satisfies the following intuitively appealing constraint. 
Property 5.25. When there is no contract clause the biased prior 13 A(T) equals 
the conditional probability 23„(T). 
Proof. If there is no contract clause, then by definition F contains only the 
argument —T. This argument is not attacked and has a strength of one. The 
value of 13 A(T) is in that case 
1  
/A(7') = 	25(T) 1 + VA 
since P(THT) = 0. The solution VA of the equation 25A(T) = j3 (T) is then 
after simple calculus 




Thus, for that choice of VA, we have indeed ]3A(T) =13_,(7'). 	 0 
We can thus use the dialectical probability (for a given dimension and ar-
gumentation framework). This is computed via the evidence mass function mA 
given in theorem 5.6, Section 5.4. This gives 
mA (0) = 0, rnA({T}) = (1— €A)pA(T), mA({-,T}) = (1— €A)pA(-,T), rnA(Q) = EA 
As for Yu & Singh's mass function, the evaluator decides to trust with respect 
to a dimension if and only if the following inequality holds for mA for that 
dimension: 
mA({T}) mA({—'7})?  p 
Next, we compare experimentally the performance of evaluators using the 
original belief function and our dialectical probability. 
5.7.5 Performance of dialectical probabilities 
To test our model, we fix an evaluator and target and generate a large number 
of interactions with random outcomes. For each interaction, having informed 
the target about the specificity of the situation we first 
• ask the target to make a decision concerning the target (trust or not trust) 
• then, we determine the precise outcome of the interaction and finally 
• assign a score to the target, depending on the correctness of its decision. 
We assume that the evaluator decides to trust if and only if the condition 
Bel({T}) — Bel({-T}) > p 
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is satisfied where p has a constant value over time. We will naturally be inter-
ested in the influence of p on the performance of the technique. For a fixed value 
of p and after a large number of interactions, we want to compare the percentage 
of correct decisions made using Yu & Singh's belief function (which corresponds 
to the robust belief function, see Section 5.7.2) versus the performance obtained 
using the dialectical probabilities (Section 5.7.4). 
Each interaction is random, which means that its characteristics are de-
termined randomly, but also, that its outcome is generated randomly from its 
characteristics. The basic characteristics of an interaction are the presence or 
not of a contract clause guaranteeing a satisfying level of service quality for each 
trust dimension. The presence of each type of clause is modeled by a Boolean 
random variable following a Bernoulli distribution with mean 0.8. This means 
that the probability for an interaction to have a contract clause (on reliability for 
instance) is 80%. All four random variables are identically and independently 
distributed. 
The randomness of the outcome of a situation with known basic character-
istics is solely due to the unpredictability of the target agent. Each outcome is 
modeled as a quadruple of Beta-distributed variables noted A (availability), S 
(security), P (privacy) and R (reliability). By definition of a Beta distribution, 
these four variable take their values inside the interval [0, 1]. The variances of 
the Beta distributions are fixed to o.2 = 3% but the means can take two possible 
values: act = 0.80 or it = 0.40. We use 
• the higher mean of µ = 0.80 (for instance for the distribution of the 
variable A) when there exists a contract clause guaranteeing the service 
availability and the target has decided to respect the clause, 
• the lower mean of it = 0.40 otherwise, when there is no contract clause or 
when there is one but the target has decided not to care about it. 
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A Beta distribution with highµ models the target's intention to produce a 
service of good quality, and a distribution with low it a lack of effort on the side 
of the target. The intention to make this effort is mainly conditioned by the 
presence of a contract clause. This idea here is that our statistical setting should 
capture the fact that service providers tend to try and honour the contracts they 
sign. Our model of trust also needs to be slightly more realistic than this and 
take into account the existence of fraud. Therefore, we introduce an additional 
parameter 0 representing the frequency with which the target tries to cheat 
(ignore the clauses of the contract). Thus, when the fraud frequency is 0 = 0, 
the target is perfectly honest and never ignores contract clauses ( au = 0.80 is 
systematically used when there is a contract and p. = 0.40 otherwise). When on 
the opposite the fraud frequency is 0 = 1, the target is never honest (µ = 0.40 
all the time). 
In each interaction, once the parameters of the Beta distributions have been 
fixed, the variables A, S, P and R can be measured. The level of service 
availability A (similarly for security S, privacy P and reliability R) is deemed 
• sufficient if and only if A> Q = 0.6, 
• insufficient if and only if A < q = 0.4, 
• inappreciable if and only if q = 0.4 < A < Q = 0.6. 
Overall, the outcome is satisfying if and only if all four levels of availability, 
security, privacy and reliability are sufficient. The outcome is disappointing 
otherwise (at least one of the levels of availability, security, privacy or reliability 
is not sufficient). The trust decision is deemed correct if and only if 
• the evaluator decides to trust and the outcome is satisfying, or 



















We use a sample of size 1000 interactions and start registering the evaluator's 
score at interaction number 20 only, so as to allow the target to compute 15. 
Our first experiment assumes 8 = 0 (no fraud) and compares the percent-
age of correct decisions obtained with the belief functions depending on the 
threshold parameter p (level of cautiousness of the evaluator). The two curves 
obtained are depicted in Figure 5.1. 
statistics-based trust 
statistics + argumentation-based trust 
0.2 	0.4 	0.6 	0.8 	1 
Threshold parameter 
Figure 5.1: Performance depending on p and assuming 0 = 0 (no fraud). 
The performance curve obtained for Yu & Singh's belief function shows a 
plateau at 27.04% performance for p < 0.5, a short performance affine transition 
for p E [0.5, 0.6] and another higher plateau at 72.86% for p > 0.6. The dialec-
tical probability leads to a long performance plateau at 78.98% for p < 0.65, 
a short performance transition for p E [0.65, 0.75] and a slightly lower plateau 
also at 72.86% for p > 0.75. For 0 = 0, the performance is thus increased by 
• 51.94% points for p E [0, 0.5] 
• more than 6.12% points for p E [0.5, 0.65] 
• 0% point or less than 6.12% points for p E [0.65, 1] 
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The reason why no improvement is possible for large values of p is that such 
values make the evaluator overly cautious and lead him/her to systematically 
not trust (under both belief functions). 
If the target delivers a service with identically and independently distributed 
service quality over time, the evaluator will constantly make the same decision. 
If the decision is always to trust, then the percentage of correct decisions will be 
equal to F = N+ IN. If the decision is always to distrust, then the percentage 
of correct decisions will be equal to 1—F = (N — +N? )/N. Thus, the theoretical 
performance of Yu & Singh's belief function is at most equal to max(F, 1 — F). 
Here we have F = 27.04%, 1—F = 72.85% and consequently MaxPerf = 72.85%. 
The performance experimentally obtained with Yu & Singh's belief function is 
indeed limited by MaxPerf, but the dialectical probability allows to break that 
theoretical barrier. In fact it offers a level of performance that is either equal 
or above it for any value of p. 
Let us examine now how these results change when fraud is taken into ac-
count. The performance depending on p and 9 in shown in the table of Figure 
5.2 for Yu & Singh's belief function and in the table of Figure 5.3 for the dialec-
tical probability. To compare the two belief functions, we can use these tables 
to derive a worst-case performance measure with respect to the fraud frequency 
O. This measure still depends on p. The worst-case performance of each belief 
function is shown in Figure 5.4. The worst case performance under the dialecti-
cal probability is clearly higher (irrespective of the choice of p), with at best an 
improvement of 53.47% points when p 0. The improvement is null for high 
values of p (as we should have expected). The average worst-case performance 
improvement calculated for p ranging over [0,1] is of 28.21% points. 
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p 0 = 0 0 = 0.25 0 = 0.5 0 = 0.75 0 = 1 
0 27.04% 20.71% 16.73% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.05 27.04% 20.71% 21.94% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.1 27.04% 20.71% 76.12% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.15 27.04% 20.71% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.2 27.04% 20.71% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.25 27.04% 21.43% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.3 27.04% 28.67% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.35 27.04% 72.85% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.4 27.04% 78.47% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.45 27.04% 79.08% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.5 27.04% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.55 46.43% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.6 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.65 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.7 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.75 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.8 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.85 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.9 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.95 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
1 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
Figure 5.2: Influence of 0 on the performance of Yu & Singh's belief function. 
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p 0 = 0 0 = 0.25 0 = 0.5 0 = 0.75 0 =1 
0 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 84.49% 99.69% 
0.05 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 91.12% 99.69% 
0.1 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.15 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.2 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.25 78.97% 75.51% 70.20% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.3 78.97% 75.51% 81.53% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.35 78.97% 75.51% 85% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.4 78.97% 75.51% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.45 78.97% 75.51% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.5 78.97% 75.51% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.55 78.97% 78.97% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.6 78.97% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.65 78.97% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.7 77.95% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.75 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.8 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.85 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.9 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
0.95 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
1 72.86% 79.18% 85.31% 91.84% 99.69% 
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Figure 5.4: Worst-case performance with respect to B depending on p. 
5.8 Related work 
This section discusses the relationship existing between our approach and meth-
ods used in subjective probability as well as work on uncertainty done in the 
areas of logic, artificial intelligence, machine learning, multi-agent systems and 
decision theory. 
In subjective probability, the intuitive comparative school (Koopman and 
Good) exploits the concept of ordering relation — not more probable than — to 
derive an empirical probability measure. A second school is based on Ramsey 
and Savage utility decision making approach, whereby the choices of a deci-
sion maker (modeled as an expected utility maximiser) are used to reveal a set 
of probabilities. Subjective probabilities, when elicited by such means, are re-
ferred to as psychological probabilities to recognise the lack of total rationality 
and coherence expected from human responses [Chesley, 1975]. Psychological 
probabilities are descriptive of human beliefs and may not conform to the basic 
axioms of probability theory. Instead, this chapter has provided an approach 
that always guarantees the normative goodness of probabilities in terms of co- 
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herence. 
A general procedure for eliciting imprecise probabilities from a subject is 
proposed in [Walley, 1991]. The idea is to obtain a number of qualitative or 
quantitative probability judgements and model them as marginally acceptable 
gambles. If this set of marginal gambles avoids sure loss, then one can use the 
natural extension to assess the probability of any event. This method is not 
easily applicable. The first problem is that the method fails whenever conflict-
ing judgements are employed. The second problem is that checking that the 
property of avoiding sure loss holds is computationally expensive and having to 
compute linear extension by linear optimisation may be impractical. Dialecti-
cal probabilities avoid sure loss and are coherent even when arguments conflict. 
Moreover, we dispose of analytic expressions to compute them directly so we no-
tably avoid the use of optimisation (dialectical probabilities are already optimal, 
since we have proved that they coincide with their natural extension). 
Belief functions are coherent [Walley, 2000] and have been used for the design 
of many expert systems [Biswas et al., 1988; Hsia and Shenoy, 1989; Kak et 
al., 1990; Krause and Clark, 1993; Saffiotti and Umkehrer, 1991]. Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence is not concerned with the problem of how to construct 
evidence mass functions. In this chapter, our contribution has been to introduce 
methods for constructing belief functions based on statistical information and 
expert opinions. 
In logic, argumentation theory is fundamentally concerned with the char-
acterisation and computation of rationally acceptable sets of arguments [Dung, 
1995] or assumptions [Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2006]. The primal 
goal of this theory is not to assess uncertainty but rather to study what a ratio-
nal subject may believe. Argumentation can be seen essentially as a qualitative 
and logical approach to uncertainty. Probability is therefore not considered as 
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essential to argumentation theory. However, a few researchers in logic and ar-
tificial intelligence have advanced the idea of estimating both objective [Poole, 
1993] and subjective probabilities [Krause et al., 1995; Ambler, 1996] by means 
of argument aggregation. The basic idea behind Poole's probabilistic calculus 
is to estimate the probability of a claim being true by summing the probability 
of statistically independent, logically derived arguments that support that same 
claim. In other words, Poole's work can be seen as argumentation aggregation 
for statistical inference, i.e. the inference of probabilistic information from an 
initial set of probabilistic judgements. On the opposite, we focus on problems 
in which no probabilistic information is available to the subject. The authors 
of [Krause et al., 1995; Ambler, 1996] embrace a more general and abstract 
view on argument aggregation than Poole and interestingly propose the use of 
algebraic calculus to assess (symbolically or numerically) the strength of argu-
ments depending on their internal structure. The method used in this thesis 
also involves a notion of argument strength, which may be assessed from the 
arguments internal structure, but which may as well be derived from an analysis 
of the dialectical relationships existing between the arguments. 
Our experiments on trust have shown that simple arguments could increase 
the performance of purely statistical methods. Recently, argumentation has 
been used to improve the performance of machine learning techniques [Mozina 
et al., 2007]. The idea is to use arguments given by experts to explain logically 
the correct classification of examples of individuals in a class. These arguments 
are then used to guide the construction of a theory (set of if-then rules linking the 
attributes of individuals to classes). Arguments thus restrict the complexity of 
the search for a theory but more importantly, also lead to theories that perform 
statistically better outside the learning set. 
Argumentation has been advocated by [Nielsen and Parsons, 2007] as a gen- 
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eral way to guide probabilistic reasoning in multi-agent systems. In their setting 
— in which an agent's knowledge is modelled by a Bayesian network — abstract 
argumentation-driven debates allow the agents of the system to reason about 
the probabilistic dependencies that exist between a set of propositions of interest 
and to eventually reach an optimal consensus, i.e. agree on which propositions 
should objectively be regarded as true or false. 
Finally, textbooks on decision theory say little about the actual construction 
of probabilities [Fishburn, 1964; French, 1987]. In fact, standard decision theory 
does not try to answer how probabilities should be constructed but considers 
them as given a priori. The authors of [Tan and Pearl, 1994], amongst others, in-
dicate that the specification of complete sets of probabilities and utilities makes 
decision theory impractical in complex tasks involving common sense knowledge. 
This important issue has favoured the emergence of qualitative approaches to 
decision making [Tan and Pearl, 1994; Boutilier, 1994; Dubois and Prade, 1995; 
Bonet and Geffner, 1996; Amgoud and Prade, 2004]. These works rely on math-
ematical models of uncertainty that not only differ from probability but, as for 
decision theory, do not seek to explain how to measure uncertainty. Instead, we 
have provided a practical method for estimating probabilities given statistical 
data and expert opinions. 
5.9 Summary and conclusion 
We have proposed a method for assessing imprecisely and subjectively the prob-
abilities of future events based on a statistical sample and the opinions of ex-
perts in the form of arguments. We have first shown how to construct robust 
belief and plausibility functions based on the statistical sample solely and with 
any arbitrarily fixed level of statistical confidence. Then, we have shown that 
these belief functions correspond to the lower and upper envelopes of maximal 
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&contaminations of an unbiased statistical prior with a level of contamination 
E that increases with the chosen level of confidence. 
In order to take into account the experts' opinions, we have first introduced 
an abstract argumentation model able to capture the claims made by the ex-
perts, the disagreements between the experts' forecasts and conflicts between 
their arguments. In order to discriminate between forecast arguments, we have 
used the dialectical measure of argument strength from Chapter 4. 
We have then exposed a general method for exploiting (conflicting) expert 
opinions in combination with statistical information and given a concrete for-
mula for the construction of imprecise probabilities. The resulting probabilities 
have been proved to remain in the form of belief and plausibility functions and to 
be equivalent to maximal &contamination models. Thus, the proposed formula 
is a contribution to Dempster and Shafer's theory in that it addresses the issue 
of constructing evidence mass functions, which is not addressed by this theory. 
A thorough analysis of dialectical probabilities in the context of robust statis-
tics and generalised uncertainty and information theory has followed, with the 
presentation of subjective measures of indeterminacy (the generalised Hartley 
measure) and uncertainty (the generalised entropy or strife). 
Dialectical probabilities have been shown to be coherent previsions, so the 
formula proposed brings to the field of imprecise probability a way to achieve 
coherence even when the subject's opinion is based on conflicting judgements, 
as opposed to Walley's scheme which requires the probabilistic judgements to 
be mutually compatible. This provides us with a strong guarantee on the ra-
tionality of this subjective model of probability. Coherence offers us a rigorous 
mathematical framework for solving problems of statistical inference, decision 
analysis, risk analysis and decision making, which is the object of study of the 
next chapter. Dialectical probabilities have been applied with success to trust 
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computing. In the next chapter, we are going to use them to solve decision 
making problems in the field of finance. 
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Chapter 6 
Statistical inference, risk 
analysis & decision making 
with dialectical probabilities 
This chapter is dedicated to statistical inference, risk analysis and decision mak-
ing when the decision maker's uncertainty is modeled by dialectical probabilities. 
Dialectical probabilities have been defined in Chapter 5. These probabilities are 
imprecise and non-Bayesian. In decision under risk, a Bayesian probability dis-
tribution is needed to choose the best decision: the expected utility criterion 
(see Chapter 2) needs to be adapted and generalised to the case of imprecise 
probabilities. The theory of coherent previsions [Walley, 1991] fortunately of-
fers such a generalisation. As a general theory of imprecise probabilities, it also 
provides general methods for statistical inference, decision and risk analysis. 
The first contribution of this chapter is to instantiate all these methods in the 
case of dialectical probabilities. We do so, so as to allow the direct exploitation of 
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dialectical probabilities for practical problems. The second contribution is that 
we relate the main criterion for decision making with imprecise probabilities to 
the classical criteria for decision making under strict uncertainty or risk (defined 
in Chapter 2). Finally, we provide a new application of argumentation and 
imprecise probabilities to finance and demonstrate experimentally the potential 
offered by dialectical probabilities for decision making in this domain. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 is background and intro-
duces the methods used under imprecise probabilities (in general) for solving 
problems of statistical inference, risk analysis and decision making. We instan-
tiate these method in the particular case of dialectical probabilities in Section 
6.2 for statistical inference, Section 6.3 for risk analysis, Section 6.4 and Sec-
tion 6.5 for decision analysis and decision making. In Section 6.6, we study 
the (decision-theoretic) axioms fulfilled by the main decision criterion used in 
imprecise probability theory. In Section 6.7, we study the links between the 
two decision criteria used in imprecise probability theory (when making deci-
sions with generic imprecise probabilities) and the classical decision criteria for 
decision making under strict uncertainty and risk. Section 6.8 presents an appli-
cation of argumentation and dialectical probabilities to financial stock trading. 
We discuss related work in Section 6.9 and conclude in Section 6.10. 
6.1 Background: using imprecise probabilities 
All the definitions and results exposed in the section hold for imprecise prob-
abilities in general and are not specific to dialectical probabilities. In Section 
5.1.5, we have defined the natural extension E of a coherent lower prevision or 
lower probability P : 52 —> R, where St = {w1, 	, wri} denotes as usual a finite 
set of n scenarios. Recall that the natural extension E is defined for any gamble 
X : 	IR. 
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6.1.1 Statistical inference 
The natural extension can be used for statistical inference, i.e. for comparing 
the likelihood of events and for computing conditional probabilities. Indeed, for 
any two events A, B C St, we can say according to [Walley, 1991] that 
• A is more likely than B if E(A — B) > 0, 
• A is at least twice as likely as B if E(A — 2B) > 0, and more generally, 
when x > 1, that 
• A is at least x times as likely as B if E(A — xB) > 0. 
The conditional lower probability P(AIB) of A given B is given by the solution 
z E l of the equation 
E(B [A — z]) = 0 
called the generalised Bayes rule by [Walley, 1991], who showed that when the 
imprecise probability is Bayesian (precise), the generalised Bayes rule becomes 
identical to the standard Bayes rules of conditioning. 
6.1.2 Decision analysis 
The concept of natural extension can also be used for decision analysis, i.e. for 
comparing decisions and for decision making. Assume that D is a set of possible 
decisions and U : D x S2 —+ T1 a value function, so that U(d, w) measures the 
desirability of the consequence of d under scenario w E S2 for the subject. Note 
here that U could for instance be determined using the method introduced in 
Chapter 4. The gamble Xd defined Vw E 52 as Xd(w) = U(d,w) models the 
decision d. According to [Walley, 1991], we may say that d is preferred to d' 
whenever E(Xd  — Xd ,) > 0. This means that the transaction where the subject 
gets Xd in exchange of Xd , is acceptable. One may also say that d is twice as 
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much preferred as d' whenever E(X d — 2X& ) > 0, and more generally that d 
is preferred A times as much as d' whenever E(Xd — AXd, ) > 0. Intuitively, 
E(Xd — Xd, ) provides a robust under-estimation of the expected value of d in 
comparison to d'. When P is a Bayesian probability distribution, the expression 
of E(Xd) collapses to the expression of the expected utility: 
E(Xd) = Ep(Xd) = E P (wi)U (d, wi ) 
i=i 
Thus, the concept of natural extension generalises the expected utility criterion 
of decision theory to the case of imprecise probabilities. 
For decision making, one needs a strict preference relation to rank decisions. 
Definition 6.1. Let X = {X d d E D}. For any Xd, Xd' E X, one writes 
X d >- X& if and only if 
• E(Xd — Xd , ) > 0, or 
• X d > X d' and Xd Xd' • 
Recall that for any gambles X and Y, the inequality X > Y means that, 
Vw E S2, X(w) > Y(w). Also, X Y means that, ]w E 52, X(w) # Y(w). 
Definition 6.2. Let X E X. X is inadmissible when there exists Y E X such 
that Y > X and Y X. Otherwise, X is said to be admissible. 
Clearly, the best decisions d should at least correspond to admissible gambles 
X d . [Walley, 1991] proposes two criteria for choosing the best decision under 
imprecise probabilities: the minimax criterion and the maximality criterion. 
The maximality criterion is defined in terms of the upper natural extension E, 
which is defined for any gamble X as T(x) = 
Definition 6.3. The minimax criterion consists in choosing a decision d 
such that X d is a minimax gamble, i.e. 
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• Xd is admissible, and 
• E(X d ) is maximal. 
Definition 6.4. The maximality criterion consists in choosing a decision d 
such that X d is a maximal gamble, i.e. 
• Xd is admissible, and 
• mind'ED r(Xd — Xd') is maximal. 
It is proved in [Walley, 1991] that the maximal gambles are exactly the 
gambles that are undominated under 	It is also proved that every minimax 
gamble is also a maximal gamble. However, it has been observed by [Berger, 
1985] that minimax gambles often do not lead to particularly good decisions. 
Hence, decisions are most often made by applying the maximality criterion. 
6.1.3 Financial risk analysis 
Finally, upper previsions can be used in risk analysis to measure financial risk. 
Consider a gamble X such that for every scenario w, X(w) represents the re-
turn of an investor after a period of time T if w occurs on a portfolio (i.e. a 
combination of financial instruments such as a bonds, stocks and options). Let 
RF be the risk-free rate over T (typically of the order of 5% per year). Then, 
according to [Pelessoni and Vicig, 2001], the risk of X can be measured by 
1 
p(X) = —E(—X) 
RF 
[Pelessoni and Vicig, 2001] have proved that whenever P is a lower probability 
or a coherent lower prevision, the function p defines a coherent risk measure in 
the sense of [Artzner et al., 1999], i.e. it satisfies for every gambles X and Y 
the following four axioms: 
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• Vc E R, p(X + cRF ) = p(X) — c (translation invariance) 
• VA E R+, p(AX) = Ap(X) (positive homogeneity) 
• if X < Y then p(Y) < p(X) (monotonicity) 
• p(X +Y) < p(X) + p(Y) (subadditivity) 
It has also been proved that, conversely, for every coherent risk measure p, there 




Moreover, note that, if p is a coherent risk measure, then minimising the risk 
p(X) of a portfolio is equivalent to maximising E(X). 
6.2 Statistical inference 
In this and the next two sections, we instantiate the methods previously dis-
cussed in Section 6.1 to the special case of dialectical probabilities. In all these 
sections, we assume given a dialectical probability as defined in Sections 5.4 
and 5.5, and still denote by K the epistemic risk-aversion parameter, I the total 
amount of information and PA : Il —> [0, 1] the biased prior. 
Statistical inference is important, as it allows to compare the likelihood of 
events and to assess the conditional probabilities of events. As presented in 
Section 6.1.1, in imprecise probability theory, an event A is said to be at least 
x times as likely as B whenever E(A — xB) > 0. In the case of dialectical 
probabilities, we have 
Theorem 6.1. For any events E, B C ft such that B 0, E can be said to be 
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{ 1)3A (E)+K 
IPA (B)+K x = 
if B C E 
otherwise IPA(E)  113A(B)+K 
{—x if B — E 0 0 
1—x if B—E= 0  
x times as likely as B, where 
Proof. Replacing E by its analytical expression (given in property 5.13), the 
condition E(E — xB) > 0 becomes 
IE0A (E — xB) + Kmin(E — xB) > 0 
Since B 	0, it is easy to see that the solutions x of this inequality must be 
such that x > 0. Let us consider the gamble Y -= E — xB. We have, Vw E 
Y(w) = 1 if w E (E — B), Y(w) = 1 — x if w E E n B and Y(w) = —x if 
w E (B — E). Since x > 0, we have 
min(Y) = 
If B — E = 0 (or equivalently B C E), the condition becomes by linearity of 
the expectation operator EPA and its coincidence with PA on events, .1- 05A(E)-
,15 A(B)) + K(1 — x) > 0, whose maximal solution is simply x = (IfiA(E) + 
K)I(IPA(B)+K). Otherwise, the condition becomes I(j3A(E)-4A(B))—Kx > 
0, whose maximal solution is simply x = 1.23A(E)1(IPA(B)+ K). 	❑  
Note that, as dialectical probabilities become more precise (I >> K), the 
value of x converges towards a limit that is the intuitively expected ratio between 
the prior probabilities of the two events: pA(E)/15A(B). This result confirms 
the suitability of dialectical probabilities for statistical reasoning. 
Let us now consider conditional lower and upper probabilities induced by a 
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{—z if B — E 0 	—z if B g E 
= min(Y) = 






dialectical lower probability P. We have 
Theorem 6.2. For any events E, B C 12 such that P(B) > 0, the conditional 
lower probability P(E1.13) is given by 





Proof. P(E1B) is defined as the solution z E R. of the generalised Bayes rule 
E(B [E — z]) = 0, which here is equivalent to 
I EI5A (B [E — z]) K min(B [E — z]) = 0 
It is easy to see that the only possible solutions of this equation are such that 
z E [0,1]. Let us then consider the gamble Y = B [E — z]. We have, Vw E 
Y(w) = 0 if w B, Y(w) = 1 — z if w E BnE and Y(w) = —z if w E (B — E). 
Since z E [0,1], 
If B C E, the generalised Bayes rule is simplified to PA (B) — zi5A(B) = 0 with 
solution z = 1. When B E, the rule becomes /(y3A(BnE)—zpA(B))—Kz = 0 
whose solution is z = /PA (B fl E)I(IPA(B) K). 	 0 
Theorem 6.3. For any events E, B C St such that P(B) > 0, the conditional 
upper probability T3(E1B) is given by 
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{ 1 — z ifBnE00 
max(Y) = 
0 ifBnE=O 
Proof. P (E1B) is defined as the solution z of the equation r(B [E — z]) = 0, 
which is equivalent to 
I E75 ,,(B [E — z]) + K max(B [E — z]) = 0 
It is easy to see that the only possible solutions of this equation are such that 
z E [0,1]. Since z E [0,1], 
If B fl E = 0, the equation is simplified to —4A(B) = 0 with solution z = 0. If 
B n E 0, the equation becomes /(1.3A(B n E) — zfiA(B))+ K (1 — z) = 0 whose 
solution is z = ( 4' A(B n E) + K)1(.43A(B) + K). 	 0 
Given the expressions of P (E1B) and P(EIB) in these last two theorems, 
it is possible to observe that P(EIB) and P(EIB) are linked by the relation 
(E113) = 1 — P(Ec1B) and thus are always the dual of each other. When 
dialectical probabilities become more precise (I >> K), the lower and upper 
conditional probabilities converge to the conditional probability 
13A(EIB) = PA(E n B) 
PA(B) 
This result again gives an intuitive confirmation of the suitability of dialectical 
probabilities for statistical reasoning. 
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6.3 Financial risk analysis 
We assume here that X : S2 —> IR is a gamble such that, for every scenario w, 
X(w) represents the return over a period T of some financial investment X if 
w occurs. As in Section 6.1.3, we denote by RF the risk-free rate. Given a 
dialectical lower probability P defined on S2, we have 
Theorem 6.4. The risk on the investment with uncertain returns X : 	R 
is given by 
1 	 
P(X) = 	[I + KEPA(X) + I + 
K 
 K min(X)] 
Proof. According to [Pelessoni and Vicig, 2001], the risk is p(X) = 
In the property 5.13 of Section 5.5, we have proved that, for any gamble Y, 
1  
E(Y) = K + (-TE75A (Y) + K max(r) 
In particular, for Y = —X, we obtain 
E( -x ) = K ± ,(1-E,5 A( -x- ) + K max(—X)) 
which by linearity of the expectation and duality of max and min operators can 
be rewritten as 
E(—X)— [K + I
EI5A(X)± K IC+ I min(X)1 
hence the expression 
—1 I 
p(X) = RF 
[ 
 I + K
E„(X) + I +KK min(X)1 
0 
207 
Here, the term min(X) represents the worst-case scenario return. The term 
in brackets corresponds to a linear combination of the expected return Ei3,(X) 
with the worst-case scenario return. The weight put on the worst-case scenario 
return is as small as the amount of information I is great in comparison to 
K. The risk measure p takes positive values when this linear combination is 
negative, and takes negative values otherwise. Thus, negative risk means that 
the investor can be confident that his investment will generate a positive re-
turn. In particular, if all his wealth is invested at the risk-free rate, then the 
risk is p(RF ) = —1. Finally, and as already said in Section 6.1.3, minimising 
the risk p(X) of investment X is equivalent to maximising E(X), which repre-
sents a pessimistic estimation of the expected return on X. Thus, dialectical 
probabilities determine coherent financial risk measures that have an intuitive 
interpretation. 
6.4 Decision analysis 
Decision analysis amounts to comparing decisions and decision making amounts 
to selecting optimal decisions. Let us assume given a set of possible decisions D 
and a value function U : D x C2 —> R. As discussed in Section 6.1.2, each decision 
d can be associated with the gamble Xd defined Vw E SI as Xd(w) = U (d, w). 
Assuming given as in the previous sections a dialectical probability, we have 
Theorem 6.5. Let d and d' be two decisions in D. d is preferred at least A 
times as much as d' whenever 
14,(Xd — AXd ,) + Kmin(X d — AXd, ) > 0 
Proof As discussed in Section 6.1.2, d is preferred at least A times as much as 
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d' whenever 
E(X d  — AXd,) > 0 
which, by property 5.13, is equivalent to 
K + I 
E„ d AX d,)  KK I min(Xd — X d , > 0 +  
and, since K I > I > 1 > 0, this is also equivalent to 
LE25 ,(X d — AXd , ) + K min(Xd — )Xd,) > 0 
0 
Let us see now how to select the best decisions when using dialectical proba-
bilities. We have seen, in Section 6.1.2, that two criteria could be used, namely 
the maximin criterion and the maximality criterion. No matter the criterion 
adopted, the best decisions must correspond to admissible gambles. Let us 
first remark that, in the case of dialectical probabilities, admissible gambles are 
undominated in the sense of imprecise stochastic dominance [Jaffray, 1999]. 
Definition 6.5. Given a credal set D and two decisions d and d', we say that 
d stochastically dominates d' if and only if `dc E R and VP E 
Paw I xd(w) < c}) < Paw Ix& < cl) 
and the inequality is strict for some co E R and Po E D. 
In the case of dialectical probabilities, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.6. Every inadmissible gamble Xd E X is stochastically dominated. 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that if Xd , > X d and Xd, X d , then d' stochas-
tically dominates d. Since we assume a dialectical probability, the credal set 
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considered is (see beginning of Section 5.6) DA , the maximal EA-contamination 
of the biased prior 23A, with contamination level E A = K/(K + I). If Xd ,  > Xd 
and X d, X d , then Vc E R 
(w) 5 cl g {w1Xd < 	and P(IwIXd,(w) < cl) < P({w1Xd < c}) 
for any Bayesian probability P. Since Xd, Xd, there exists co E R for which 
the set inclusion is strict: {wIXd ,(w) < co} C {w1Xd < co}. Let Po = (1 — 
EA)fiA +EAQ0, where qo is the uniform probability distribution qo : SZ —> {11191}. 
Po obviously belongs to DA. VIL,  E 52 : Po(w) > 0 therefore Po is strictly 
monotonic and Po({w1Xd ,(w) 5 co}) < Po({7.0 1Xd 5 co}). 	 0 
We now propose a general algorithm for computing maximal gambles (see 
Algorithm 4 here-after). Maximal gambles correspond to the best decisions 
under the maximality criterion, which constitutes the main criterion in the 
theory of imprecise probabilities, as discussed in Section 6.1.2. The algorithm we 
propose is general, in the sense that it applies to any imprecise probability and 
not only to dialectical probabilities. In [Walley, 1991], no algorithm is described 
to allow the computation of maximal gambles so this algorithm can be seen as 
a contribution to the theory of imprecise probabilities. Our algorithm is based 
on an optimisation method known as semi-infinite programming [Blankenship 
and Falk, 1976]. 
Theorem 6.7. Algorithm 4 returns a maximal gamble X* E X. 
Proof. It is proved in [Walley, 1991] that if X is a compact set under the 
supremum-norm topology and P is coherent, then there exists at least one 
maximal gamble in X. In order to find a maximal gamble X E X, one may 
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Algorithm 4 Finds a maximal gamble X* E X (optimal decision) given a 
gamble X E X as input. 
1: Initialise: set k = 0 and yo = 
2: Compute: xk = (Xk , mk ) which maximises mk E R subject to Xk E X, 
P E D and VY E Ylc , 	< EP(Xk — 17)• 
3: Compute: Yk-fi E X which minimises E(Xk — Yk+o• 
4: Check: if mk < E(Xk — Yk+1) then go to step 5, else update yk+1 = 
yk U {Yk+i } and return to step 2 with k = k + 1. 
5: Initialise: X = x k . 
6: Compute: X* E X which maximises El°11  x-7 subject to X* > X. 
proceed as follows. First, find a solution X of the maxmin problem 
max min E(X — Y. ) 
XEX YEX 
and then transform X into an admissible gamble X* > X. When X is compact 
under the supremum norm, the existence of a maximal gamble implies that the 
solution X of the maxmin problem will be such that VY E X , E(X —y. )› 0. 
By monotonicity of E, it is clear that any X* > X would also be such that 
VY E X, r(.x.  —31> 0. Hence, X* is guaranteed to be a maximal gamble. 
The initial maxmin problem is equivalent to solving 
max m 
(X,m)EX x111 
subject to the constraint that VY E X, m < E(X — Y). In this problem, the 
variable m plays the role of the quantity minyEx E(X —Y. ) which depends on 
X and that we want to maximise. Introducing the function f defined for every 
x = (X, m) E X x lib as f(x) = —m and the function g defined for every (x, y) 
where x = (X, m) E XxR and y=17 E X as g(x, y) = m—E(X—Y), the initial 




subject to the constraint that Vy, g(x, y) < 0. Since the domains of the variables 
x and y are non-empty and compact and the functions f and g are continuous, 
the maxmin problem can be solved using the algorithm of [Blankenship and 
Falk, 1976] 
1. Initialise: set k = 0 and choose yo c X. 
2. Compute: xk which minimises f (x) subject to Vy E yk, g(x,y) < 0. 
3. Compute: yk+i which maximises g(xk , y). 
4. Check: if g(xk , y k + 1 \ ) < 0, then go to step 5, else update yk-F1 = yk u 
{Yk+i} and return to step 2 with k = k + 1. 
5. Return: xk. 
and resulting in steps 1 to 5 of Algorithm 4. The final transformation of the 
solution of the maxmin problem into an admissible gamble corresponds to step 
6 of the algorithm. 	 ❑  
This algorithm will be used later on in the application Section 6.8 for corn-
puting optimal trading decisions. 
6.5 Forcing decisions 
Typically, dialectical probabilities are imprecise, so that 	(see definition 6.1) 
is not a complete ordering of X and there exists more than one maximal gam-
ble. As a result, the decision maker may still be undecided. The subject's 
indeterminacy (inability to estimate probabilities precisely) is the main cause 
of his undecidedness. Therefore, in this section, we review a number of existing 
methods available for reducing the indeterminacy to zero, or, in other words, 
for transforming imprecise probabilities into Bayesian probability distributions. 
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All these methods only apply to imprecise probabilities that correspond to belief 
functions. Fortunately, dialectical probabilities are belief functions (see Section 
5.6). We are thus going to apply all the existing methods for transforming a be-
lief function into a Bayesian probability distribution to dialectical probabilities. 
First, recall from Section 5.6 theorem 5.6 that a dialectical probability is a 
belief function whose evidence mass function mA : 20 	[0, 1] is defined for 
every event X by 
mA(X) = — cAV A(X)S(IXI,1) + €A8(1 X1, InI) 
where b is the Kronecker symbol (see the proof of property 5.5 for a definition 
of this). 
Definition 6.6. The pignistic probability is the Bayesian probability distri-
bution BetP obtained by application of the pignistic transform [Smets, 1990] 
and is defined for any belief function with evidence mass function m by 




In the case of the dialectical probability, we straightforwardly have by defi-
nition of mA that 
Property 6.1. The pignistic probability is given Vw E /2 by 
cA BetP(w) = (1 — EA)pA(w) W21 
Notice that BetP = (1— €A)pA cAu, where u : 12 —+ {1/1521} is the uniform 
probability distribution. Thus, it appears that for the dialectical probability, 
the pignistic probability is a linear combination of the biased prior PA and the 
uniform distribution u. Recall that u is known to be [Klir, 2006] the Bayesian 
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probability distribution P that maximises the Shannon entropy 
S(P) = E —P(wi ) log2(P(wi )) 
J=1 
Definition 6.7. The cautious probability is the Bayesian probability dis-
tribution CautP obtained by application of the cautious probabilistic transform 
/Daniel, 20061 and is defined for any belief function with evidence mass function 
771 by 
CautP(w) = v, E xcsi,wcx 
m(X)
1.-,vES1EXCS-2,vEX m(X) 
In the case of the dialectical probability, we have 
Property 6.2. The cautious probability is given Vw E S2 by 
CautP(w) = (1  — E.A.VjA(w) + A  
1 + A(I121 - 1) 
Proof. Observe that 
• first Exco,wEX MA(X) = (1 — EA)/3A(w) + CA, and finally that 
• EvE11 EXgt2,vEx MA(X) = (1-6A) EvEO 3A(V)+EA191 = 1+CA(PI 
It is easy to check that CautP = (1 — €')13A + e'u, where 
= 	EA PI  
1 + EA(PI — 1) 
and u is the uniform probability distribution. The cautious probability is thus 
also a linear combination of 73A  and u, although in that case, the weight associ-
ated to u is e instead of EA. The ratio between these weights is 
6, 
EA1 +EANI — 1) — ICI 
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This means that e' is an amplification of EA . Understandably, CautP is a more 
cautious version than the pignistic probability. 
Definition 6.8. The proportional probability is the Bayesian probability dis-
tribution PropP obtained by application of the proportional probabilistic trans-
formation /Daniel, 20061 and is defined for any belief function with evidence 
mass function m by 
PropP(w) = maw)) E 	
m(X)  
xcp,wEx- EyEx m({v}) 
In the case of the dialectical probability, we have 
Property 6.3. The proportional probability is given Vw E CZ by 
PropP(w) = PAM 
Proof. By definition of mA, we have PropP(w) = 
(1 - EA)PA(W) 
E 	(1 — cA)PA(x)6.(ixi, 	 EA  
XCS-2,wEX ~vEX(1 - EA )15A ( v) 
+ 
EvEn(1 — cA)pA(v) 
(1 — EA )pA(w) ( (1 EA)pA(W)± 6A 	= (1 - EA)13A(W) 	1 CA  
(1 - CA)VA (W) (1 1 	EA 	PA(W) 
\- EA 
0 
The proportional probability is simply equal to the biased prior 13A . Here, 
the prior is not combined with u, which makes the proportional probability the 
least cautious of all probabilities seen so far. 
Definition 6.9. The plausible probability is the Bayesian probability distri- 
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bution Pl_P obtained by application of the plausibility transformation method 
[Cobb and Shenoy, 20061 and is defined for any plausibility function Pl by 
Pl({w})  Pl_P(w) = EvEO p/({v}) 
In the case of the dialectical probability, we have 
Property 6.4. The plausible probability is given Vw E 52 by 
— EAVA(W)  Pl_P(w) = 
eit(IC11 
Proof. We have for a dialectical probability 
Pl({w}) = 1  — Bel({w}c ) = 1 — (1 — EA)23A({w}c ) = 1  — (1 — EA)(1  fiA(w)) 
so Pl_P(w) = (1 — CA)pA (W) 	 A. Clearly, 
PI_P({v}) = (1— CA) + eAg =1+ eA(PI —1) 
vEn 
0 
The plausible probability is remarkably identical to the cautious probability 
CautP and consequently also represents a very cautious Bayesian substitute for 
dialectical probabilities. 
6.6 Axioms fulfilled by the maximality criterion 
Recall that the main criterion for choosing the best decisions under any impre-
cise probability, and in particular for dialectical probabilities, is the maximality 
criterion. By definition, this criterion consists in choosing an admissible gamble 
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Xd maximising mind, E(Xd — Xd , ) (see Section 6.1.2). We would like to know 
which rationality axioms from decision theory amongst those of Section 2.1.2 are 
satisfied by this criterion. Here, we do not assume that the imprecise probability 
is a dialectical probability, but consider the general case. This decision-theoretic 
analysis has not been given by [Walley, 1991]. Note that, for this analysis to be 
possible, we need to assume that the set of possible decisions is finite. 
Theorem 6.8. The maximality criterion fulfils axioms 2.1 (complete ranking), 
2.2 (independence of labelling), 2.3 (independence of value scale), 2.4 (strong 
domination), 2.6 (independence of addition of a constant to a column) and 2.7 
(independence of column duplication) under strict uncertainty (vacuous previ-
sions) but does not fulfil axiom 2.5 (independence of irrelevant alternatives). 
Proof. Axiom 2.1. By finiteness of D, the value mind, E(Xd — Yd') exists for 
every d E D and any valuation in IR of decisions induces a complete ranking of 
the decisions. 
Axiom 2.2. The ordering of the set of scenarios and set of decisions has no 
influence on mind, E(Xd —KO and subsequently on the ordering obtained. 
Axiom 2.3. Let f(x) = ax + b be an affine transformation of the utility 
scale with a, b E IR and a > 0. For every Bayesian probability P and gamble 
X, we have E p( f (X)) = >wE0 P(w) f (X (w)) = EwEf2 P(w)(aX (w) + b) = 
aE p (X) + b = f (E p (X)). For any set D of Bayesian probabilities (credal set), 
we have r( f (X)) = SUPPED E p( f (X)) = sup pep f (Ep(X)) = f (r (x)) since 
f is strictly monotone increasing. Similarly, we have mind, r( f (Xd) — f (X d , )) = 
f(mind,  E(Xd — Xd , )), so the strict preference of d1 over d2 is unchanged by 
application of the affine transformation f to the utility scale. 
Axiom 2.4. If Xd1 (w) > Xd 2 (w) for every scenario w E 1-2, then there 
exists a constant i > 0 such that Xd i > 2 p. For every d' E D, we have 
E(Xd , — Yd,) > E(xd2 — Yd' il) = E (X 2 — Yd , ) + p. Clearly, we also have 
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mind, E(X d , — Yd') > mind, E(Xd2  — Yd, )-1-,u and, by consequence, di is strictly 
preferred to d2. 
Axiom 2.5. Take for instance the vacuous prevision E = max. Assume 
S2 = {wi, w2} and consider the gambles Xd„ Xd 2 , Xd2 , and Xd4 defined by 
Xdi = 0, Xd2 = 1, Xda (W1) = 0, Xd3 (W2) = 1/2, Xd4(W1) = 1, Xd4(w2) = 3/2. 
If D = 	d2 , d3 }, then we have the ranking di < d3 < d2: 
• mind,ED E(Xdi — Xd , ) = min(0, —1, 0) = —1 
• i Innd'ED _T(xd2 — X d' ) = min(1, 0, 1) = 0 
• mind,ED E(Xd3 — Xd, ) = min(1/2, —1/2, 0) = —1/2 
but if we add d4 and D = 	d2 , d3 , d41 we obtain instead 
• mind,ED r(Xdi Xd, ) = min(0, —1, 0, —1) = —1 
• mind,ED E(Xd2 — X d') = min(1, 0,1, 0) = 0 
• mind, EDr(xd, — 	min(1/2, —1/2, 0, —1) = —1 
dl = d3 < d2: 
so the strict preference of d3 over di depends on d4. 
Axiom 2.6. Consider a utility function U : D x 	R and U' such that for 
every d and w w3 we have U' (d,w) = U(d, w) and U'(d, w .1 ) = U(d, w + c, 
where c is a constant (this is equivalent to adding the constant c to the utility 
of outcomes in column j in the decision table). Define Xd(w) = U(d, w) and 
Xd = U'(d, w) for every d E D and w E a Remark that, for every w E St, we 
have the equality Xd(w) — X d , (w) = X:i(W) — X (w) and therefore, the strict 
preference of di over d2 under U is equivalent to strict preference of di over d2 
under U'. The addition of a constant to the utility of every outcome under a 
chosen scenario does not affect the strict preference of a decision over another 
one. 
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Axiom 2.7. The question of independence of the preferences with respect to 
column duplication only makes sense in the context of decision making under 
strict uncertainty, as the duplication of a scenario in ft would otherwise violate 
the property of disjointedness of the universe ft Thus, assuming that E = max 
(vacuous upper prevision), it is clear that the values mind, E(Xd — Xd') are 
unchanged (the max of a list of numbers does not change if one of the numbers 
is duplicated) and the same subsequently holds for the preferences over the 
decisions. 	 ❑  
So the maximality criterion for imprecise probabilities fulfils the same set of 
axioms as Savage's minimax regret criterion (see Section 2.1.2). We will examine 
more closely in the next section the relationship between these two criteria. 
6.7 Link with decision criteria under strict un-
certainty and risk 
In decision making under strict uncertainty, no probabilistic information is as-
sumed to be available. Reasoning under strict uncertainty is (intuitively) equiv-
alent to reasoning under maximally imprecise probabilities. These probabilities, 
called the vacuous lower and upper probabilities are defined respectively for ev-
ery event E as min(E) and max(E). Clearly, vacuous probabilities convey no 
probabilistic information. It is thus a natural question to check whether the 
minimax and maximality criteria under vacuous probabilities correspond to any 
of the criteria for decision making under strict uncertainty of Section 2.1.2 and, 
if not, which are the properties that distinguish them. Importantly, one should 
bear in mind that dialectical probabilities become vacuous as the confidence 
level (1 — x)100% imposed by the decision maker becomes close to 100% or 
when the ratio K/I is very large (see Section 5.6). 
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Property 6.5. Under the vacuous previsions, all decisions that are optimal ac-
cording to the minimax criterion are also optimal according to Wald's maximin 
return criterion. 
Proof. A decisions d is optimal according to the minimax criterion if and only 
if the gamble Xd is admissible and maximises E(X d ). When the prevision is 
vacuous, E is simply equal to min. So, d is optimal under a vacuous previ-
sion if and only if Xd is admissible and d has a maximal security level sd = 
U(d, w). 	 ❑  
The converse however does not hold in general because of the admissibility 
condition. The minimax criterion is thus stronger than Wald's criterion. 
Although Savage's regret criterion and the maximality criterion satisfy the 
same decision-theoretic axioms (result of the previous section), the two criteria 
differ. Indeed, 
Property 6.6. Under the vacuous previsions, 
• the maximality criterion is equivalent to choosing a decision d such that 
Xd is admissible and solves 
max min max(U(d, w) — U (d' , w)) 
d d' w 
• Savage's regret criterion is equivalent to choosing a decision d that solves 
max min min(U(d, w) — U (d' , w)) 
d 	w 
Proof. A decision d is optimal according to the maximality criterion if and only 
if the gamble Xd is admissible and maximises mind,ED E(Xd — Xd'). Under 
the vacuous previsions, E is simply equal to max. So, a decision d is optimal 
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according to the maximality criterion if and only if Xd is admissible and d 
maximises 
min max(U(d, w) — U (di , w)) 
d'ED wES2 
In other words, the maximality criterion consists in choosing a decision d such 
that Xd is admissible and d solves 
max min max(U(d, w) — U (di , W)) 
d w 
Savage's regret criterion consists in choosing a decision d that minimises 
Pd = max md
ax(U(d, w) — U (d, w)) 
w 	' 
Savage's criterion is thus equivalent to maximising —p(d), and thus can be 
formulated equivalently as choosing a decision d that solves 
max min mM (U (d, w) — U (di , W)) 
d w d' 
or since the min operators always commute 
max min min(U(d, w) — U (d' , W)) 
d d' w 
0 
Thus, the two criteria differ in their inner parts: Savage's regret involves 
a min and the maximality criterion a max. The regret is based on worst-case 
scenario comparisons to other decisions, whilst the maximality criterion is based 
on best-case scenario comparisons. Thus, intuitively, the maximality criterion 
is less "pessimistic" than Savage's regret criterion. 
Laplace's principle of insufficient reason cannot be directly compared to the 
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minimax and maximality criteria. Nevertheless, we can still state that 
Property 6.7. Under the vacuous previsions, the Bayes gambles Xd deter-
mined by the pignistic, cautious or plausible and proportional probabilities are 
in one-to-one correspondence with the decisions d that are optimal according to 
Laplace's principle of insufficient reason. 
Proof. It can easily be shown that the pignistic, cautious and proportional prob-
abilities that derive from the vacuous probability simply correspond to the uni-
form distribution. The corresponding Bayes gambles Xd are thus by defini-
tion the gambles with maximal expected utility under the uniform distribution. 
Hence, they are trivially in one-to-one correspondence with the decisions d that 
are optimal according to Laplace's principle of insufficient reason. 	0 
Let us now study the case of decision making under risk, where a precise 
or Bayesian probability distribution P is available. We can show that both 
the minimax criterion and the maximality criterion are compatible with the 
expected utility criterion. 
Property 6.8. In decision under risk, the decisions that are optimal according 
to the minimax criterion are also optimal under the expected utility criterion. 
Proof. The credal set is the singleton 7, = {P}, so the natural extension E is 
simply equal to the expect utility Ep. The converse does not hold in general 
because minimax gambles must fulfil the admissibility condition. 	0 
Property 6.9. In decision under risk, the decisions that are optimal according 
to the maximality criterion are also optimal under the expected utility criterion. 
Proof. Since in that case E = Ep and Ep is linear, we have 
7g(Xd — Xd') = Ep(Xd — Xd') = Ep(Xd) — Ep(Xd') 
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and we may write 
min r( x,— xd‘ ) = Ep( xo— max Ep(Xd') d' 	 ' 
The ranking obtained using the maximality criterion is perfectly equivalent to 
the one obtained using the expected utility criterion. Again, the converse does 
not hold (decisions with maximal expected utility are not always optimal under 
the maximality criterion) because the admissibility condition may not hold. 0 
Both the minimax and maximality criteria generalise the expected utility 
criterion to imprecise probabilities. The minimax criterion degenerates to the 
pessimistic criterion of Wald and the maximality criterion degenerates to a more 
optimistic version than Savage's regret criterion. 
6.8 Application to stock trading 
The purpose of this section is to provide an experimental validation of the 
substantive goodness of dialectical probabilities and the suitability of the max-
imality criterion. We also wish to illustrate the use of abstract argumentation 
in finance and assess its added value. 
6.8.1 Description of the problem 
One of the most basic activities for investors in financial markets consists in 
buying and selling stocks, an activity referred to as stock trading. This applica-
tion is restricted to single stock trading, although investors normally compose 
portfolios with tens or hundreds of stocks, using optimisation techniques such 
as mean-variance portfolio selection [Markowitz, 1952]. 
We will consider a fixed stock (American Express) and the repeated decision 
problem of buying or selling the stock on a daily basis. We assume that the 
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present and past values of the stock's prices can be observed by the investor. 
We assume that the investor has an initial budget of 1, that the investor is not 
allowed to short-sell the stock 1 nor use leverage (borrow money) to magnify his 
profits. Scenarios can be generated from a sample of past daily returns over an 
horizon of one year by clustering (we use the deterministic annealing algorithm 
of [Rose, 1998]). We use as benchmark B the period of trading days starting on 
January, 2nd 2003 and ending on September, 2nd 2008 (see Figure 6.1) and we 
will use the Sharpe ratio [Sharpe, 1966] 
S= 	— RF 
Q 
where 
• it is the annualised mean of the daily investment returns, 
• a is the annualised volatility of the returns and 
• RF = 5% is the yearly risk-free rate 
as a measure of performance for investment strategies. 
We thus consider a single stock and denote the series of its adjusted daily 
closing prices xo, x1, 	„ .... The initial price of the stock is xo and for every 
integer i, xi denotes the price of the stock per unit after i periods. All periods 
have a same duration of T = 1 trading day. We will denote by to the date of 
the first trading day and for every integer i the date after iT trading days have 
elapsed, so on a calendar with trading days only the time t, = to + iT. At time 
to, the investor is assumed to start with a budget of 1 and no stock. This sum 
or cash is placed in the bank at a constant risk-free rate of RF expressed in 
'Short-selling a stock means borrowing the stock from someone, selling it immediately after 
and re-buying it later in time at a cheaper price, so as to return it to its owner. Short-selling 
allows to make money on a stock whose price is falling. It is mathematically equivalent to 




















American Express 	 
Trading days 
Figure 6.1: American express stock from August, 11 1998 to August, 8 2008. 
percents per period T. At any time t,, where i > 0, the investor may use part 
of his cash to buy an amount of q, E IR units of the stock. If q j  < 0, we will say 
that the investor sells stocks, and if q j = 0, that he does nothing. No buying or 
selling is permitted intra-period. Buying and selling stocks incurs transaction 
costs usually proportional to the amount of the transaction. Thus, in order to 
buy (or sell) q, units of the stocks, the investor must pay lxiTC/100 in cash, 
where TC is the transaction cost expressed in percents. We denote by C, the 
amount of cash at time t, and Q, the quantity of stock owned by the investor 
in units before any decision has been made at that time. The total gross wealth 
of the investor is then given by W, = + 
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Co = 1, Qo = 0, Wo = 1 
Cz+1 = Cz — lqz I xi (TC/100) — chx, 
Q,±1 = Qi + qi 
Wi+1= Ci+i + Qz+ixi-Fi 
The performance of the investor depends on the evolution of his gross wealth 
W2 . A useful metric in quantitative finance [Lhabitant, 2001] to measure the 
performance of an investor is the Sharpe ratio [Sharpe, 1966], given earlier. A 
high Sharpe ratio value means that the average yearly growth rate of the wealth 
is large compared to the irregularity of its variations. As said earlier, the Sharpe 
ratio is given by the formula 
S= a — RF 
The two parameters /1 and a of this formula are precisely computed in the 
following way. First, compute the sequence of log-returns for every i > 0 as 
ri = ln(1 + 	w 	). Then, compute the log-return 1' as the mean (arithmetic 
average) of the sequence (ri ). Compute the log-volatility v as the standard 
deviation of the sequence (ri ). Let x = 252/T be the annualization factor. 
Compute the yearly log-return ry as "rx and the yearly log-standard deviation 
vy as v N/7. Finally, compute 
• the aggregated yearly return iu = er. — 1, and 
• the yearly volatility a = ev. — 1. 
The Sharpe ratio is not much significant if calculated on an horizon of less than 
5 years and reporting periods T of more than a quarter of a year. A negative 
Sharpe ratio means that the investor under-performs the risk-free rate, and 
a positive one that the investor on the contrary outperforms it. Historically, 
reference market indexes (which are dynamically updated portfolios) such as 
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S&P 500 and FTSE 100 realise Sharpe ratios going up to almost 0.5 and (at 
the time of writing this thesis) the world's top hedge funds have Sharpe ratios 
of value slightly above 1. 
6.8.2 Building arguments from technical analysis 
In finance, the forecast of stock prices is based on fundamental analysis and/or 
technical analysis. Fundamental analysis is defined (InvestorWords.com) as a 
method of security valuation which involves examining the company's finan-
cials and operations, especially sales, earnings, growth potential, assets, debt, 
management, products, and competition. Fundamental analysis takes into con-
sideration only those variables that are directly related to the company itself, 
rather than the overall state of the market or technical analysis data. Technical 
analysis is a method of evaluating securities by relying on the assumption that 
market data, such as charts of price, volume, and open interest, can help pre-
dict future (usually short-term) market trends. Unlike fundamental analysis, 
the intrinsic value of the security is not considered. Technical analysts believe 
that they can accurately predict the future price of a stock by looking at its 
historical prices and other trading variables. Technical analysis assumes that 
market psychology influences trading in a way that enables predicting when a 
stock will rise or fall. For that reason, many technical analysts are also market 
timers, who believe that technical analysis can be applied just as easily to the 
market as a whole as to an individual stock. 
We adopt here technical analysis for its simplicity of use. For any given stock 
and time, we seek to identify the current stock price trend and potential risk 
of that trend being interrupted and then reversed (the phenomenon is called a 
divergence). Trends and divergences allow to build a number of useful forecast 
arguments. To build such arguments, one looks at existing technical indicators 
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(basically functions of the past prices of the stock and volumes exchanged). We 
use here MACD (moving average convergence/divergence) and RSI (relative 
strength index) as indicators. Mitigation arguments can be built by looking at 
confirmation signals, which are indicators used in technical analysis to back up 
or invalidate the forecast of technical analysts. We use here moving average 
and centerline crossovers to build mitigation arguments. Denoting by x, the 
current price of the stock and x j+1(w) its price after T if scenario w occurs, we 
introduce the following arguments: 
• an uptrend argument noted Tr 
— if the stock is oversold (the value of the RSI has dropped below 30 
and still remains below 50) 
— with supported event XT1 = { w E SZ I xi+i (w) > xi} 
• a downtrend argument noted Ti 
— if the stock is overbought (the value of the RSI has jumped above 70 
and still remains above 50) 
— with supported event XT, = {w E S21x,+1(w) < 
• a positive divergence argument noted DT 
— if the stock and the values of MACD have been going down and 
MACD only has started to go up 
— with supported event X D, = {w E Qlx,+i(w) > xi} 
— attacking the downtrend argument T4 
• 	a negative divergence argument noted Di 
— if the stock and the values of MACD have been going up and MACD 
only has started to go down 
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— with supported event XD I = {w E 91xi-Fi(w) < xi} 
— attacking the uptrend argument TT 
• a lack of confirmation argument noted —DT (respectively -'Di) 
— if there is a positive (respectively negative) divergence argument 
— attacking the divergence argument DT (respectively D1) 
• 	a bullish moving average crossover argument noted MA-XT 
— if MACD has crossed its 9-day exponential moving average from be-
low (bullish EMA-crossover) and there has been a uninterrupted flow 
of positive divergence arguments since then 
— attacking the lack of confirmation argument —DT 
• a bullish centerline crossover argument noted C-XT 
— if MACD has jumped from negative to positive values (bullish cen-
terline crossover) and there has been a uninterrupted flow of positive 
divergence arguments since then 
— attacking the lack of confirmation argument —DT 
• a bearish moving average crossover argument noted MA-XT 
— if MACD has crossed its 9-day exponential moving average from 
above (bearish EMA-crossover) and there has been a uninterrupted 
flow of negative divergence arguments since then 
— attacking the lack of confirmation argument —01  
• a bearish centerline crossover argument noted C-XT 
— if MACD has jumped from positive to negative values (bearish cen-
terline crossover) and there has been a uninterrupted flow of negative 
divergence arguments since then 
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— attacking the lack of confirmation argument —,D1  
The possible attacks between arguments can be visualised in Fig. 6.2. Ob-
serve that divergence arguments attack trend arguments and that divergence 
arguments are always attacked by a lack of confirmation arguments (this is a 
systematic principle of cautiousness). Confirmations can be provided either by 
centerline or moving average crossover arguments. We believe that such an 
abstract argumentation framework constitutes a possible and honest reconsti-
tution of the reasoning process used by technical analysts and traders on a daily 
basis. 
T1 	T1  
I 	1 DI Di 
1 	I C-X1-->--iDi —01-c---C X1  
I 	1 
MA-X1 MA-X1  
Figure 6.2: Attacks in the stock trading abstract argumentation framework. 
At any given time, the argumentation framework may only be in one of the 
11 configurations listed in Table 6.1. These configurations differ essentially by 
the presence of trend and divergence arguments and the number of confirma-
tions of the divergence argument. We are now going to assess, for each one of 
these configurations, the strength of each argument according to our measure of 
strength given in Chapter 4. Intuitively, in absence of divergence arguments the 
trend argument should have maximal strength. A divergence argument should 
decrease the strength of the trend argument. The impact of the divergence ar-
guments should however diminish with the number of divergence confirmation 
arguments (moving average and centerline crossover arguments). The strength 
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values obtained for every argument in the various possible configurations of our 
financial framework are computed in Table 6.2. As expected, trend arguments 
have a maximal strength of 1 in the absence of divergence arguments. When a 
divergence exists, but has no confirmation, the strength of the trend argument 
collapses to 0.5 and the divergence argument has an even lower strength of 0.25. 
However, a first confirmation argument restores the strength of the divergence 
argument to 0.5, and a second to brings it to 0.583. With this first and second 
confirmation of divergence, the strength of the trend argument further plunges 
to 0.386 and 0.348. Notice that in the absence of trend argument, the strength 
of the divergence argument is unchanged. This is quite natural as the trend 
argument does not constitute an attack against the divergence argument. 






{TT , Di , -01} 
{T1, Di, -,DT} 
{(D1, Tr), (-Di, Din 
{(Di, T.l), (-Dr, Dill 
{TT , Di, —Di , MA-X1} 
{T1, DT, -DT, MA-XT} 
{(DI ,TT ), (-01, Di), (MA-X1, -Di)} 
{(DT, Ti), (-DT, DT), (MA-XT, -D1)} 
ITT , D1,  -01,C-Xi} 
VT , DT, -Dr, C-XT} 
{(Di,TT ), (-D j.,D1 ), (C-X 1 ,-01 )} 
{(DT, TI), (-DT, DO , (C-X1, -DO} 
{T1 , D 4. ,-A,MA-X I ,C-X 1 } 
{TI , DT, -DT, MA-X1, C-Xt} 
{(D i , TT ), (-01 , Di), (MA-Xi, -Di), (C-X1, 	DI,)}- 
{(Dr , Ti), (-DT, DO, (MA-X1, -DT), (C-x-r, -DT)} 
Table 6.1: Possible configurations of the abstract argumentation framework. 
6.8.3 Decision making 
A simple strategy for a Bayesian investor (using either the pignistic, cautious or 
proportional probability distributions) would consist at each ti to buy a quantity 
qi of the stock that maximises the expectation of his future wealth E(Wid_ 1(qi )) 
and, more generally, for an investor using an imprecise probability model, to 
choose qi so that his future wealth X (qt ) = W,+1 is a maximal gamble. Let us 
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{T1, Di, -01} 0.5, 0.25,1.0 
{Ti , DT , —Di} 0.5, 0.25,1.0 
{T1, Di, —01, MA-X1} 0.386, 0.5, 0.25,1.0 
{Ti, DT, -IDT , MA-XT } 0.386, 0.5, 0.25,1.0 
{TT , Di, —Di, C-Xi} 0.386, 0.5, 0.25, 1.0 
{Ti , DT , —0/ , C-XT } 0.386, 0.5, 0.25,1.0 
{Tr , D1, —Di, MA-X1, C-X1} 0.348, 0.583, 0.167, 1.0, 1.0 
{T1, DT , --DT , MA-XT , C-X/ } 0.348, 0.583, 0.167, 1.0, 1.0 
Table 6.2: Strength of arguments depending on the framework configuration. 
then first identify the set of gambles X. First, budget constraints exist on the 
decision variable qi . Since we assume that the investor cannot borrow any cash, 
the future cash value Ci,±1  must remain always positive, therefore qi E R must 
satisfy the following constraints 
{
Ci - qi xi (TC 1100) - qi xi > 0 
Ci + qi x i (TC/100) - qi xi > 0 
Secondly, the amount of stock to be sold is limited by the amount already owned 
or equivalently, the quantity Qi+i must always remain positive 
Qi qi > 0 
The decision variable qi is consequently bounded up and below. The gamble 
X(qi ) associated to the decision qi is defined Vw E 12 as 
X(gi )(w) = Ci - 	xi (TC/100) - qixi 
The set X = {X (qi ) qi  E R, Ci±i (qz ) > 0, Qi±1(q2 ) > 0} is non-empty, since it 
contains notably X(0). X is clearly compact, as it is the image by continuous 
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function into the space of gambles of the variable q, which ranges over closed 
interval of possible values. A maximal gamble can be found by application of 
Algorithm 4 from Section 6.4. This algorithm can be slightly specialised to the 
stock trading problem as shown in Algorithm 5. 
Algorithm 5 Finds a maximal gamble X*. 
1: Initialise: set k = 0 and yo = {X(0)} where the gamble X(0) is defined 
Vw E 52 as X(0)(w) = C, Qixi-ki(w)• 
2: Compute: xk = (Xk, mk) which maximises mk E IR subject to X k E X 
and VY E yk , mk < E(xk — Y) using Algorithm 6. 
3: Compute: Yk±i E X which minimises E(Xk - Yk+1) using Algorithm 7. 
4: Check: if mk < r(Xk 	— Yk+i) then go to step 5, else update Yk+1 
Yk U {Yk+i } and return to step 2 with k = k +1. 
5: Initialise: X = xk . 
6: Compute: X* E X which maximises 	.)q subject to X* > X. 
Property 6.10. Algorithm 5 returns a maximal gamble. 
Proof. This directly derives from the correctness of Algorithm 4 and the fact 
that X(0) E X. Indeed, X(0) is by definition the gamble representing the future 
wealth of the investor if he does nothing at time i. X(0) belongs to X since 
q, = 0 E R and when qz = 0, we have Ci±i = C.„ > 0 (the investor cannot borrow 
any money) and Qt±i = Q, > 0 (the investor cannot short-sell the stock). 0 
Property 6.11. Algorithm 6 gives an optimisation program with linear objec-
tive function and linear and quadratic constraints that is equivalent to maximis-
ing mk E R subject to the constraints Xk E X and VY E yk , mk < r(,ck — Y) 
under the dialectical probability. 
Proof. The first two inequality constraints are equivalent to Ci+i > 0. The 
third inequality constraint is equivalent to Qi+i > 0. The fourth and fifth 
inequality constraints are together equivalent to z, > 	Since the objective 
m to be maximised decreases as z, becomes larger (sixth and last inequality 
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Algorithm 6 Maximise mk E R s.t. Xk E X and VY E yk, mk  < r(xk - Y). 
1: Variables: 	...,tini, Xk(wt), • • • ,Xk(wisti),P1, • • • 'Pis-11,m E R 
2: Maximise: 
3: Subject to the linear and quadratic constraints: 
Ci — qi xi (TC 1100) — qi xi > 0 
Ci + qi xi (TC/100) — qixi > o 
Qi + qi > 0 
zi > qi  
zi > —qi  
V j E fi,..., ISeill : Xk(W j) = Ci - Zi Xi (TC /100) - qixi + (Qi + qi)xi+i(w.i) 
V j E {1, . .. , PI} : t j > 0 
ti + ... + ti ll ' =1 
V j E {11• • • I PI} : Pi = (1 - E)pA(Wj) + ftj 
VY E yk : m < Ep(X k -I-) 
constraints), the variable ; plays exactly the role of lq I. Thus, the first six 
constraints are equivalent to Xk E X. 
Under the dialectical probability, the constraint P E DA is equivalent to 
> the linear constraints Vj E {1, ... 191}: 	= ( 1 — 023A(w3)Et3' t3 	0 and 
El:2=1 1 t3 = 1. So, the seventh, eighth and ninth constraints are equivalent to P E 
DA. For given gambles Xk and Y, maximising at subject to m < Ep(Xk — Y) 
and P E DA is equivalent to maximising m subject to m < E(Xk - Y). 
The objective m is linear. All constraints are clearly linear except the last 
inequality constraints m < Ep(X k —Y) which is quadratic, as it involves factors 
that multiply pairs of variables of the program. 	 0 
Property 6.12. Algorithm 7 gives a linear optimisation program that is equiv-
alent to minimising E(X k — Yk+1) subject to Yk+1  E X under the dialectical 
probability. 
Proof. This directly derives from the expression of E for the dialectical proba-
bility given in property 5.13 and the fact that all constraints after the second 
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Algorithm 7 Minimise E(Xk — Yk+1) subject to Yk+i E X. 
1: Variables: 	Yk-f-i (Wi), 	Yk-f-i (Wm') E R 
2: Minimise: m 
3: Subject to the linear constraints: 
Vw E 52 : m > [/Ep, (Xk — Yk+i) + K(Xk (w) — Yk+i (W))] 1(K + I) 
Ci. — qii x i (TC 1100) — q,;xi > 0 
Ci + qi xi (TC/100) — qi xi > 0 
Qi + q'i > 0 
4 > qi  
4> —qti  
Vj E {1,...,0} : Yk+i(wi = Ci — z (TC/100) — gixi + (Qi + 
one are equivalent to Yk+1  E X (as in the proof of correctness of the previous 
algorithm). 	 0 
6.8.4 Choice of the parameters K and VA 
The statistical confidence parameter x used for calculating the Wilson score 
intervals, E and eventually K can be chosen arbitrarily. In finance, a high 
statistical confidence implies more cautiousness and less risk taking. If no risk 
is taken, the investor's return is the risk-free rate and the Sharpe ratio is null. 
If the investor takes too much risk, the volatility of his investment's returns 
explodes and leads inevitably to low Sharpe ratio values as well. Statistics do 
not offer any method for choosing the ideal value of x in our problem. We 
have shown in Chapter 5 that robust belief functions are equivalent to maximal 
contaminations of the statistical prior 15 with level of contamination E. Thus, 
E represents the frequency with which the random process observed does not 
follow the distribution 23, but some other unknown probability q. We have also 
shown that dialectical probabilities collapse to robust beliefs whenever the set 
of forecast arguments is empty (A = 0), see property 5.9. Therefore, c should 
be chosen so as to match with the frequency Fr(A 0) with which the set 
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of forecast arguments is not empty. This frequency can be measured from the 
benchmark B. We thus choose E = Fr(A 0) and K = c/(1—€), or equivalently 
Fr(A 0)  K= 
1— Fr(A = 0) 
We have also seen (see property 5.17 in particular) that when the set of 
forecast arguments is non-empty (A 0), the level of contamination EA  is lower 
than E. The value EA is interpreted as the frequency with which the random 
process does not follow the distribution of the biased prior PA . Assuming that 
the forecast arguments are good enough, we can expect the frequency failure c A 
to be, let us say, half of c. Under this assumption, the average informational 
value IA of the arguments must be such that c/2 = K/(K + IA + 1), or, after 
simplification, IA is in average equal to K +1. Denoting now by (s) the average 
value (in time) of the total strength of the forecast arguments (also be estimated 
from the benchmark B), we choose 
VA = 
( s ) 
6.8.5 Performance results 
We may now compare the investment performance obtained with the American 
Express stock (AXP), using maximal gamble strategies and, as probabilistic 
model, either 
• the statistical prior 23, calculated from an historical sample of daily returns 
over one year and updated monthly, 
• the robust belief functions based on /3, using a rolling window of 10 years 
to estimate the epistemic risk aversion parameter K, or 
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statistics stock stat. prior robust belief dialectical prob. 
average yearly return 4.08% 0.90% 7.51% 16.17% 
worst daily log-return -14.60% -14.60% -11.50% -11.50% 
best daily log-return 12.01% 10.42% 12.01% 12.01% 
yearly volatility 35.63% 32.01% 21.13% 24.38% 
Sharpe ratio -0.02 -0.12 0.11 0.41 
yearly skewness -0.43% -0.85% 1.71% 2.59% 
Table 6.3: Performance of the statistical prior, robust beliefs and dialectical 
probabilities compared to the stock's performance. 
same 10 years window to estimate VA • 
The transaction costs TC are taken equal to 0.25% and the yearly risk-free rate 
assumed is RF = 5%. The evolutions of the gross wealth, starting from an 
initial budget of 1 are shown in Figure 6.3. The bottom curve corresponds to 
trading with the statistical prior, the middle curve to the robust belief and the 
top curve to the dialectical probability. 
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We now analyse quantitatively and qualitatively the results obtained (see 
Table 6.3). The difference between the middle and bottom curve shows the 
added value of robust belief functions and justifies the importance of imprecise 
probabilities. The average yearly returns with the statistical prior are of 0.90%, 
and with the robust beliefs are of 7.51%. The worst daily log-return is improved 
from —14.60% to —11.50%, the best daily log-return from 10.42% to 12.01%. 
The volatility (risk) is also reduced from 32.01% to 21.13%. The overall perfor-
mance (Sharpe ratio) is increased from the negative value (below the risk-free 
rate) —0.12 to 0.11, which means we outperform the risk-free rate. The robust 
beliefs make the log-returns distribution positively skewed, which means that 
the downside risk (part of the risk that really matters) is reduced. We observe 
here that robust belief functions allow to build much safer and more efficient 
investment strategies than statistical priors, by greatly reducing the volatility 
and increasing the return from a level below the risk-free rate with the statistical 
prior to a level slightly above. 
Figure 6.4: Risk of holding the stock per unit of money invested. 
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The difference between the top and middle curve shows the added value of ar-
gumentation (and more generally the potential of using subjective information) 
over robust belief functions. The average yearly returns with the dialectical prior 
are further increased from 7.51% to 16.17%. The worst and best daily returns 
remain the same. The volatility is slightly increased from 21.13% to 24.38%, 
although the skewness is in fact improved. The overall performance gain is quite 
important, with a Sharpe ratio jumping from 0.11 to 0.41. This performance is 
high despite the credit crunch period (last 250 trading days) where the coherent 
risk measure does not fail to detect an abnormally high level of risk (observe 
the jump made on Figure 6.4 after roughly 2400 trading days). 
In conclusion, it appears that dialectical probabilities constitute a good basis 
for the construction of efficient and dynamic investment strategies, with quasi 
equal levels of risk and much higher returns. This advantages is provided by 
carefully chosen, weighted and combined arguments concerning price trends or 
divergences generated fully automatically and drawn from expert knowledge in 
technical analysis. 
6.9 Related work 
Imprecise probability is a rather recent topic and its use for statistical inference, 
decision and risk analysis has been investigated so far essentially by only a few 
researchers in statistics, artificial intelligence, finance and operations research. 
In statistics, imprecise probabilities are used to obtain robust intervals as well 
as maximum likelihood estimations for probabilities, conditional probabilities, 
expectations, variances, entropy or mutual information [Berger and Berliner, 
1986; Hutter, 2003]. Notably, the &contamination models used by robust Bayes 
analysts [Huber, 1981; Berger and Berliner, 1986], but also the imprecise Dirich-
let model introduced by [Walley, 1991] relax the classical Bayesian assumption 
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that a prior state of ignorance can be represented by a single prior probability 
distribution. Like these authors, we have provided in Chapter 5 robust intervals 
for probabilities, conditional probabilities, expectations and entropy. A robust 
interval for variance is given in the appendix (the proof of this technical result 
obtained by Lagrangian duality is omitted) for dialectical probabilities. Inter-
estingly, the imprecise Dirichlet model uses an hyper-parameter noted s that 
allows the subject to control the speed at which probabilistic imprecision de-
creases with the amount of information. The epistemic risk-aversion parameter 
K introduced in our approach plays essentially the same role. 
In the area of artificial intelligence, credal sets have been found appropriate 
for representing uncertainty in situations where the information is incomplete 
[Zaffalon, 2002a], imprecise [Walley and Fine, 1979; Zaffalon, 2002b; Kozine and 
Utkin, 2005; Utkin, 2006], vague [Zadeh, 1978; de Cooman, 1997; Walley and 
de Cooman, 2001] or contradictory [Walley, 1996]. Imprecise probabilities are 
thus appreciated as a model of partial ignorance, incompleteness, indeterminacy 
and indecision [Zaffalon, 2005]. We have discussed these aspects in the case 
of dialectical probabilities in Chapters 5 and 6 and, in this chapter, we have 
shown in detail the connection between decision making under total probabilistic 
ignorance (vacuous previsions) and strict uncertainty. We have also observed 
empirically that our trading agent was less frequently undecided when taking 
into account expert opinions (the wealth grows more often at the risk-free rate 
under robust belief functions than it does under dialectical probabilities). 
In finance, authors such as [Knight, 1921] and more recently [Kane, 1999] 
have argued against the existence of a common observable stationary probability 
measure for security prices. Indeed, the periodic returns of a firm's stock do not 
really fulfil the definition of a random experiments in statistics (i.e. an experi-
ment that can be repeated many times in exactly the same conditions) as e.g. 
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firms constantly introduce new products and services. Also, [Cragg and Malkiel, 
1968] observed that different security analysis firms' estimates differed greatly. 
The very existence of active and volatile securities markets challenges the as-
sumption of unanimous agreement as to what parties feel as security is worth. 
Kane ascertained that "imprecision gives active and volatile markets a reason 
to exist". These observations justify the importance of imprecise probabilities 
in finance. Notice that for instance, coherent financial risk measures [Artzner et 
al., 1999] are equivalent to coherent upper previsions [Pelessoni and Vicig, 2001; 
Vicig, 2008]. In this chapter, we have proposed such a measure of financial risk 
based on dialectical probabilities and demonstrated experimentally its ability 
to detect risky situations (credit crunch). 
In operations research, [Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2000] showed that even 
small perturbations of uncertain quantities could result in highly infeasible solu-
tions of linear optimisation problems. For these problems, a robust formulation 
was proposed in terms of a matrix of uncertain coefficients ranging within an 
uncertainty set. [Bertsimas and Brown, 2008], who observed that the literature 
on robust optimisation was "essentially silent on the question of constructing 
these uncertainty sets" proposed a systematic method for constructing uncer-
tainty sets from coherent risk measures [Artzner et al., 1999]. They produced 
then a number of uncertainty sets for robust linear optimisation from several 
important coherent risk measures, such as e.g. CVaR and one-sided moment 
measures. Naturally, the same technique may be used to produce uncertainty 
sets in robust linear optimisation from our coherent risk measure p based on 
dialectical probabilities. 
[Treynor and Ferguson, 1985] have explained theoretically how investors pos-
sessing private and non-price information could statistically achieve unusual 
profits by using technical analysis. In particular, [Osler, 2003] provided ex- 
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perimental evidence and an explanation for the predictive success of technical 
analysis in the foreign exchange market. Our experiments in this chapter have 
confirmed that unusual profits could be achieved by using technical analysis. 
[Lo et al., 2000] introduced kernel regression as a mathematical method for 
removing the noise component of stock price time series, thus simplifying the 
problem of automatic pattern detection in technical analysis. In our experi-
ments, pattern detection was based on argumentation and thus was done quite 
differently. [Gately, 1996] and [Refenes et al., 1997] have developed automatic 
trading systems using technical analysis based on neural networks and [Simutis, 
2000] and [Dourra and Siy, 2002] used fuzzy logic. In this chapter, we have 
explained how to design an automatic trading system using technical analysis 
based instead on imprecise probabilities. 
6.10 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that the maximality criterion generalised the ex-
pected utility criterion to the case of imprecise probabilities and have studied 
the decision-theoretic properties fulfilled by this criterion. We have observed 
that the maximality criterion had the same properties as Savage's regret cri-
terion, but that the maximality criterion was less pessimistic than the regret 
criterion. We have also introduced a general algorithm based on semi-infinite 
programming for finding maximal gambles under any imprecise probability. 
We have applied existing results from the theory of imprecise probabilities 
and thus showed how to solve problems of statistical inference, financial risk 
analysis and decision analysis when using dialectical probabilities in particular. 
The efficiency of dialectical probabilities combined with the maximality criterion 
have been experimentally validated in a financial setting. We have demonstrated 
experimentally the potential of expert arguments drawn from technical analysis 
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and their ability to improve the performance of investment strategies based on 




In this thesis, we have proposed a methodology for constructing decision making 
models in decision theory. In Chapter 2, we have introduced decision theory 
and described the three possible components of a decision model, namely, a 
decision table, a value function and a Bayesian probability distribution. Then, 
the construction of each one of these components has been considered as a 
problem on its own and has been examined in detail in a separate chapter of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 3 has been dedicated to the construction of decision tables. By 
definition, a decision table is the graphical representation of a mapping T : 
D x 	X, where D is a set of possible decisions, 11 an exhaustive set of 
mutually exclusive scenarios and X a set of outcomes. A decision table thus 
represents all the possible outcomes of decisions in a given situation. First, basic 
influence diagrams have been introduced as a tool for describing logical and 
uncertain knowledge about a given decision domain. We have used assumption-
based argumentation to analyse and process basic influence diagrams. We have 
proved that the new liberal stable semantics could be used to process basic 
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influence diagrams in a rational way and derive decision tables. We have studied 
the suitability of hypergraph algorithms to compute the liberal stable semantics 
and have applied this technique to build a decision table for the game of poker. 
Chapter 4 has been dedicated to the construction of value functions. By 
definition, a value function is a function V : X 	that quantifies the desir- 
ability of each outcome in X. We have used abstract argumentation to model 
the uncertain knowledge of a decision maker regarding the desirability of his ob-
jectives. In order to weigh the uncertainties, we have developed a quantitative 
measure of argument strength. This measure allows to estimate the strength 
of arguments in dialectic settings, whereby each argument is a justified claim 
on its own and the arguments may undermine or "attack" each other. The 
strength of an argument is defined as the value (the guaranteed expected gain) 
of a proponent of the argument confronting an opponent of the argument via a 
repeated game of argumentation strategy. We have used a simple mechanism of 
preference aggregation from cardinal welfare theory to calculate a value function 
V, by combining the decision maker's arguments concerning the desirability of 
his objectives and the precise strength of these arguments. We have studied the 
main properties of the value functions obtained and have applied the proposed 
technique for obtaining value functions to build value functions for poker players 
with various psychological and emotional patterns. 
Chapter 5 has been dedicated to the construction of imprecise probabilities. 
Imprecise probabilities generalise the Bayesian model of probability. Probabil-
ities serve to quantify the chance of occurrence of each possible scenario in a 
We have developed a framework for constructing imprecise probabilities called 
dialectical probabilities taking the form of belief functions, given as input some 
statistical data plus a number of expert opinions concerning the expected oc-
currence of scenarios in Q. Opinions have been modeled by sets of abstract 
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arguments called forecast and mitigation arguments. Forecast arguments are 
justified claims in favour of the occurrence of events (thus supporting one or 
more scenarios) and mitigation arguments as justified claims undermining fore-
cast or mitigation arguments. We have proved that dialectical probabilities 
are mathematically coherent and can be interpreted as coherent previsions. We 
have also established that they could be interpreted in the same way as in robust 
Bayes analysis. This has allowed us to study their ability to model probabilistic 
indeterminacy. Dialectical probabilities have been applied with success to trust 
computing. 
Imprecise probabilities are not Bayesian and thus cannot be used directly to 
make decisions in decision theory. Therefore, we have dedicated Chapter 6 to ex-
plaining how dialectical probabilities could be used in practise to solve decision 
making problems, as well as problems in decision analysis, statistical inference 
and financial risk analysis. Then, we have studied in detail the main criterion for 
making decisions with imprecise probabilities (maximality criterion) and have 
provided a new algorithm based on semi-infinite programming for computing 
optimal decisions. We have also studied the exact relationships between the 
classical decision-theoretic criteria and the criteria used in imprecise probabil-
ity theory. Argumentation, dialectical probabilities and the algorithm used to 
compute optimal decisions have been applied and validated within a financial 
setting, whereby we could demonstrate that expert abstract arguments drawn 
from technical analysis can significantly improve the performance of statistical 
stock trading strategies. 
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are 
• a practical method for constructing decision models in decision theory, 
• applications of that method to poker, trust computing and finance, 
• a family of diagrams for the logical representation of situations of decision 
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making under strict uncertainty, 
• a semantics for assumption-based argumentation and an algorithm based 
on hypergraphs to compute this semantics, 
• a game-theoretic approach to the computation of the strength of argu-
ments in abstract argumentation, 
• formulae for building value functions from uncertain judgements of desir-
ability, 
• formulae for building belief and plausibility functions from statistical data 
and expert opinions, 
• a general algorithm for computing maximal decisions under any imprecise 
probability, 
• an analysis of the relationships between the decision criteria used in deci-
sion theory and those used in the theory of coherent previsions, and 
• formulae to solve problems of statistical inference, risk and decision anal-
ysis when using statistical data and expert opinions. 
The results in this thesis provide a foundation for the future design of expert 
systems. Two important challenges remain however to be addressed for the 
successful deployment of such systems. The first task would be to endow these 
systems with the capability to acquire, enhance and adapt their expertise with 
a high degree of autonomy. Achieving this would probably involve the use 
of advanced and maybe even novel techniques combining elements of machine 
learning and argumentation. The second issue would be to make these complex 
systems more understandable, influenceable and persuasive from the perspective 
of the people exploiting them. Argumentation is doubtlessly the key here. 
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Appendix 
Theorem 5.3 Let x be a parameter comprised between 0 and 1. Let p(w) 
and 27)(w) be the roots of the quadratic equation in the variable p 
2 	 z2 
(1 + TvZ p2 - (2P(W) IT) p P(w)2 = 0 
where we assume that p(w) < 15(w) and z corresponds to the 1 — x/2 percentile 
of the standard normal distribution A1(0,1). Then, 1(w) = [p(w), p(w)] is an 
approximate (1 — x)100% confidence interval for the true probability p(w). 
Proof Consider some fixed scenario w E S2 and the random variable X : 	R 
defined Vw, E SZ as X(wi ) = 1 if w, = w and 0 otherwise. Let X1, 	XN E 
{0, 1} be a random sample of N observations of X and X = EiN_, xi be the 
sample mean. If p(w) is the true probability of w, then X has a unit binomial 
distribution with success p(w). The mean and variance of this distribution exist 
and are respectively equal to it = p(w) and a2 = p(w)(1 — p(w)). If N is large, 
then by the central limit theorem, the random variable 
Z = 	[X — 
has an approximate standard normal distribution. Thus, Pr(—z < Z < z) = 
1 — x, or equivalently Pr(Z 2 < z2 ) = 1 — x, which yields by definition of the 
random variable Z 
Pr 
(N  (X 
 — P(. ))2 < z
2) = 1 - x 
P(W)(1  P(W)) 
and after simplification 
Pr ((1 + 	p2 — (2X- + -.=z2 ) p + < 0) = 1 — x iv 
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hence the solutions of the above-mentioned quadratic equation. 	 El 
Property 5.1 Every Choquet capacity of order k > 2 is also a Choquet ca-
pacity of order k' = 2,3,..., k. 
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that for any integer k > 2, if p is a Choquet 
capacity of order k then it is also a Choquet capacity of order k — 1. Let then 
p be a Choquet capacity of order k. Let also A1 , Ak _ i C Si be a family of 
k — 1 events. We may introduce Ak = 0. We have by hypothesis on p 
(U AJ)= P (U Ai)> E 	n 
If k E K, then n3EK Aj  = 0, and since p is a monotone measure, it satisfies in 
particular p(0) = 0. Therefore, we have in fact 
U 	E 	(-1)1 K'lit (n Ai) 
j=1 jEK 
K00 
and thus p is also a Choquet capacity of order k —1. 	 ❑  
Property 5.2 Every Choquet capacity of order 2 is a lower probability. 
Proof. Let p be a Choquet capacity of order 2 and D the set of all probability 
distributions that dominate p 
D = fpiVE C SZ, p(E) < p(E)} 
Let us introduce the function q : 20 	[0,1] defined for every event E as 
q(E) = E p({w}) 
wEE 
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j=1 	 j=1 	 jEK 
k-1 
Ai ) 
Since p is a Choquet capacity of order 2, we have for every event E 
,u(E) ti(S1) - µ(S2- E) <1 - 	p({wl) = 1 - q(E) 
wEE 
Let us now define p : St -4.1R. for every scenario w as 
p(w) = 1- q({w}) + 
We have q({w}) = p({wl) < p(51) = 1 and q(12) < p(12) = 1 by monotonicity 
of p, hence p is positive. Moreover, it is easy to check that p is normalised and 
thus defines a probability distribution. Finally, p dominates 1- q, which in turn 
dominates p. Finally, p E D and D is guaranteed to be a non-empty set. Let 
then P be the lower probability defined by the credal set D. For every event 
E and every p E D, we have ,a(E) < p(E) and consequently 1.(E) < P(E). 
For every event E, OCECO and since p is a monotone measure we have 
0 < p(E) < 1. There exists therefore a probability distribution pE such that 
pE(E) = ,u(E). This implies notably that pE E D. Therefore, P(E) < ,u(E). 
Finally, we have P = ,u, so p is indeed a lower probability. 	 0 
Property .1. Given an imprecise probability with credal set D, the lower and 
upper variances of a gamble X defined by [Walley, 1991) as 
V(X) = Ipni-7;Vp(X), V(X) = npagVp(X) 
where Vp(X) = Ep((X - Ep(X))2 ), are in the case of the dialectical probability 
equal to 
V(X) = (1 - e A ) (E3 A (X 2 ) - (1 - eA)EL(X)) + E A min(7 (X)) 
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V(x) = -(1 - CA) (4, (x2 ) - (1 - EA )E?,A (x)) - EA Illax(7(X)) 
where y(X) = (1 — € A )X 2 — 2(1 — E A )Ep A(X)X. 
Proof. This result can be obtained by application of Lagrangian duality, see 
[Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004]. The detailed calculus is omitted. 	❑  
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